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ABSTRACT 
This thesis answers the question: Has the throughput of patients in public hospitals 
changed since the introduction of Activity Based Funding? A multi-case study of one 
New South Wales Metropolitan and one Regional Local Health District, was conducted. 
Hospital admissions and visits to Emergency Departments of patients with chronic 
diseases, are analysed over the period 2009 to 2013. Changes in patient throughput 
are identified, and seven possible explanations for these changes, such as a change 
in demography of patients or a change in clinical practice, are explored. An index (the 
PARI) was developed from which the potential revenue and resource implications for 
each clinical condition, in each hospital, in each Local Health District, are examined. 
The findings from this study are discussed within the theoretical framework of Alford’s 
(1974) structure interests at three levels: first, the micro level (public hospitals and 
patient care); second, the meso level (public health policy for publicly-owned and 
operated health services); and third, the macro level (the role of the state vis-à-vis 
capital accumulation, interest groups and the global health market).  
It is concluded that, many patients who were ‘eligible’ to be treated in a setting other 
than that of an inpatient, were admitted to hospital for their treatment. Activity Based 
Funding has, however resulted in patients spending fewer days in hospital. The 
implications of these findings are that: (i) the ‘bio-medical’ model of the provision of 
health care will continue, and the interest of current interest groups preserved; (ii) the 
increasing amounts of public expenditure to the private sector, means less funding is 
available for publicly-owned and operated health services; and (iii) more of the cost of 
health care is being passed from the taxpayer to the consumer. The greatest change 
in dominant interests, since the work of Alford, is the growing influence of multi-national 
companies that supply health-related goods and infrastructure globally, which hinders 
the development of a competitively strong domestic industry.  
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INTRODUCTION  
This thesis answers the question: Has the throughput of patients in public 
hospitals changed since the introduction of Activity Based Funding? A 
nationally consistent approach to Activity Based Funding (ABF) was 
introduced in 2011 as a mechanism from which to fund public hospital 
services following years of debate in Australia about the economic and 
technical efficiency of the current health system, and whether it will continue 
to be affordable (Council of Australian Government [COAG] 2011).  
On the one hand, it has been claimed that Australia cannot afford the 
projected increasing cost of the now well-entrenched ‘bio-medical’ model of 
Western medicine, which predominantly consists of the treatment of disease 
in hospital (Blewett 2000). Many economists and health policy experts have 
reinforced this opinion in numerous publications (Boxall & Gillespie 2013; 
Duckett, Breadon, Weidmann & Nicola 2014). On the other hand, it has been 
claimed that there is no real affordability crisis, and that the proportion of 
expenditure on health care is affordable, and therefore Australia is in a strong 
position to meet future increases in the cost of health care (Scotton 1995; 
Richardson 2005).   
The position adopted in this thesis is that concern about the future 
affordability of health services is only one of the many reasons of why there 
are persistent calls for reform of the health system. There has also been a 
change in the health care needs of the population in Australia, and the current 
provision of health services, which are mainly provided through public 
hospitals and Medicare payments to doctors, is not meeting those needs 
(Johnston & Duffield 2002; Baum 2008; Barraclough & Gardner 2008; Boxall 
& Gillespie 2013).  
The most recent attempt to reform the health system was in 2011, when the 
Commonwealth government introduced the National Health Reform (NH 
Reform), of which ABF is a key component (COAG 2011). Under the NH 
Reform Agreement (2011), Medicare Locals (and Super Clinics), which are 
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private entities supported by Commonwealth government grants and 
established through public-private partnerships (PPPs), and Local Hospital 
Networks, which consist of a group of public hospital services located within a 
defined geographic area, were established (COAG 2011, Schedule D & E).  
These entities were expected to work together: (i) to improve the local 
responsiveness to the needs of their communities; (ii) to provide seamless 
care to patients, and (iii) for more of that care to be provided in non-acute 
settings, where appropriate (COAG 2011, Schedule D & E). States also 
agreed to implement a national efficient price for each patient episode of 
hospital care using ABF. Implementation of this funding model was expected 
to improve public hospital efficiency (COAG 2011, Schedule A). An intended 
outcome from implementing ABF is described as service substitution in this 
thesis, where some categories of patient with chronic disease are diverted 
from receiving their treatment as an inpatient in an acute hospital, to a non-
acute service location preferably in the community (COAG 2012). 
If successful, the impact of these initiatives on public hospitals would be that 
fewer people would be admitted to hospital with conditions that were 
potentially able to be treated in a setting other than that of an acute hospital. 
Fewer of these people would present for treatment to an Emergency 
Department, and fewer of those who did present would be admitted to 
hospital. Achieving these outcomes would require changing the behaviour of 
interest groups who, rely on public hospitals for their economic survival, and/or 
who have a vested interest in maintaining the current bio-medical’ model for 
the delivery of health services. 
Whether the objectives of this most recent reform were achievable has been 
met with scepticism, which is reinforced by the history of the unsuccessful 
implementation of other health policies. Many health policy commentators’ 
believe that the implementation of previous policies was unsuccessful 
because they did not changed the known structural, economic and political 
impediments to improving the health system, and that, without addressing 
these impediments, the way that health care is provided would not change 
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greatly (Duckett 1984; Murray & Peetz 2013; Boxall & Gillespie 2013). 
Considering the disquiet about the current health system, the question is - 
why is there such resistance to changing the way in which health care is 
funded and provided? Examination of the role of the state and Alford’s (1975) 
theory of structural interest provides insight into the answer to this question.  
The state’s role in the health system is complex; it is the regulator, funder, 
and provider of many publicly-funded health services: functions which are 
operationalised through regulation and bureaucratic structures, and by the 
development and implementation of health policies. This role enables 
government to have a degree of influence in the health market, to provide 
some public-good, and, at the same time, for it to continue to provide the 
conditions for private property rights to be upheld, and for the accumulation of 
capital from which the state benefits through receiving revenue from taxation 
(Offe & Ronge 2009; Loeppky 2014; Spies-Butcher 2014).  
Examples of health policies that enable the state to operationalise its role 
include Medicare, the Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme (PBS), the 
Therapeutic Goods Administration (TGA), Private Health Insurance (PHI) and 
the NH Reform policies including ABF. These policies are all designed to 
contain public expenditure, and to provide some public benefit, while at the 
same time supporting a market approach to the delivery of health care 
(Griffith 2006; Broom & Primrose 2014). Embedded in these policies are 
opportunities for greater involvement of the private sector in the provision of 
public health services, a government strategy that was introduced with the 
passing of The Private Establishments Act 1982 (Eager et al 2001, p.61). The 
passing of this Act enabled the planned development of private services and 
led the way to the creation of a market, which is now underpinned by 
neoliberal ideology (Eager et al 2001; Stilwell 2011). This market, through 
which health care is provided, contains many interest groups, and the 
activities of these interest groups in maintaining the status quo have been 
cited as the reason why past attempts to reform the health system have been 
consistently unsuccessful (Alford 1975; van Gool 2007; Baker 2014).  
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The problems described above are set against a backdrop where hospitals 
remain the dominant provider of health care, because that is the way health 
care has traditionally been delivered in Australia (Peterson 2005). Providing 
health care in a centralised location is claimed to be efficient, because it 
enables a limited number of trained health professionals to provide care to 
more people, and allows the most efficient use of expensive equipment. 
Hospital administrators, health professionals, and some communities who 
rely on their local hospital for employment, continue to use these arguments 
to secure the largest possible proportion of available public health funding for 
their hospitals, and in doing so maintain public hospitals as the dominant 
health service provider – maintenance of the status quo (Evans, Gil-Soo Han 
& Madison 2006). 
However, the main focus of the thesis is to examine, at a micro level, changes 
in the use of services in public hospitals to answer the research question: Has 
the throughput of patients in public hospitals changed since the introduction 
of Activity Based Funding? The aim of the thesis is to identify whether ABF 
has changed patient throughput using three chronic diseases each of which 
has been identified as potentially able to be managed in a setting other than 
that of an acute hospital (Australian Institute Health and Welfare [AIHW] 
2015). Analysed are: (i) the number of patients with chronic obstructive 
airways disease, or diabetes, or cellulitis admitted to hospitals that receive 
ABF; (ii) those patients’ mode of access to, and destination from, hospital; 
and (iii) the balance between the potential revenue available and the 
resources required to treat those patients. Where statistically significant 
changes in these parameters are observed, possible explanations for those 
changes are explored, and conclusions are drawn.  
Understanding whether the implementation of ABF has resulted in change, or 
not, and who benefits most, has both political and health policy relevance. 
This thesis will provide timely new knowledge, which will be useful to health 
managers and policy makers, by providing a baseline for future health policy, 
practice and research. Additionally, using a political economy approach, the 
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thesis makes a case for taking the influence of interest groups into account in 
the evaluation of the reasons for the success (or otherwise) of health policies 
such as ABF.  
This thesis has seven chapters, the contribution of each chapter to answering 
the research question is as follows.  
Chapter One presents the theoretical framework used to describe the socio-
economic and political environment in which public health services are funded 
and delivered in Australia. This environment is the context in which the NH 
Reform has been introduced, (a component of which is ABF), and on which 
its success is dependent. This theoretical framework draws on the work of 
Alford (1975) and other authors who have claimed that interest groups, such 
as clinicians, administrators, private and public companies, and other 
agencies, which are reliant on public hospitals for their economic survival, 
have a vested interest in maintaining hospitals as the dominant provider of 
health care. This is in spite of the knowledge that the many medical 
treatments which hospitals offer, may not meet the health needs of those 
suffering from chronic disease. The influence of vested interests in the 
formulation and implementation of health policy (meso level), and how those 
dominant and challenging interests use their influence locally, and with 
government, to secure health policies that are favourable to their achieving 
their business objectives, are discussed. Applying the theory of structural 
interests enables analysis of the existing interests (and interest groups), and 
their influence on the implementation of ABF, and other health policies at a 
micro (hospital/consumer), meso (state) and macro (global) level. It is 
important to understand the interconnections among these three policy levels, 
because each has the potential to influence the success (or otherwise) of the 
implementation of ABF.  
Chapter Two presents the methodology in two sections, each of which 
describe separate but interrelated methods necessary to answer the research 
question. Section one presents the research design of a multi-case study of 
one Metropolitan (Western Sydney) and one Regional (Hunter New England) 
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Local Health District1. The selection of these two Local Health Districts for 
analysis, will show whether there are different impacts of ABF in different 
locations, and it will enable demographic differences in Metropolitan and 
Regional Local Health Districts to be examined. Demographic differences 
influence: the type and mix of local health services; the ease of patients’ 
access to health services; clinical referral patterns; clinical and social support 
for patients after discharge from hospital; and funding arrangements. The 
selection of these two Local Health Districts has the added benefit that it will 
enable the analysis to establish that each Local Health District selected is 
reasonably representative of other Local Health Districts in its group. This is 
important to enable the findings from this research to be generalisable beyond 
the two Local Health Districts under study. 
Section two of this chapter describes the quantitative methods used to select 
for analysis: those hospitals that receive ABF, the three clinical conditions, 
(chronic obstructive airways disease, diabetes and cellulitis), and the data 
variables used in the analysis. In describing how data are managed and 
analysed, and for what purpose, the many biases that could affect the 
interpretation of data, which might result in the assertion of a causal relationship 
which does not in fact exist, are discussed. To mitigate this risk, for any 
significant change in patient throughput, seven possible explanations are 
explored, such as a change in demography of patients, or a change in clinical 
practice, or a change community morbidity and/or health policy. Finally, 
changes in patient throughput have financial consequences, which, when 
known, enable a more complete analysis of the implications of the introduction 
of ABF for public hospitals. A method to identify change in the balance between 
potential available revenue from ABF and the resources required (but not 
actually used) to treat patients in those hospitals, is developed.   
Chapter Three presents the incentives for State governments to sign the 
National Health Reform Agreement (2011), the salient elements contained in 
that Agreement; and the infrastructure established for its implementation. By 
                                            
1 Local Health District is equivalent to a Local Hospital Network in NSW 
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providing a description of the model of ABF from which public hospital 
services are funded, and how it was operationalised in New South Wales 
(NSW), the history of the development of ABF and the complexity of its 
implementation are conveyed. The disease classification system - Diagnosis 
Related Groups which is the basis for coding each patient’s episode of care, 
on which ABF operates is then discussed. It is important to understand this 
classification system because it is the basis on which data have been 
selected (and analysed) to answer the research question.  
Chapters Four, Five and Six deal respectively with chronic obstructive 
airways disease, diabetes and cellulitis. Each chapter presents the number of 
admissions to hospital, and visits to Emergency Departments over the five-
year period of the study, 2009 to 2013. Each chapter also presents the 
balance between the potentially available revenue and the resources used in 
the treatment of patients for each hospital, for each clinical condition, for 
those patients who might reasonably be expected to be treated in a setting 
other than that of an acute hospital. The discussion of the findings from each 
of these analysis contributes to the final conclusion drawn, which answers the 
research question.  
Chapter Seven presents the conclusion drawn from the analyses, and 
discusses the health policy implications at three levels. First, the micro level 
(public hospitals and patient care); second, the meso level (public health 
policy for publicly-owned and operated health services); and third, the macro 
level (the role of the state vis-à-vis capital accumulation, interest groups and 
the global health market). This approach provides a comprehensive picture of 
the implications of health policy decisions on public-good.  
It is concluded that the implementation of the policy of ABF has not changed 
patient throughput or the practice and/or behaviour of interest groups in the 
ways that were intended. The implications at a micro level are that, the 
dominant ‘bio-medical’ model of the provision of health care will continue, and 
the interest of current interest groups will be preserved. The implication of 
current health policies (the meso level) is that, more of the cost of health care 
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is being passed from the taxpayer to the consumer. Additionally, as a 
consequence of the diversion of increasing amounts of public expenditure to 
the private sector, less funding is available for publicly-owned and operated 
health services. The implication of the growing interdependence of multi-
national companies and the state (the macro level) is that, it has enabled 
these companies to dominate the global supply of health-related goods and 
infrastructure, which hinders the development of a competitively strong 
domestic industry for the provision of these items. 
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Chapter 1:  The political economy of health  
 
1.1 Introduction  
This thesis contends that the power of interests embedded within existing 
arrangements should be incorporated in studies that examine, at a micro level, 
the impact of meso level policies such as the NH Reform and its policy of 
Activity Based Funding (ABF). This is particularly important for ABF because 
the aim of the national policy is to make the provision of hospital services 
more efficient, which will be evident (or not) when changes in the throughput 
of patients admitted to hospital are examined. Changing patterns of patient 
throughput will require a change in the practice and/or behaviour of clinicians 
and other staff working at the micro level (that is in public hospitals). The 
process of change begins with engaging these interest groups, and if that 
engagement is not successful the status-quo will remain. For example, a 
senior clinician recently stated: ‘If today I walk into a hospital ward and ask the 
doctors: What is ABF? – I believe that no-one would be able to tell me. If I 
asked them: How has ABF changed your work practice? The response is 
likely to be, “in here, it is business as usual!” (Personal Communication 2014). 
Thus the degree of success in implementing ABF will be influenced by the 
degree to which clinicians are engaged. 
Clinical practice at the micro level (hospital) is also influenced by other 
interests. As will be shown in this Chapter, the behaviour of these other 
interest groups is self-serving and is influenced by the culture embedded in 
their respective professions. As well as the organisation in which they work: 
the unions who represent their interests, large corporations which provide 
health related goods and services, and others who have a vested political 
interest in maintaining the status quo at the micro, meso and macro-levels. 
Thus the degree of success in implementing policies such as ABF is 
influenced by the level of support for that policy by a range of interests groups 
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within the wider community and who participate in the market for health 
services (hospital and community). 
To provide a better understanding of the reasons why health reform had been 
consistently unsuccessful, Alford (1975) categorised the interests and interest 
groups in the health system of the United States (US). His categorisation 
showed how dominant and challenging interests and groups maintained their 
influence, and how they continued to obtain support from the state (Alford 
1975). As a result, the process of capital accumulation was maintained, some 
of the benefits of which flow back to the state from the revenue it receives 
through taxation. 
These interest groups were described by Alford (1975) as: (i) corporate 
rationalisers, who comprise administrators and planners who control public 
hospitals, medical schools and government agencies; (ii) professional 
monopolies, who comprise physicians, bio-medical researchers, not-for-profit 
hospitals and others who benefit from autonomy, independence and control 
over their work conditions; and (iii) repressed structural interests, who 
comprise consumers, community people, and minorities who are marginal to 
the system, but who often come together to work on a specific issue or need, 
and who are easily co-opted by more powerful others (Taylor 1977). Duckett 
(1984) used these three categories to look beyond the interest groups 
themselves, and to understand the broader interests which were being served 
by their activities in the Australian health system.  
Since the publication of Alford’s (1975) research findings, there has been a 
change in which interest groups are the most dominant, and new interest 
groups have emerged. Checkland, Harrison and Coleman (2009) claimed that 
the role of some ‘corporate rationalisers’ had changed, and that hospitals (as 
corporate entities) had emerged to form a new category of interests which 
they called ‘corporate monopolists’. As shown by Checkland et al (2009), and 
as was acknowledged by Alford (1975), the dominant and challenging 
interests and interest groups will change over time, and therefore the theory 
of structural interests will evolve. 
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The contributions of Duckett (1984) and Checkland et al (2009) expanded 
Alford’s theory of structural interests, although they have not altered it 
substantially. The theory remains relevant as a tool for: (i) categorising 
interest groups, (ii) identifying whose interests they serve, and (iii) elucidating 
the extent to which these interest groups might influence the formulation of 
health policy. Before describing the current interest groups, the political 
context in which health services are funded and provided is presented. It is 
important to understand the role of the state in the health market, and the 
mechanisms that it has adopted in operationalising its role, because it is 
through these structures and processes that the political economy of health 
becomes apparent.  
The structure of the chapter is as follows. The chapter explores the role of the 
state, the economic and political disposition of government, and why the state 
supports the process of capital accumulation. Various interest groups, and 
the interdependence between these groups and the state, are identified. The 
extent to which the state and these groups share a common interest in 
supporting a market approach to the delivery of health services is established 
by examining four current health policies. This examination also shows the 
influence of an ideology that, promotes the rights of private property, on the 
modus operandi of all these interests, and the subsequent implications for the 
state in its meeting its obligations to provide public-good in health: i.e. ‘a good 
or service that it is not possible to exclude people from consuming once any 
is produced’ (Culyer 2005, p. 280). 
 
1.2 Political economy context  
Australia is a capitalist democratic state: its laws and regulations protect the 
rights of owners of private property; it obtains its revenue through taxation; it 
promotes the conditions that support capital accumulation, and its 
government is democratically elected by its people (Offe & Ronge 1975; 
Stilwell 2011). The role of the state in a capitalist democratic society is to 
govern, and it does this through the passage of laws, regulations and policies. 
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Among the many regulations implemented and monitored by the state, the 
state provides regulations for the collection of revenue through taxation, and 
its subsequent redistribution (Hollingsworth & Boyer 1997; Duckett & Willcox 
2011). Without tax revenue the capacity of the state to influence economic 
and policy decision-making would be seriously diminished (Offe & Ronge 
1975). 
The redistribution of the state’s surplus resources includes, appropriately, the 
provision of public-good that benefits the general population, such as publicly-
funded health services. However, this role competes with the state’s informal 
obligation to those interest groups which also provide (private) health 
services, which have often helped the government to a position of power. 
This interdependence between government and interest groups has resulted 
in public health policies (and the success of their implementation) being 
strongly influenced by political ideology, and by vested interests, as shown in 
the history of Medicare (Stilwell 2011; Legge, Gleeson, Lofdren & Townsend 
2014).  
Since the introduction of Medibank in 1974 by the Whitlam Labor government, 
the scheme has undergone a series of changes, each driven by the ideology 
of the government of the day (Boxall & Gillespie 2013). In 1976, the Fraser 
Conservative Coalition government increased the involvement of private 
enterprise in the health market, a move which was supported by the 
Australian Medical Association (Scotton & Ferber 1978, 1980; Jennett & 
Stewart 1990). The result of that policy was similar to that experienced as a 
result of the introduction of the Menzies Conservative Coalition government’s 
health policy (1950), where the health needs of the most vulnerable groups in 
society became less well-protected (Scotton & Ferber 1980; Boxall & 
Gillespie 2013).  
In the early 1980’s, following its election, the Hawke Labor government 
introduced Medicare, which was similar to Medibank (Boxall & Gillipsie 2013). 
Medicare was designed to provide ‘universal access to health services’ with 
the emphasis on subsidising the cost of the health care which people 
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received (Jennett & Stewart 1990, p. 223). However, there was no 
intervention to alter the organisation of the delivery of health care, and thus 
the ‘bio-medical’ model of the delivery of health services remained dominant 
(Jennett & Stewart 1990).  
Although public opinion continued to support Medicare, it was rejected by the 
Australian Medical Association, and was the cause of the 1984-1985 doctors’ 
dispute (Jennett & Stewart 1990). In 2004, universal health insurance and a 
Medicare safety net were introduced, but in 2013 the protection afforded by 
the Medicare safety net was lowered (Spies-Butcher 2014; Bundey 2014). In 
2014, the Abbott Conservative Coalition government announced a $20 
reduction in the rebate for short General Practitioner visits, and a freeze on 
non-General Practitioner Medicare rebates, which would hinder peoples’ 
access to diagnostic testing, to the medications available under the PBS, and 
to other health-related services, thus further eroding the integrity of Medicare 
(Bundey 2014).  
In an ABC News program the former Prime Minister Tony Abbott was quoted 
as saying that his party’s policy on co-payment measures gave a much-
needed ‘price signal’ to the market, thus demonstrating the party’s view that 
health care is a commodity, which will respond to the market principles of 
demand and supply (Woodruff 2015). As shown by Chester (2014), essential 
public services such as health care do not operate in this neoclassical way, 
and those people in greatest need are not well served by such policies.  
More recently, The Commonwealth Minister of Health, Susan Ley M.P., 
announced in a Media Release a review of Medicare (Medical Benefits 
Schedule), which was triggered by the perception of the unaffordability of the 
continuing escalating cost of publicly-funded health services (Ley 2015).  
The continuous oscillation between the ideology of Conservative Coalition 
and Labor governments in the formulation of health policy, in an environment 
where the policies of both parties are influenced by the values underpinning 
capitalist society, has resulted in the occurrence of incremental change, 
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which has eroded the public-good component of Medicare (Scotton & Ferber 
1978; Jennett & Stewart 1990; Spies-Butcher 2014). Following this long and 
politically-fraught-process, which has spanned 42 years, the demise of 
Medicare is now thought to be imminent (Jennett & Stewart 1990).   
One potential consequence of the demise of Medicare is that it will lead to the 
erosion of the integrity of other health policies, thus providing an opportunity 
for even greater involvement of the private sector in the provision of health 
services, for more public monies to flow from the public to the private sector, 
and for more of the cost burden of health care to be passed from the taxpayer 
to the consumer (Spices-Butcher 2014; Bundey 2014). As examples, the 
PBS, the TGA, and PHI policies have been examined to identify the intent of 
each, who benefits most from their implementation, and whether the integrity 
of these policies is also being eroded.  
In Australia, the PBS was established in 1944 by the Curtin Labor 
government, to ‘include drugs with some evidence of efficacy’ (Boxall & 
Gillespie 2013, p. 26). The cost of the PBS to the taxpayer is now about $8.8 
billion annually, and as a consequence, greater emphasis is now being given 
to containing expenditure (PBS 2013). While its core objectives remain, the 
Scheme has undergone change, as a result of which consumers now 
contribute to the cost of their medication – an intended goal of neoliberal-type 
health policies (Ewig 2009; Baker 2014). The success of this Scheme in 
containing expenditure has been celebrated, and it is being copied by other 
countries, but the effect of this policy on improving the health of individuals or 
the population has never been examined in Australia, and its impact on health 
outcomes is unknown (Gardner 1996). What is known is that the introduction 
of a policy of co-payments, where patients share some of the cost of their 
medication with the state, shifts costs from the taxpayer to the consumer, and 
can result in the poor not obtaining medications when they need them most 
(Bundey 2014).  
The TGA is another example of a health policy that, again supports the 
involvement of the private sector by providing a secure market for the sale of 
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their goods to public hospitals and other service providers (TGA 2013). The 
TGA was established in Australia as the mechanism for government to control 
product standards, and to contain expenditure on a wide range of goods such 
as prostheses, devices and intravenous fluids (Gardner 1996; Richardson 
2005). The TGA has earned international respect for the economic success of 
its standard-setting and pricing policy. It is now a World Health Organization 
(WHO) Collaborating Centre for changing standards - but there is little 
evidence of evaluation of its impact on any social objective (Gardner 1996). 
Nor has its contribution to the public-good, by improving the health of 
individuals or the population, ever been evaluated.  
The supply of health services is strongly influenced by the Private Health 
Insurance Act 2007, (and associated regulations) (Australian Government 
[AG] 2013). Through the Australian Government Rebate, the legislation 
regulating PHI enables the private health insurance industry to receive 
indirect annual financial subsidies from government costing $5.5 billion 
annually, with the advertised aim of increasing competition in the health 
market and thus lowering prices (Boxall & Gillespie 2013; Spies-Butcher 
2014).  
Even though there had been an overall reduction in the uptake of private 
health insurance, membership has grown recently, driven by incentives such 
as ‘avoidance of tax penalties or fears of higher premiums in later life..’ 
(Boxall & Gillespie 2013, p. 173). A perception also exists that those who 
have private health insurance will receive priority access to health services, 
and those who do not will find that they are put on a waiting list and will 
experience delays in their access to health care (Boxall & Gillespie 2013). In 
fact, the outcome of this policy has been to inhibit competition, and to reduce 
the overall uptake of private insurance by older people, which, in turn, has put 
more pressure on public hospital beds (Deeble 2009). Such negative 
outcomes are likely to be compounded by the reduction in the total number of 
public hospital beds per head of population, which was reported by Bundey 
(2014).   
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There is also evidence that many people who have private health insurance 
do not use it when they go to hospital. Seah, Cheong and Anstey (2013), 
estimated that the cost to public hospitals of the10 per cent of patients who 
have private health insurance, but who, when admitted to a public hospital 
choose not to use it, is of the order of $588 million annually. Financially, 
private health insurers benefit from this practice, which is reported to be 
because patients discover that the outcome of the cost of treatment in hospital 
is not met by their private health insurance cover (Seah et al 2013).   
In spite of the negative impact of this policy, the Commonwealth government 
is considering giving even greater power to private health insurers, by 
allowing them to limit the price paid for treating patients in publicly-funded 
health services – a strategy aimed at containing costs. Dr Brian Owler, the 
previous President of the NSW Australian Medical Association, spoke out 
about the negative consequences for the Australian health system if the 
government were to give this level of power to the private insurance industry 
(Seven Thirty Report 2014). Again, the contribution that this policy has made 
to improving the health of individuals or the population, remains unevaluated 
and unclear, but there is a growing concern that, as a result of incremental 
changes to the PHI policy, access to health care is increasingly becoming a 
two-tier system (Richardson 2005). This example also shows the ease with 
which taxpayers funds are diverted to the private sector through financial 
subsidies which are embedded in health policies.  
The policies contained in the NH Reform also provide some public good and 
encourage greater involvement of the private sector in the provision of health 
services. However, these policies are different from those described above, 
because cooperation of the States, the private sector, and other interest 
groups is required for their successful implementation. Commonwealth/State 
relations are complex as shown using the history of the development of ABF.  
 
The origin of the policy of ABF, which determines how hospital services are 
now funded, began in 1988, when the then Labor Federal Minister for Health, 
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Dr Neil Blewett, incorporated provision for progressing casemix funding using 
Diagnosis Related Groups (DRGs) in the Medicare Agreement (Leeder 1999; 
Duckett 2007). This decision led the way for the Medicare Agreement (which 
is negotiated every five-years) to become the vehicle, that the Commonwealth 
government uses to obtain agreement with the States, for implementation of 
certain health reforms (Leeder 1999).  
 
Casemix funding for public hospitals was based on the average cost (price) of 
treating each patient according to their disease and its severity (Leeder 1999). 
Both the Conservative Coalition and Labor governments believed that 
casemix funding could contain expenditure in public hospitals, and both 
supported the process of refining the model of casemix funding for use in 
Australia. In 1993, the newly appointed Kennett Conservative Coalition 
government in Victoria introduced casemix funding as a mechanism for 
funding its public hospitals. At the same time as casemix funding was 
introduced, the Victorian government rationalised hospital services, and 
removed $220 million from the health budget (Hancock 1999 p.141). The 
State made no provision for enhancement of the availability of, or access to, 
health services in the community (Hancock 1999).  
 
The Victorian experience showed that casemix funding was a viable 
alternative to the previous method of funding public hospitals in terms of 
economic efficiency. In 1996 the Olsen Conservative Coalition government in 
South Australia under its policy of privatisation, introduced casemix funding, 
and other States followed soon after (Handcock 1999). Even today there is 
insufficient research to know what the impact was of casemix funding on 
patient care, but this lack of information did not slow the pace of its adoption 
(Hancock 1999). In 2008 at a meeting of the Council of Australian 
Governments (COAG), the States agreed in principle to introduce a national 
approach to the funding of public hospital services (Department of Health 
[DoH] 2011). This in-principle agreement was realised in 2011, when the then 
Federal Labor Minister for Health and Ageing, Nicola Roxon negotiated with 
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the States (and Territories) to introduce a national approach to funding 
hospital services, which was ABF. The NH Reform Agreement (Clause 18), 
requires a review of the Reform in 2015-16, and an evaluation of the 
implementation of ABF. The outcome of the evaluation of ABF was due on 31 
May 2016 (Independent Hospital Pricing Authority [IHPA] 2013). At the time of 
writing this thesis a search of the IHPA web-site for the outcome of this 
evaluation showed ‘no publications found’.  
 
The formulation of all these policies is built on the perception that Australia 
cannot afford the projected increasing costs of the now entrenched model of 
Western medicine, and therefore emphasis is rightly placed on curtailing 
public expenditure (Duckett 1984; Blewett 2000; Duckett & Willcox 2011). 
Many economists and health policy experts have reinforced this opinion in 
numerous publications (Hollingsworth & Peacock 2008; Boxall & Gillespie 
2013; Duckett et al 2014). In a recent; Federation Discussion Paper (2015), 
public expenditure on health care was reported to be $100 billion dollars 
annually (Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet [DPMC} 2015). 
In 2010, Australia’s expenditure on health care accounted for over nine per 
cent of its Gross Domestic Product (Organisation for Economic Cooperation 
and Development [OECD] 2013). This level of expenditure is similar to that of 
the United Kingdom or Japan, and less than that of Canada or the US (OECD 
2013). Therefore, when compared with the level of Gross Domestic Product 
expenditure in other OECD countries, the argument that the level of 
expenditure on health care is not affordable does not stand up well to 
scrutiny. This point was made by Richardson (2005) when he reported that 
the current expenditure on health care is affordable, and that Australia is in a 
strong position to meet future increases in the cost of health care. The 
question then becomes: why is the state (represented by government and 
politicians’) reluctant to invest more of the state’s resources in the health 
budget?   
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One explanation is that the state gains no short-term benefit from investing 
more of its resources in the health system. Publicly-funded health services do 
not produce a product that can be exchanged in the market, and therefore 
they do not contribute directly to capital accumulation. Their contribution to 
accumulation is through labour power, enabling an increase in overall 
economic productivity as a result of the state having a healthier workforce 
(Chave 1987). This long-term and convoluted cycle of return on investment 
means that the gain from any investment of revenue in health services does 
not result in measurable economic outcomes in the short-term (Johnson 
2011a).  
If the government wished to invest more in the health budget it could do so by 
reducing its current level of funding in another portfolio, and by re-investing 
the funds gained in health. This strategy of disinvestment and reinvestment is 
not often pursued, because it has been known to create political tension. As 
pointed out by Offe and Ronge (1975), maintaining the status quo and doing 
nothing is the approach which is taken most often.  
Another reason which is cited for politicians choosing to do nothing, in the 
absence of disinvestment, is that any increase in funding to publicly-funded 
services will only occur if individuals and/or households are prepared to give 
more money for public spending through increased taxation. While people 
want access to quality health care when they are ill, they do not want to pay 
more for it, and politicians are always reluctant to raise taxes (McTaggart, 
Fudlay & Parkins 1996).  
Given these explanations of why there is reluctance to invest more of the 
state’s resources in the health system, an alternative option is for politicians 
to support the creation of a health market, which was facilitated in Australia 
with the passing of The Private Establishments Act 1982 (Eager et al 2001). 
This option is attractive to governments of most Western countries, including 
Australia, because the ideology that underpins this market is consistent with 
that which underpins capitalism per se (Broom & Primrose 2014). An added 
attraction for supporting the creation of a health market is that it has the 
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potential to deflect the responsibility for the decisions about, and the 
operation of, some health policies from the public to the private sector, thus 
absolving politicians from having to make unpopular decisions (Anderson 
2014).  
The nature of the health market requires further explanation. Globally, the 
health market has evolved from being an oligopoly, where power and control 
of the market was in the hands of the few, to being more pluralist, consisting 
of powerful social institutions, and professional, corporate and community 
interests, where power is shared more generally among interest groups in 
ways that enable each to meet their own objectives (Feingold 1977; 
Checkland et al 2009). Under these circumstances convergences and 
conflicts between interests and interest groups will inevitably occur, but the 
players understand the rules of any engagement, and their interests are likely 
to converge over time, to their mutual benefit (Hollingsworth & Boyer 1997). 
However, this market is changing rapidly to become neoliberal, which Mikler 
(2012) has suggested will ultimately force the state to adopt a similar role to 
that of a large corporation. Under such conditions government is likely to 
become even more open to trading-off its public-good responsibilities in 
return for economic prosperity.  
Neoliberal ideology contends that markets are efficient and self-regulating, 
and that government involvement is useful, but required only to provide those 
public goods and services that private enterprise has no interest in providing 
because they do not generate a direct economic return on their investment 
(Stilwell 2012). The best use of public spending is seen to be when it creates 
employment in the private sector, thus supporting a market approach to the 
delivery of services, where individual responsibility and freedom of choice rule 
(Stillwell 2011). In addition, opening state borders to free trade is viewed as 
positive, because it will ‘ultimately’ benefit all (George 2013, p. 10).  
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However, in the terminology of economics, the health market is a failed 
market, because it does not satisfy the attributes of a free competitive market 
(Spies-Butcher 2014). In a free market it is believed that, consumer demand 
for a particular commodity (product or service) will drive the supply of that 
commodity to the point where an equilibrium is reached. At this point the price 
of the commodity should stabilize; if the demand is greater than the supply the 
price will rise and if the supply is greater than the demand the price will fall. 
These conditions do not apply in health. For example: the price for each 
episode of care in hospital, which is set by the Independent Hospital Pricing 
Authority (an independent Government agency), is governed by the ABF 
policy, clearly demonstrating that the health market is not self-regulating 
(IHPA 2011; Stilwell 2011). This failed market can only operate successfully 
with the involvement of government, its legislation and associated regulations 
and policies (Stilwell 2012). Cahill and Paton (2011, p. 12) claim that the 
‘involvement of government, its regulations and policies is, in fact, necessary 
for markets to develop’. Many of the state regulations and policies now bear 
the hallmarks of neoliberal ideology, the impact of which is now discussed 
(George 2013).  
The NH Reform contains two distinct but related policies which, when 
combined, support a market approach to the delivery of health services in 
practice, up-holding the neoliberal principles of: private property rights, free 
markets, and the opening of state borders to trade (Peck 2010; Stilwell 2012). 
The two policies are: ABF which is designed to improve efficiency in publicly-
funded Local Hospital Networks, and the creation of public-private 
partnerships which are designed to create Medicare Local and Super Clinics 
in the private sector (COAG 2011).  
ABF is designed to contain health care expenditure in the public sector. The 
intended effect of ABF on hospital services is a reduction in the cost of each 
patient’s episode of care bought about by improved economic efficiency, 
which is likely to arise from a decline in the length-of-stays of patients in 
hospital. A decline in the length-of-stay will result in an increase in the number 
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of patients who, on discharge from hospital, require on-going health care in 
the community. The state encourages the private sector to provide this care 
on a fee-for-service basis, either paid for by the consumer direct, or by 
Medicare under the auspice of Medicare Locals or Super Clinics. Entities 
which have been established using Commonwealth grants. These entities can 
expand their services to include diagnostic testing and/or to form alliances 
with large corporations (international) for services to be provided at a one-
stop-shop. The private sector is therefore able to access taxpayer dollars to 
establish, grow and maintain their business, while, at the same time, public 
sector services are constrained. There is government regulation, but little 
control over the total price paid by consumers for services provided by the 
private sector, and consumers are often required to meet more of the cost of 
their health care from their own pocket.  
When there is a relative increase in government expenditure to the private 
sector, as a result of the combined effect of the implementation of such 
policies, it results in a redistribution of wealth (Ryan 2016). Such policies 
demonstrate that the state is captured by, and continues to support, the 
development of a market for health, which Peck (2010) and other authors 
describe as ‘actually existing’ neoliberalism. The state’s influence in this 
market may in fact increase, but its responsibility for the direct delivery of 
public good/services is eroded (Cahill 2013).  
A market will purportedly be efficient if there is adequate competition: thus 
from a neoliberal perspective opening state borders to trade is viewed, as 
positive because it will create competition which will ‘ultimately’ benefit all 
(George 2013, p. 10). However regulation and trade agreements which favour 
the private sector, and which enable monopolies to operate supply chains at a 
local, state and global level (micro/meso/macro-levels), have been shown to 
result in less competition in the market and in higher costs to consumers. For 
example, consumers pay more for medications in Australia compared with 
their overseas counterparts (Bundey 2014). 
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The adoption of neoliberal health policies, which encourage a greater 
involvement of the private sector in the delivery of health services, is based 
on a perception that the private sector can provide these services more 
efficiently (Johnson 2011a). However, as noted by Spies-Butcher (2014) 
some public services operate more efficiently than those provided by the 
private sector, because they do not have the same overheads. There is also 
a belief that the flow-on effects of those policies will benefit individuals and 
the community, a belief that has been challenged by a number of authors, 
who report that the main beneficiaries of the outcomes of regulation and 
health policies remain those interest groups which are in dominant positions 
in our society (Feingold 1977; Johnston & Duffield 2002; Checkland 2009; 
Harvey 2012). These dominant interests do not include consumers. 
Although health services would not exist without consumers (the ‘repressed 
structural interests’), consumers have limited power compared with that 
exercised by health professionals and the other interest groups. When 
consumers are ill, their interest is to have access to high-quality health 
services, preferably close to where they live, and at least cost to them. Most 
consumers do not have expert knowledge about their condition, or how to 
navigate the health system, and therefore, when they are ill, they are not in a 
position to make rational choices about which doctor they should see, or 
which hospital has the best outcome for certain procedures, or the best 
record in controlling hospital-acquired infections (Hollingsworth & Peacock 
2008; Davidson 2011; Spies-Butcher 2014). 
Consumers rely on their general practitioner for appropriate care and/or for 
referral to a specialist, or to the Emergency Department of a local hospital which 
is usually of the general practitioner’s choice (Johnston & Duffield 2002; 
Hollingsworth & Peacock 2008; Britt, Miller, Henderson, Charles, Valenti, 
Harrison, Bayram, Chambers, Zhang, Pam, O’Halloran, Pollack 2013). Further, 
many people who are on low incomes do not access health care in a timely way, 
because queues in the public system are long, and they cannot afford the private 
care which may be more immediate (Baker 2014). Therefore, consumers are not 
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in a position to know the type or amount of services required to cure illness or to 
maintain good health, and as a consequence they do not drive demand for 
health services directly. The neoclassical mechanism, of market forces of 
consumer demand driving the supply of goods and services, does not apply in 
the health market.   
In fact, the health market in most OECD countries is supply-driven, where the 
supply of goods and services drive the demand for them (Loeppky 2014). 
Hence governments’ focus on the formulation of health policies that curtail 
expenditure – one of their interests is to cap the supply of health-related 
goods and services in this quasi-market. Examination of the sources of 
supply of health-related goods and services helps to identify who are the 
dominant interest groups today, and whose interests are being served by 
them. These groups are now discussed. 
The supply of medical professional labour in both the private and public 
sectors is controlled by Universities and their associated facilities such as 
medical schools and government agencies (‘corporate rationalisers’). Their 
control is exercised through restricting the number of entrants and graduates, 
and through control over the work conditions of employees (Feingold 1977). 
However, because they do not have control over the medical profession per 
se, or over other elements of the health system, their power is limited 
(Feingold 1977).  
Nevertheless, these agencies remain influential in controlling the number and 
type of health professionals available to the health market, and these 
‘corporate rationalisers’ have a vested interest in maintaining the current ‘bio-
medical’ model of the provision of health care – hospitals, for example, are 
where most health professional graduates have gained their practical 
experience and where they will find employment. Universities and other 
education and training institutions, who rely on public hospitals as a venue for 
the training and education of their students, welcome expansion in these 
facilities, particularly in the light of the recent doubling of intakes to medical 
schools (Medical Training Review Panel [MTRP] 2013). 
The political economy of health 
- 25 - 
 
The supply of labour is, to an extent, also controlled by unions (‘professional 
monopolies’), whose professional self-interest is well-known. Unions work to 
increase their membership by supporting their existing members in improving 
their working conditions and/or wages, and by representing them in industrial 
disputes (McTaggart et al 1996). The Australian Council of Trade Unions 
represents ‘over 150 affiliated unions’, some of whom have members working 
in or for hospitals (Gardner 1996; McTaggart et al 1996, p. 925). Any 
reduction in the level of hospital employment would mean fewer potential 
union members, and therefore less revenue, so that unions also have a 
vested interest in maintaining the status quo.  
In general, unions do not support multi-skilling practices, the removal of 
restrictive work practices, or the loss of any already-gained advantage, but 
they do exercise their power when it is used to support an increase in the 
number of employee positions, using mechanisms such as bargaining for 
change in their respective awards to include new categories of staff, or 
changing the staff work-ratio (Gardner 1996). This latter strategy was 
demonstrated when the NSW Nurses and Midwives Association put forward a 
case to increase the nurse-to-patient ratio from 1: 5 to 1: 4, with the claim that 
increasing the ratio would improve the quality and safety of health care for 
patients (N&MA 2014). No evidence has been found to support the claim that 
those outcomes would be achieved by increasing the number of staff, 
particularly when there has been no previous evidence of changes in their 
work practices in public hospitals (Numata, Schulzer, Van Der Wal, 
Globerman, Semeniuk, Balka & FitzGerald 2006).   
The most influential union in the health sector is claimed to be the Australian 
Medical Association, even though since the early1980s its power has been 
eroded (Gardner 1996). While, the Australian Medical Association supports 
public-private partnerships, and greater involvement of the private sector in 
the provision of health services, it does not support what it deems to be 
‘Socialist medicine’, such as the provision of publicly-owned and funded 
community health services (Jennett & Stewart 1990; Gardner 1996; Blewett 
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2000; Johnston & Duffield 2002; Boxall & Gillespie 2013). The failure of the 
Community Health Program to reduce ‘institutionalisation, or provide a saving 
in health care costs’ has be attributed to the tension which exists between 
health service providers (Hancock 1999, p. 173).  
This Association has been successful in its quest to maintain its members’ 
position at the top of the professional hierarchy in health, and it continues to 
influence the formulation (and implementation) of new health policy, as 
demonstrated by its inclusion as a member on recent health policy 
committees (Ley 2015). Gardner (1996) has claimed that the maintenance of 
doctors’ position at the top of the professional hierarchy is also supported by 
the state, through its continuing to fund orthodox medicine and treatments, 
which in effect also maintain hospitals as the dominant provider of health 
care.  
Whatever the reason, the medical profession has enormous power and 
autonomy in the health system, which gives doctors the capacity to provide 
the best care possible to their patients, and at the same time to maintain their 
own personal and professional interests (Gardner 1996). Their autonomy is 
exemplified by the fact that many doctors work both in public hospitals and 
also in private practice, a model of service provision which, although 
supported by their Award entitlements, is poorly monitored, the outcome of 
which is that public hospital services are open to exploitation.   
These hospitals in which the state is both the funder and provider of health 
care remain the monopoly providers of publicly-funded health services, and, 
as proposed by Checkland et al (2009), public hospitals are now ‘corporate 
monopolists’ (Hollingsworth & Peacock 2008). The goal of public hospital 
managers and administrators (e.g., Chief Executives of Local Health Districts 
in NSW) is at least to maintain their existing level of funding, or to position 
their hospital(s) to obtain a greater share of the total annual funds allocated to 
the health sector (McTaggart et al 1996; Hollingsworth & Peacock 2008).  
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The claim for more funding for hospitals is strongly supported by the interest 
groups which supply hospitals with goods and services and labour, or which 
monitor compliance with the standards contained in the regulations that 
govern both the supply of, and demand for, health services (McTaggart et al 
1996; Hollingsworth & Boyer 1997). The result of this dynamic is that the 
interests of hospital managers and other interest groups, such as the medical 
profession in general, are also progressed by the ‘corporate monopolists’, 
and by other interest groups.   
These other interests include the private and not-for-profit organisations that 
operate outside the public health sector, but which are financially dependent 
on its continuing existence, for example the Red Cross Blood Bank and 
disease-focussed associations such as Juvenile Diabetes, Cancer Care, and 
many more (Feingold 1977). Alford (1975) examined the role of these 
organisations in the health service industry in the context of ‘modern society’, 
and concluded that the real influence of some of these organisations came 
from their contacts with people in prominent positions in society. Boxall and 
Gillespie (2013) also came to a similar conclusion. In their recent publication 
titled: ‘Making Medicare’, it was claimed that the structural interests of 
‘organized medicine and organized medicine itself, draws its power from the 
way it fits the logic and principles of the dominant interests in a society’ 
(Boxall & Gillespie 2013, p. 66).   
The influence of structural interests in the health market is particularly evident 
in the case of large multi-national companies, which for the purpose of this 
thesis, have been categorised as ‘corporate monopolists’. The emergence of 
multi-national companies, to become a dominant interest group in the health 
sector, is the most significant change in the balance of interests since the 
original work of Alford, which was conducted in 1975. Large multi-national 
companies now supply the majority of goods and infrastructure to specialist 
clinics and hospitals, in the form of intravenous fluids, prostheses, bandages, 
medications, surgical instruments, large-scale diagnostic equipment, and 
much more.  
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The major interest of multi-national companies is to provide a return on 
investment to their shareholders; hospitals are no more than a secure market 
for the sale of their products, and with the growing influence of these 
companies, the state has become their collaborator, rather than an 
independent negotiator in securing the best price for their indispensable 
goods and services, as will be shown below. The growing influence of these 
companies is demonstrated by four recent trends in the way that they now 
operate.  
The first trend is cited by Murray and Peetz (2013) who identified that 
between 2006 and 2010, foreign ownership of Australian health 
manufacturing and supply companies had increased. One of the 
consequences of Australia not having a strong manufacturing industry, 
coupled with the changing modus operandi of states which do, is that 
Australia is dependent on these countries (and their corporations) for access 
to many necessary items, over which it has only limited influence in price-
setting. Further, as fewer Australian-owned companies exist, fewer dollars will 
circulate domestically, and more of the necessary health-related goods and 
infrastructure will be imported into Australia.  
The second trend, which is particularly evident in the pharmaceutical industry, 
is that the ‘high cost of research and development has encouraged the 
amalgamation of companies’, resulting in a concentration of power and 
budgets in fewer companies which ‘operate global supply chains’ (Gardner 
1996; Mikler 2012, p. 47). The Australian government’s attempt, in 1987, to 
introduce initiatives (Factor f scheme), which were designed to support the 
development and maintenance of a domestic pharmaceutical industry, was 
not successful (Gardner 1996). The consequence of which is that, Australia is 
increasingly becoming a net importer of pharmaceuticals, with an annual rate 
of increase of $0.5 billon (7 per cent per. annum) (Australian Bureau of 
Statistics [ABS] 2015).  
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The third trend, which demonstrates the growing influence of these 
companies, is a change in the modus operandi of some multi-national 
companies who now are using ‘international rules’ to protect their market 
share globally (Ranald 2014, p. 77). The consequence is that the domestic 
laws of countries in which these companies trade are being challenged in the 
international arena. For example the right of the Australian Government to 
restrict advertising of tobacco, on the grounds that tobacco has caused much 
ill-health to its citizens, is being challenged in an international court by Philip 
Morris Tobacco Company (Ranald 2014).   
Even so, the state continues to provide regulatory frameworks and policies 
that extend the favourable environment for these companies’ trade and 
investment strategies. This has influenced the way in which health care is 
now provided and has resulted in some unintended consequences for 
consumers (Ranald 2014). In Australia, private providers now dominate the 
provision of diagnostic testing and pathology services, and these providers 
now charge a fee of $66 for those diagnostic tests which are not covered by 
the Medicare rebate, thus increasing the profit margin for those companies 
(Baker 2014). Many companies that provide diagnostic tests and other 
services, are supported by medical practitioners (‘professional monopolies’) 
who, when ordering diagnostic and pathology tests for their patients, use 
request forms which carry the brand of a specific company (Baker 2014).   
This subtle networking between these providers and the medical profession 
demonstrates the pluralist nature of the health market. It shows also that more 
of the costs of health care are being met by consumers, the consequence of 
which is that many people with limited financial resources have difficulty in 
accessing those services at all, or in a timely way (Baker 2014). Such policies 
are welcomed by the interest groups who stand to benefit from those policies, 
such as members of the Australian Medical Association, the private health 
insurance industry, and multi-national companies who supply health-related 
goods, infrastructure and services.   
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The fourth trend demonstrates the growing interdependence of the state and 
multi-national companies. Mikler (2012) has suggested that states are now 
facilitating the business objectives of multi-national corporations registered in 
their own jurisdiction when negotiating trade agreements, and that it is those 
companies that benefit most from those agreements, once implemented. 
Trade agreements designed primarily to achieve economic objectives, and 
which open state-borders more fully to international trade, have serious 
implications for the state in it meeting its obligations for public-good in health 
care. For example, future health policies will need to be formulation within the 
constraints of those agreements, regardless of their impact on the health of 
the population (Legge et al 2014). 
Legge et al (2014, p.117) have also reported that trade negotiations have 
opened the way for stronger ‘geopolitical alliances’ to emerge, where the 
more dominant states, which have an advantage in trade negotiations, are 
reaching agreements with states which are less dominant, and whose citizens 
are potentially affected negatively by those agreements. For example, 
American negotiators were successful, in securing, on behalf of companies 
registered in the US, the inclusion of a much-disputed intellectual property 
clause in the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (Legge et al 2014). The 
outcome of which is an increase in the life of patents, the benefits of which 
flow mostly to companies registered in the US (Legge et al 2014).  
The inclusion of this clause in the Agreement was supported by the current 
Conservative Coalition government in Australia in spite of the opposition of 
many health policy commentators, who remain concerned that it is likely to 
prevent competition, and will delay the availability of cheaper medication to 
consumers (Legge et al 2014). Australian citizens’ currently pay more for their 
medications, and more from their own pocket, than do citizens of other 
countries (PC 2015). The Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement is currently 
being submitted to the Australian Parliament for its endorsement, thus also 
demonstrating the extent to which the current Government is prepared to 
trade-off its obligation to provide public-good in health for economic gain. 
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1.3 Conclusion 
This chapter has presented the economic and political context in which public 
health services are provided in Australia, and has identified interests and 
interest groups that comprise the health market and whose interests are 
served by them. There is no doubt that the greatest beneficiaries of the nexus 
between government and these interests and interest groups are those 
individuals and organisations which rely on the health market for their 
economic survival (Harvey 2012).  
From a health policy perspective, the pronouncements of politicians (and 
other health policy commentators) that health care is unaffordable, has a 
number of potentially unfortunate consequences. It focuses the health debate 
on economic efficiency and particularly on, but not limited to, specific 
diagnostic and treatment modalities and public hospitals, and defers any 
discussion about the effectiveness of care (technical efficiency) and what 
government could do to improve and/or maintain the health of its population 
(its public-good obligation), as was reported recently in a report prepared by 
the Productivity Commission (2015). The NH Reform and its policy of ABF 
reinforces the perception that greater economic efficiency will make public 
health services technically efficient. As will be shown in this thesis this is not 
the case. 
Whether the most recent NH Reform and its policy of ABF has been able to 
change the modus operandi of those interests and interest groups mentioned 
above, or to enable the state to meet its public-good obligations in health, 
remain unexplored questions. Chapter two discusses the methodological 
approach adopted to answer the research question. 
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Chapter 2:  Methodology 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The overall research design of this thesis consists of a multi-case-study of one 
Metropolitan and one Regional Local Health District, in which public hospital 
inpatient and Emergency Department data are examined over five years; 
three years before and two years after the introduction of ABF. These 
analyses determine the different impacts of ABF in a Metropolitan and 
Regional context. The Chapter has two Sections.  
In Section One the characteristics for the NSW population are used to: (i) 
demonstrate differences in the demographic characteristics of Metropolitan 
and Regional Local Health Districts; (ii) justify the selection of the two Local 
Health Districts in the case study; and (iii) to determine the extent to which 
each of the selected Local Health Districts is representative of the other Local 
Health Districts in its group. Published literature on this question of 
generalisability of the results from this research, is used to assert that each 
Local Health District is adequately representative of its group.  
Section Two presents the quantitative method used to: (i) identify those 
hospitals that receive their funding through the NH Reform model of ABF in 
each of the selected Local Health Districts; (ii) select three clinical conditions 
for analysis; and (iii) identify in a dataset, appropriate data variables for each 
clinical condition from which the research question is answered. Three data 
management steps are then described, and for each, the methods used to 
analyse data to identify change in patient throughput, examine possible 
explanations for any significant change observed, and to demonstrate the 
balance between potential revenue and resources required to treat patients 
for each clinical condition, in each hospital, in each Local Health District. 
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2.2 Selection of Local Health Districts  
Each Local Health District in NSW comprises a number of Local Government 
Areas (LGAs). The eight Local Health Districts which are classified as 
Metropolitan by the NSW Ministry of Health comprise 50 LGAs. These Local 
Health Districts are: Central Coast, Illawarra Shoalhaven, Nepean Blue 
Mountains, Northern Sydney, South Eastern Sydney, South Western Sydney, 
Sydney’ and Western Sydney (NSW Ministry of Health [MoH] 2014a; ABS 
2011). The seven Local Health Districts which are classified as Regional by 
the NSW Ministry of Health comprise 103 LGAs. Those Local Health Districts 
are: Far West, Hunter New England, Mid North Coast, Murrumbidgee, 
Northern NSW, Southern NSW, and Western NSW (MoH 2014a; ABS 2011). 
Since ss. 20 of the NSW Health Services Act 1997, No. 154 states that, the 
function of a Local Health District is ‘to promote, protect and maintain the 
health of the residents of its area’, it is appropriate to begin this section, by 
exploring the demographic characteristics of the Local Health Districts. In 
particular, the demographic characteristics of those groups of residents whose 
social circumstances mean that they are more likely to rely on public hospitals 
for their health needs (COAG 2012).  
The demographic characteristics were obtained from the 2011 Census data 
(ABS 2011). The following data were extracted from the Basic Community 
Profile (Table B 01a) for each LGA in each Local Health District: geographic 
area (square km), total persons, total number of Indigenous persons, number 
of persons whose language spoken at home was ‘English only’ (or, the 
number of persons where a language other than English is spoken), and the 
number of persons aged 0-4 years, and 75 years and older. These data 
enabled the following to be calculated: the population density (persons per 
square km), the proportion of residents identifying as Indigenous, the extent to 
which the resident population was of an English-speaking background, and 
the distribution of the resident population. Characteristics for all the NSW 
Metropolitan and Regional Local Health Districts, are shown in Table 2.1. 
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Table 2.1: Characteristics of NSW Metropolitan and Regional Local 
Health Districts 
Characteristic Metropolitan LHDs (n=8) Regional LHDs (n=7) 
Geographic area (square 
Km) 
25,031 (3% of NSW) 779,368 (97% of NSW) 
Total population (persons) 5,030,541 (70% of NSW) 2,068,668 (30% of NSW) 
Population  density 
 (persons / square km) 
 
193.4 2.7 
Indigenous residents 
 (% of residents) 
 
1.4% 5.0% 
Only English spoken at 
home 
 (% of residents) 
 
64% 91% 
Residents aged 0-4 years 
 (% of residents) 
 
6.7% 6.4% 
Residents aged 75+ years 
 (% of residents) 
 
6.3% 8.3% 
 Source: ABS 2011; MoH 2013. 
 
Only 30 per cent of NSW residents live in Regional Local Health Districts 
which occupy 97 per cent of the geographic area of the State. Regional Local 
Health Districts are populated much more sparsely, by residents who are 
more likely to be Indigenous i.e. Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander or both, 
more likely to speak only English at home, and who have an older 
demographic profile. The differences in demographic characteristics between 
Metropolitan and Regional Local Health Districts provide a rationale for 
selecting, for the purpose of this study, one Local Health District which is 
representative of a Metropolitan area, and one which is representative of a 
Regional area, in NSW.  
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Western Sydney was selected as the Metropolitan Local Health District for 
study because its demography is typical of that of a metropolitan area. The 
Western Sydney Local Health District spans 775 square km, has a population 
density of 938 people per square km, and provides health services to 11 per 
cent of the State’s population. Of those people, two per cent identify as 
Indigenous, which is consistent with the average for the State, and 45 per cent 
of the population speak only English at home (ABS 2011).  
The Hunter New England Local Health District was selected as the Regional 
Local Health District because its demography is relatively representative of 
the demographic profile of a mixed urban / rural population. The Hunter New 
England Local Health District spans 11,627 square km, has a population 
density of nearly eight (7.26) people per square km, and provides health 
services for 12 per cent of the State’s population. Of those people, five per 
cent identify as Indigenous, which is more than twice the State average, and 
91 per cent of the population speak only English at home (ABS 2011).  
Another reason for selecting Hunter New England as the Regional Local 
Health District was because its boundaries did not change in the most recent 
re-organisation of health services in NSW in 2010. Therefore, service 
provision in this Local Health District is likely to have been more stable than 
that in other Local Health Districts, where boundary re-organisations occurred 
at the same time as ABF was introduced.  
Thus the Western Sydney and Hunter New England Local Health Districts 
display different demographic characteristics. However the extent to which 
these case-study Local Health Districts are representative of their respective 
Metropolitan and Regional Local Health District groups requires exploration. If 
each Local Health District can be demonstrated as being generally 
representative of its group (Metropolitan or Regional), then it is reasonable to 
assert that the findings of this thesis are generalisable, or at least transferable, 
to other comparable Local Health Districts, and the findings of this thesis will 
be useful beyond the boundaries of this case study (Sarantakos 2005). The 
question of generalisability of research findings is now discussed.   
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2.3 Generalisability of research findings 
The selection of one Sydney Metropolitan (Western Sydney) and one 
Regional (Hunter New England) Local Health District for study has been 
described. It is recognised that each Local Health District is unique, but the 
question is: to what extent is each of these two Local Health Districts 
representative of other Local Health Districts in its group? 
In answering this question, the proposition put forward by Hollingsworth and 
Peacock (2008) and Weidmann and Duckett, (2014) that, research findings in 
the health sector are not generalisable but are only relevant to the study under 
question, is challenged. These authors cited the following reasons for their 
stated position: differences in the demography and health status of 
populations; different referral networks operating in different regions, low 
quality of available data, and ‘omitted variable bias’ (Weidmann & Duckett 
2014, p. 1). Omitted Variable Bias is where unknown variables are not 
controlled in the research design, and these may unwittingly influence the 
research findings. The difference between the work conducted by these 
authors and the work reported in this thesis is outlined, and it is argued that 
each threat to generalisability is countered in this thesis.  
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2.3.1 Demographic Characteristics in Metropolitan Local Health 
Districts 
The results of an analysis of the demographic characteristics of the eight 
Metropolitan Local Health Districts are shown below, and conclusions are 
drawn about the extent to which the Western Sydney Local Health District is 
representative of other Metropolitan Local Health Districts. This analysis is 
then repeated for the Hunter New England Local Health District in respect of 
other Regional Local Health Districts.   
Total population of Metropolitan Local Health Districts  
The total population of each of the eight Metropolitan Local Health Districts is 
shown in Figure 2.1. 
 
Figure 2.1: Total population of each Metropolitan Local Health District 
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In 2011, four of the eight Metropolitan Local Health District each had a 
population of approximately 800,000, while that of the Sydney Local Health 
District was just over 500,000. The three more peripheral Local Health 
Districts each had a population between 300,000 and 400,000. Thus the 
Western Sydney Local Health District is comparable with the other central 
Metropolitan Local Health Districts in terms of its total population, and 
contained a substantial proportion (17 per cent) of the population of the eight 
Metropolitan Local Health Districts in 2011. 
Age profile of the population in Metropolitan Local Health Districts 
The relative proportions of the very young and the very old in each of the eight 
Metropolitan Local Health Districts (ranked by difference between proportions 
of young and old populations) are shown in Figure 2.2. 
 
Figure 2.2: Proportions of those aged 0-4 years, and 75 years and 
older, in each Metropolitan Local Health District  
 
The Western Sydney Local Health Districts had the youngest age profile of all 
the Metropolitan Local Health Districts, while two of the peripheral 
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Metropolitan Local Health Districts (Illawarra Shoalhaven and Central Coast) 
had the oldest age profile. 
Population density in Metropolitan Local Health Districts 
The geographic area covered by each of the Metropolitan Local Health 
Districts varies widely, from 123 square km (Sydney Local Health District), to 
9,122 square km (Nepean Blue Mountains Local Health District). The 
population density of each of the Metropolitan Local Health Districts is shown 
in Figure 2.3. The population density is the population of the Local Health 
District (persons) divided by the total area of the Local Health District (square 
km). 
 
Figure 2.3: Population density of each Metropolitan Local Health 
District 
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population density of each of the others is less than 200 persons / square km. 
The population density of the Western Sydney Local Health District lies in the 
mid-range for the Metropolitan Local Health Districts. 
The mid-range position of the Western Sydney Local Health District is partly 
accounted for by the diversity of its constituent LGAs. Figure 2.4 shows the 
area of each of the constituent LGAs of the eight Metropolitan Local Health 
Districts plotted against its population. The geographic area is plotted on a 
logarithmic scale to accommodate the thousand-fold range in geographic area 
of the LGAs. The five LGAs of the Western Sydney Local Health District are 
shown as black diamonds. 
 
Figure 2.4: Area and population of each LGA of the Metropolitan Local 
Health Districts 
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area in the west of Sydney, and is relatively densely populated, is an outlier. 
Indeed, its 2011 population of 301,099 was half as large again as the next 
most populous Metropolitan LGA, which was the Sutherland Shire, with a 
2011 population of 210,863. 
Indigenous population in Metropolitan Local Health Districts 
The proportion of people who identified as Indigenous (i.e. Aboriginal, Torres 
Strait Islander, or both), varies considerably from Local Health District to Local 
Health District. Figure 2.5 shows the proportion of people in each of the 
Sydney Metropolitan Local Health Districts who identified as Indigenous. 
 
Figure 2.5: Proportion of Indigenous residents in each Metropolitan 
Local Health District 
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the central Metropolitan Local Health Districts. The proportion of residents 
identifying as Indigenous was higher in the peripheral Local Health Districts. 
 People of non-English-speaking background in Metropolitan Local Health 
Districts 
The proportion of people whose only language spoken at home was English 
was taken to be an (admittedly inverse) measure of non-English-speaking 
background, because the alternative Census description ‘Other language’ 
included 'Inadequately described' and 'Non-verbal, so described', and was 
thought to be potentially less precise. The proportion of people whose only 
language spoken at home was English varied considerably from one Local 
Health District to another. Figure 2.6 shows the proportion of people in each of 
the Sydney Metropolitan Local Health Districts whose only language spoken 
at home was English. 
 
Figure 2.6: Proportion of residents in each Metropolitan Local Health 
District whose only language spoken at home was English 
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In the Western Sydney Local Health District, the proportion of people who 
spoke only English at home was relatively low, largely because of the 
substantial immigrant populations in the Auburn LGA, where the proportion of 
households where ‘only English spoken at home’ was only 21 per cent. 
2.3.2 Demographic Characteristics in Regional Local Health Districts 
The total population of each of the seven Regional Local Health Districts is 
shown in Figure 2.7.  
 
Figure 2.7: Total population of each Regional Local Health District 
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District was just over 800,000. Thus the Hunter New England Local Health 
District is larger than the other Regional Local Health Districts in terms of its 
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total population, and contained 41 per cent of the population of the seven 
Regional Local Health Districts in 2011.  
The relative proportions of the very young and the very old in each of the 
Regional Local Health Districts (ranked by difference between proportions of 
young and old populations), are shown in Figure 2.8 
 
Figure 2.8: Proportions of those aged 0-4 years, and aged 75 years and 
older, in each Regional Local Health District  
 
 
The proportion of older people (aged 75 years and older), exceeded that of 
the very young (aged 0-4 years) in all the Regional Local Health Districts, with 
the difference being greatest in the populations of the Northern NSW and Mid 
North Coast Local Health Districts. The difference for the Hunter New England 
Local Health District lies in the mid-range. 
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The geographic area covered by each of the Regional Local Health Districts 
varies widely, from 249,803.2 square km (Western NSW Local Health District), 
to 11,324.2 square km (Mid North Coast Local Health District). The population 
density of each of the Regional Local Health Districts is shown in Figure 2.9.   
 
Figure 2.9: Population density of each Regional Local Health District 
 
 
There is a considerable range of population densities among the Regional 
Local Health Districts, ranging from 17.7 persons / square km (Mid North 
Coast Local Health District), to 0.2 persons / square km (Far West Local 
Health District). The Hunter New England Local Health District occupies an 
intermediate position, with a population density of 6.4 persons / square km. 
Figure 2.10 shows the area of each of the constituent LGAs of the seven 
Regional Local Health Districts plotted against its population.  The geographic 
area is plotted on a logarithmic scale to accommodate the five hundred-fold 
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range in geographic area of the LGAs. The 25 LGAs of the Hunter New 
England Local Health District are shown as black triangles. 
 
Figure 2.10: Area and population of each LGA of the Regional Local 
Health Districts 
 
 
While most of the Hunter New England LGAs lie within the general cluster of 
the Regional LGAs, the LGAs of Newcastle and Lake Macquarie, which are 
densely populated, and urban in character, are outliers. 
Figure 2.11 shows the proportion of people in each of the seven Regional 
Local Health Districts who identified as Indigenous. 
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Figure 2.11: Proportion of Indigenous residents in each Regional Local 
Health District 
 
 
The proportion of people who identified as Indigenous (i.e. Aboriginal, Torres 
Strait Islander, or both), varied considerably from Local Health District to Local 
Health District, ranging from 10 per cent in the Far West of the State, to 3 per 
cent in the South. In the Hunter New England Local Health District, 4.6 per 
cent of the 2011 population identified as Indigenous, placing the Local Health 
District in the mid-range of the Regional Local Health Districts. 
The proportion of people whose only language spoken at home was English 
was taken to be the measure of non-English-speaking background, which 
varied considerably from Local Health District to Local Health District. Figure 
2.12 shows the proportion of people in each of the seven Regional Local 
Health Districts whose only language spoken at home was English.  
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Figure 2.12: Proportion of residents in each Regional Local Health 
District whose only language spoken at home was English 
 
 
In the Regional Local Health Districts, including Hunter New England, most 
people spoke only English at home, and the proportion of people of non-
English-speaking background was consistently low across all Regional Local 
Health Districts. 
In summary, the 50 LGAs which make up the eight Local Health Districts in 
the Metropolitan area exhibit a substantial variation in their demographic 
characteristics, and it would be surprising if any one Local Health District 
could be taken to be representative of the whole group. However, the 
demographic characteristics of the Western Sydney Local Health District are 
sufficiently similar to those of at least the central group of Metropolitan Local 
Health Districts as to suggest that it is not unreasonable, at least in the first 
instance, to extrapolate (hereafter to transfer) the findings from the Western 
Sydney Local Health District to the other Metropolitan Local Health Districts.   
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As might be expected, the 103 LGAs which make up the seven Regional 
Local Health Districts also exhibit a substantial variation in their demographic 
characteristics. The Hunter New England Local Health District is by far the 
largest in population terms, but is in the middle of the range of Local Health 
Districts in respect of the other demographic characteristics: age profile, 
proportion of Indigenous residents, proportion of people whose only language 
spoken at home is English. It is not unreasonable, therefore, at least in the 
first instance to consider the findings from the Hunter New England Local 
Health District as transferable to the other Regional Local Health Districts.  
The demography of the Western Sydney and Hunter New England Local 
Health Districts is compared below. This analysis shows that there are 
differences between the demographic characteristics of each Local Health 
District. All these characteristics have implications for the delivery of health 
services to residents. For example, Regional patients are likely to experience 
greater difficulties in accessing health services than their Metropolitan 
counterparts. 
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2.4 Differences between Local Health Districts  
The Western Sydney Local Health District has demographic characteristics 
which are similar to those of other Metropolitan Local Health Districts, as does 
Hunter New England to other Regional Local Health Districts. However there 
are differences in the demographic characteristics of the two Local Health 
Districts, as shown below in Figures 2.13 and 2.14.    
 
Figure 2.13: Distribution of age groups in the populations of the Western 
Sydney and Hunter New England Local Health Districts 
 
 
Compared with the Western Sydney Local Health District, a greater proportion 
of the resident population is older (>45 years) in the Hunter New England 
Local Health District. The age distribution of the Hunter New England is 
consistent with that of other Regional areas (not illustrated). A greater 
proportion of younger people (<45 years) live in Western Sydney Local Health 
District, and this distribution is also consistent with that of other Metropolitan 
areas (again, not illustrated). 
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Figure 2.14 shows a comparison of the proportions of Indigenous people, and 
those whose language spoken at home is other than English, in the LGAs of 
the Western Sydney and Hunter New England Local Health Districts 
 
Figure 2.14: Prevalence of Aboriginality vs. only English spoken at Home 
in each LGA 
 
 
Indigenous people comprise a greater proportion of the resident population in 
the LGAs of the Hunter New England Local Health District, compared with the 
LGAs that comprise the Western Sydney Local Health District, where a 
smaller proportion of people speak only English at home.  
So far, a justification has been given for selecting the Western Sydney and 
Hunter New England Local Health District for the case-studies in this thesis, 
and a demonstration that the geography and demographic characteristics of 
each are not greatly different from their respective Metropolitan and Regional 
counterparts. While there is considerable variation between the Local Health 
Districts in each of the (Metropolitan and Regional) groups of Local Health 
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Districts, there is little evidence to suggest that it is inappropriate, at least in 
the first instance, to transfer the findings from the two selected Local Health 
Districts to the other Local Health Districts in their respective group. This 
conclusion counters the first reason cited by Hollingsworth and Peacock 
(2008) and Weidmann and Duckett, (2014) for believing that the findings of 
health system research are not generalisable on account of demographic 
differences.  
The second reason cited by those authors for caution in generalising the 
results of local health system research to other health services, using of 
inpatient data, is that there are differences in health status among populations 
(Hollingsworth & Peacock 2008; Weidmann & Duckett 2014). The use of data 
collected from patients who are admitted to hospital (inpatient data) as a proxy 
for measuring or for reporting differences in health status, is problematic 
because those data tend to reflect the supply of hospital and/or health 
services. Therefore, inpatient data alone should not be used to reflect the 
health status of a population. If there is no consensus on what data can be 
used to measure the health status of a population or an individual, and if the 
health status of populations or individuals are not routinely measured, it is 
difficult to see how health status can be used as an argument against 
generalisability. 
The third reason cited by those authors for caution in generalising the result of 
health system research is the low quality of health data. Richardson (2005) 
has also reported unexplained variations in service provision and cost across 
large sectors of the health system, which were claimed to be associated with 
poor-quality data. However, a higher degree of consistency has been 
introduced recently into the collection and monitoring of, and reporting on, 
activity in Local Health Districts (COAG 2012). The introduction of ABF has 
increased this need for accuracy in the collection of data and in coding to 
classify each patient’s episode of care, using the Diagnosis Related Group 
(DRG) classification system refined for Australian conditions called the 
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Australian Refined - Diagnosis Related Groups (AR–DRGs), details of which 
are described in chapter three. 
This emphasis on improving the accuracy of data has been reinforced at a 
hospital level, and has resulted in standardisation of: data definitions, coding, 
data collection, storage and reporting in all hospitals in NSW, and beyond. 
Data definitions are now standardised for the following datasets - Admitted 
Patient Services, Outpatients, Emergency Department activity, Residential 
Care and Community Health. Patient-based financial accounting and reporting 
are also standardised. All hospital managers are now expected to meet the 
same set of performance targets, over the same time periods, such as 
meeting benchmark times for patients to be seen on presentation to an 
Emergency Department, the length of time patients wait for surgery, and the 
overall financial performance of the Local Health District (COAG 2012).  
Therefore, it is argued here that data quality has improved to the extent that 
comparisons can be made between comparable facilities in Metropolitan and 
Regional Local Health Districts. These improvements in the quality of the 
collection and reporting of data now make it possible for those data to be used 
for identifying variations between comparable clinical services and hospitals, 
as shown by Duckett et al (2014). Given those improvements, the low quality 
of health data is not a valid reason to question the generalisability of the 
research findings in this thesis.  
The fourth reason cited by those authors for caution in generalising the results 
of health system research is that there are differences in the referral networks 
operating in different Local Health Districts. In chapter one, it was reported 
that in Australia and in most OECD countries, the ‘bio-medical’ model is the 
dominant model which underpins the provision of health services. The 
dominance of this model of service provision has resulted in a strong ‘bio-
medical’ culture which is reinforced in Australia through undergraduate, 
graduate and postgraduate medical education, and by various interest groups. 
This culture is evident in everyday clinical decision-making regardless of 
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where professional staff are located, or in which location health care is 
provided, and it is likely to remain stable for the foreseeable future.  
The resilient structure of the health system influences medical referral patterns 
(Gardner 1996). Referral patterns are known to be based on professional 
networks and organisational linkages, such as links between teaching 
hospitals and university undergraduate and postgraduate training sites, and 
between tertiary and district hospitals. These networks and linkages enable 
patients to have access to different levels of clinical care, which are 
considered to be necessary by their treating clinician, but the mix of services 
and the type of service offered is similar across hospitals of comparable Role 
Delineation Levels (MoH 2002). In essence Role Delineation means that the 
role assigned centrally by the NSW Ministry of Health to each hospital, limits 
the type, mix and range of available services able to be offered by that 
hospital to patients.  
The Role Delineation level of a hospital (or speciality health service) describes 
‘the complexity of the clinical activity undertaken by that service and is chiefly 
determined by the presence of medical, nursing and other health care 
personnel, and the availability of support services and equipment’ (MoH 2002, 
p. i-ii). These necessities are ‘backed up with formal appointment and 
credentialing of medical practitioners’ (MoH 2002, p. i-ii). Due to the 
geographic distribution of the current workforce, and the requirement for 
quality and safety in the delivery of health care, it is unlikely that the existing 
Role Delineation Levels of hospitals will change in the near future. As a result, 
hospitals with the same core and support services Role Delineation Level 
provide similar types and levels of health care to patients (Hindle 2002). 
Suffice to say, in each Metropolitan and Regional Local Health District there 
are hospitals and health services, general practices, and health related non-
government organisations, but compared with Metropolitan Local Health 
Districts, Regional Local Health Districts usually have a lower level of health 
services available locally (less specialist care), and the travel distance to 
access health services, particularly specialist services, is greater (MoH 2013). 
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It is therefore argued here that the health care that patients receive will be of 
the same general nature, whether a patient receives their care in a 
metropolitan or regional hospital of a comparable Role Delineation Level. 
Therefore the fact that different referral networks operate in different regions 
should not prevent generalisability, because the services available are fixed, 
the general principles of medical decision-making are uniform, and the 
underlying medical culture is stable.  
The final reason cited by Hollingsworth and Peacock (2008, p. 101) and 
Weidmann and Duckett, (2014, p. 1) to caution against generalising the 
results of health system research, is ‘Omitted Variable Bias’. The only way to 
guard against Omitted Variable Bias is to be aware of the phenomenon, and 
to identify potential variables that could unwittingly influence the research 
results. Potential variable biases are identified in this thesis. For example, 
changes in patient throughput could be due to changes in the way in which 
public hospitals conduct their business, or could be a result of other 
simultaneous changes in the health sector.  
In response to such possibilities, explanations for change observed in health 
service use, as alternative explanations to ABF, are identified where 
appropriate in this thesis, and their potential impact on patient throughput is 
assessed. The results of each of these analyses are provided in chapters, four 
to six. It is contended that differences in the demographic characteristics and 
other variables, put forward by previous authors as reasons for caution about 
generalising the findings of health system research, are less important than 
the existing homogeneous medical culture, health policies and structure of the 
health system, that collectively result in the same general type of health care 
being received by patients, regardless of a patient’s geographic and/or 
demographic characteristics, or the location where that care is provided 
(Metropolitan or Regional hospital).  
If the same general type of care is received by patients regardless of those 
factors, than it is reasonable to assert that the findings from this thesis, if not 
generalisable, are at least transferable to other comparable Local Health 
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Districts. This conclusion is also supported by the research on which 
Hollingsworth and Peacock (2008) based their proposition, when they used 
health outputs or health outcomes in order to compare economic efficiency 
across health service facilities. Similarly, Weidmann and Duckett (2014, p. 1) 
described their research as ‘an exercise in benchmarking hospital 
performance’, where hospital level comparisons were made between like-kind 
health services (and the associated costs).  
In contrast, in this thesis, inpatient and Emergency Department data are 
examined within, as well as between, hospitals, to detect changes in the 
number of patients admitted (or who presented) to each facility over time. 
Therefore, each hospital included in the analysis can act as its own control. 
Further, the research design is a multi-case study, which was selected 
because it is more robust than a single-case study approach (Yin 2003).  
In this section it has been established that the geographic and demographic 
characteristics of Metropolitan and Regional Local Health Districts, and the 
level of health services they provide, are different, and that those differences 
have the capacity to influence the level, range and type of health services 
available to their respective residents. The rationale for selecting each 
Metropolitan and Regional Local Health District has been given, and the 
proposition is made that each is likely to be sufficiently representative of other 
Metropolitan or Regional Local Health Districts, to the extent that inferences 
can be drawn (and results transferred) from the research findings of this thesis 
to other comparable Local Health Districts.  
Having established that the research findings from this thesis are transferable 
to other comparable Local Health Districts, the next step is to present the 
methods used: to identify hospitals that receive ABF in the two Local Health 
Districts; to select appropriate clinical conditions for analysis; to extract from 
the datasets the data variables which are required for analysis; and to show 
how those data are analysed to answer the research question.  
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2.5 Hospitals, clinical conditions and variables for analysis 
This Section describes three different, but related data management steps, 
and how the resulting data were analysed to answer the research question. 
The first step was to identify those hospitals in each Local Health District that 
are funded on the model of ABF. Those hospitals were identified from a list of 
hospitals contained in Appendix ‘C’ in the publication titled ‘NSW ABF and 
Small Hospitals Operational Specifications 2013-14’ (Activity Based Funding 
Taskforce [ABFT] 2013a). The four general hospitals in the Western Sydney 
Local Health District in descending order of complexity, based on the Role 
Delineation level of the Emergency Department for each hospital) are: 
Westmead, Blacktown, Auburn, and Mount Druitt (ABFT 2013a). 
The eight general hospitals in the Hunter New England Local Health District in 
descending order of complexity, based on the Role Delineation level of the 
Emergency Department for each hospital, are: John Hunter Hospital, Calvary 
Mater Newcastle Hospital, Maitland Hospital, Manning Base Hospital, Belmont 
Hospital, Tamworth Base Hospital, Armidale and New England Hospital, and 
Kurri Kurri District Hospital (ABFT 2013a). The inclusion of Kurri Kurri District 
Hospital in the ABF group is interesting, since the total annual number of 
admissions was consistently less than 3,500, which is the minimum volume 
(throughput) generally used to identify hospitals which are appropriate for 
receiving ABF (ABFT 2013a). However, for completeness this hospital was 
included in the initial analyses.  
The second data management step was to select specific clinical conditions 
from a list that, identified conditions that are potentially ‘eligible’ for treatment 
in a setting other than that of an inpatient in an acute hospital (AIHW 2015). 
Three clinical conditions described as chronic (i.e. the clinical condition is 
ongoing, and the patient can be treated but is unlikely to be cured) were 
selected: chronic obstructive airways disease (COAD), diabetes and cellulitis 
(MoH 2014b).  
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A number of different systems are used to classify clinical conditions. The 
principal one used in this thesis is the Australian Refined-Diagnosis Related 
Group v6.X, (AIHW 2015). The validity of using this classification system was 
checked through the use of the International Classification of Disease (ICD-
10), ‘a disease classification system which promotes compatibility in the 
collection, processing, and presentation of mortality statistics internationally’ 
(Culyer 2005, p. 180; World Health Organisation [WHO] 2015). 
Having selected these three clinical conditions, the third data management 
step was to obtain data on hospital admissions of patients with each of these 
conditions. On request, the NSW Ministry of Health provided an inpatient 
dataset which contains a set of 25 descriptive variables for each inpatient 
admission to each of the study hospitals in the Western Sydney and Hunter 
New England Local Health Districts over the period from 1 July 2008 to 30 
June 2013 (about 1.8 x 106 admissions). Table 2.2 gives a list of the inpatient 
data items extracted from this dataset, and used in this thesis.  
The data items were used in one of two ways: either filtering to extract the 
data relating to patients to be included in an analysis (in bold typeface in the 
Table), or for undertaking the analysis itself. 
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Table 2.2: Inpatient data items and their purpose in analyses  
Source:  MOH 2013. 
  
Data items  Purpose in analyses 
AR–DRG  to identify patients admitted to ABF hospitals in each Local 
Health District for each selected AR-DRG for chronic 
obstructive airways disease, or diabetes or cellulitis 
ICD-10 codes to check the validity of using AR-DRGs to assign patients 
admitted to hospital as either being ‘eligible’ or ‘ineligible’ for 
treatment in a setting other than that of an acute hospital  
facility_identifier  identification of ABF hospital in which treatment was provided 
date_of_admission  calculation of duration of a patient’s stay in hospital (mean, 
median, minimum, maximum) 
date_of_discharge calculation of throughput of patients in each financial year 
(2009 to 2013) 
calculation of duration of a patient’s stay in hospital (mean, 
median, minimum, maximum)  
estimation of  the number of hospital bed-days occupied (for 
calculation of PARI) 
sex description of patient demographics 
year_of_birth calculation of age of patient 
analysis of potential change in patient demographics 
postcode_of_residence analysis of potential change in patient demographics 
identification of residents of the Local Health District and 
inflows of patients from other Local Health Districts 
analysis of social factors as a possible explanation for change 
observed 
Aboriginality, non-English 
speaking background 
analysis of potential change in patient demographics 
final  NWAU Inlier cost / 
price weight 
an indicator of the relative resource use in providing treatment 
for each patient admitted  
disposition destination once discharged from hospital 
Community_Health_Flag number (and %) of patients referred to a Community Health 
Service when discharged from hospital 
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Either of two of the variables extracted in this third data management step 
could potentially be used to identify patients admitted to hospital with one of 
the selected clinical conditions: the AR-DRG, or the ICD-10. To make a 
decision as to which of these classification systems to use, the hospital 
admission data for people with each of the selected clinical conditions were 
filtered using each of these variables separately, and the output from the two 
extractions was compared. 
Data for each of these identifiers were extracted from the dataset using SAS 
Basic / SAS Enterprise Guide v8, and the resulting tables were saved to 
Microsoft Excel spreadsheets for analysis. The data outputs for AR-DRGs and 
ICD-10 were compared. As an example, the two sets of data relating to 
people with diabetes admitted to hospitals in Western Sydney were 
compared, as follows.   
First, the data were extracted by filtering for the two diabetes AR-DRGs codes 
(K60A and K60B) at the four Western Sydney hospitals (Westmead, 
Blacktown, Auburn, and Mount Druitt), and the number of admissions coded 
to each was analysed. In a second operation, the data were extracted by 
filtering for the diabetes ICD-10 codes (E10 to E16) at the same hospitals, and 
the number of admissions coded to each of the two AR-DRGs was analysed. 
The two methods of extracting the data yielded exactly the same number of 
admissions to each hospital coded to each to the diabetes codes K60A and 
K60B, although filtering for the diabetes ICD-10 codes (E10 to E16) yielded 
many more admissions coded to a number of AR-DRGs other than K60A or 
K60B.  
The question then became: should any of these other AR-DRGs be used to 
identify people admitted with diabetes but who could reasonably have been 
treated in a clinical environment other than that of an inpatient in hospital? To 
answer this question the list of extracted AR-DRGs was reviewed, using the 
clinical judgment of the investigator, to identify admissions of people who were 
likely to be ‘ineligible’ for care in a less clinically sophisticated environment 
than in an acute hospital.   
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AR-DRGs were identified as ‘ineligible’ either because they required access to 
an operating room, or they involved procedures which were judged to be 
unsafe or inappropriate to be undertaken outside a hospital setting, or which 
were coded as having catastrophic or severe complications or co-morbidities. 
This resulted in the identification of a group of AR-DRGs which were assigned 
to a category which was designated ‘ineligible’. The remaining AR-DRGs were 
identified as being ‘eligible’ for care in a less clinically sophisticated 
environment, on the grounds that the criteria for ineligibility were clearly not 
met, and the condition was comparatively minor and not life- or health-
threatening. AR-DRGs in this category were designated ‘eligible’.  
Further confirmation of the appropriateness of the assignment of each AR-
DRG as being ‘eligible’ for treatment in a setting other than that of an inpatient 
in hospital, was obtained by reviewing the National Weighted Activity Unit 
(NWAU) Inlier Price Weight for each candidate AR-DRG. The NWAU Price 
Weight ‘…expresses relative resource use for services funded on an activity 
basis..’ and was obtained from Appendix G in ‘NSW ABF and Small Hospitals 
Operational Specifications 2013-14’. Thus, the low Inlier Price Weight for AR-
DRGs assigned to the ‘eligible’ category provided further confidence in the 
appropriateness of the assignment to that category.  
In a separate operation, ICD-10 codes for diabetes (i.e., E10.0 to 
E10.9…..E14.0 to E14.9 only) that had been identified as ‘…potentially 
preventable hospitalisations...’; published by the Australian Institute Health 
and Welfare, and included in the National Health Care Agreement 2015, were 
aggregated and analysed for each Local Health District (AIHW 2015b). This 
exercise enabled comparison of the number of admissions identified by using 
the selected range of ICD-10 codes for diabetes, with the number resulting 
from application of the more restricted set of codes, published by the AIHW 
(AIHW, ICD 2015).   
This exercise revealed that when the AIHW list of codes was applied, the 
number of admissions were fewer, but 95 per cent of admissions for diabetes 
to hospitals in the Western Sydney Local Health District were accounted for 
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by two AR-DRGs (K60A and K60B), compared with 67 per cent using the 
selected ICD–10 codes for diabetes. In the Hunter New England Local Health 
District, when the AIHW list of codes were applied, the number of admissions 
were again fewer, but over 99 per cent of admissions for diabetes were 
accounted for by the two K60 AR-DRGs, compared with 60 per cent using the 
selected ICD–10 codes for diabetes. Based on this result, and to simplify the 
complexity of the analysis, the two AR-DRGs, K60A and K60B, were used as 
the final filter, because they captured all admissions coded to the selected 
ICD-10 codes, and gave a greater number of admissions for analysis.   
The category of patients identified as ‘ineligible’ for receiving their treatment in 
a setting other than that of an acute hospital were identified as those coded to 
AR-DRG - K60A (diabetes with severe complications and comorbidities). The 
category of patients identified as ‘eligible’ for receiving their treatment in a 
setting other than that of an acute hospital were identified as those coded to 
AR-DRG - K60B (i.e., diabetes without complications or co-morbidities). The 
assignment of AR-DRGs to each category (‘eligible’ or ‘ineligible’) was 
reviewed by a senior clinical specialist (a Professor of Medicine and Specialist 
Endocrinologist) who confirmed that the assignment of AR-DRGs for diabetes 
to these categories was clinically appropriate (personal communication, 20 
March 2015).  
Similar analyses were conducted for both of the other selected clinical 
conditions: COAD, and cellulitis. Table 2.3 shows the AR-DRG for each 
clinical condition selected as ‘eligible’ or ‘ineligible’, and their respective 
NWAU Inlier Price Weights (ABFT 2013a).  
  
Methodology 
- 64 - 
 
Table 2.3: AR-DRGs, description of diagnosis, and NWAU Inlier Price 
Weight 
 Australian Refined Diagnosis 
Related Group (V6.X) and Code  
Australian Refined Diagnosis 
Related Group (V6.X) and 
Code 
Selected 
condition 
‘eligible’ AR-DRGs NWAU 
Inlier 
Price 
Weight 
‘ineligible’ AR-
DRGs 
NWAU 
Inlier 
Price 
Weight 
Chronic 
obstructive 
airways 
disease 
E65B  COAD without 
catastrophic 
complications or co-
morbidities 
1.0331 
E65A  COAD with 
catastrophic 
complications or co-
morbidities 
2.0699 
Diabetes 
K60B  Diabetes 
without catastrophic 
or severe 
complications or co-
morbidities 
0.9543 
K60A  Diabetes with 
catastrophic or 
severe complications 
or co-morbidities 
2.2639 
Cellulitis 
J64B  Cellulitis 
without catastrophic 
or severe 
complications or co-
morbidities 
0.7763 
J64A  Cellulitis with 
catastrophic or 
severe complications 
or co-morbidities 
2.0681 
Source: ABFT 2013. 
 
In summary, the AR-DRGs which identify patients who could potentially be 
treated safely and effectively in a less resource-intensive setting than that of 
an acute hospital (‘eligible’ category), and the corresponding AR-DRGs for the 
‘ineligible’ category, have been identified for the three clinical conditions under 
study in the ABF hospitals in each Local Health District. 
Although the emphasis of the analysis is on hospital admissions of those 
patients coded to an ‘eligible’ category, the analyses are sometimes extended 
to include (separately) those in the ‘ineligible’ category, to enable comparisons 
between the throughput of patients with, and without, complications, and to 
provide a picture of changes in patient throughput for the clinical condition as 
a whole.  
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The next task is to describe the other data variables selected for analysis to 
answer the research question, to show how these data were analysed, and for 
what purpose. Before describing the other data variables, two modifications to 
the inpatient dataset were made, which enabled data to be manipulated for 
specific analyses: 1) a SAS program was written to enable calculation of the 
duration of each patient’s stay in hospital, by subtracting the ‘date of 
admission’ from the ‘date of discharge’, and saving the output to a new 
column (LoS) created in the SAS inpatient dataset; and 2) a SAS macro was 
created which, when applied to each patient’s date of discharge from hospital, 
enabled a patient’s data to be allocated to one of the five financial years (1 
July 2008 to 30 June 2013) covered by the study data.   
The data for variables relating to patient admissions to ABF hospitals in each 
of the two Local Health Districts in the five financial years for each selected 
clinical condition, were extracted using SAS Enterprise Guide v8.  As 
appropriate, variables were extracted as frequency distributions or cross-
tabulations, and descriptive statistics were calculated (e.g., number, mean, 
median, minimum, and maximum). The resulting output was saved to 
Microsoft Excel spreadsheets for further analysis and display, such as the 
construction of graphs or charts. 
On request, the NSW Ministry of Health also supplied a dataset which 
contained a set of 18 descriptive variables for each presentation to the 
Emergency Departments in the study hospitals in the Western Sydney and 
Hunter New England Local Health Districts over the same period (from 1 July 
2008 to 30 June 2013) (about 2.6 x106 presentations). To enable each 
patient’s data to be allocated to one of the five financial years (1 July 2008 to 
30 June 2013) of the study data, the SAS macro created for the inpatient 
dataset, was also applied to the ‘date of arrival’ in the Emergency Department 
dataset. Table 2.4 gives a list of the Emergency Department data items used 
in this thesis.   
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Table 2.4: Emergency Department data items and their purpose in 
analyses 
Data items Purpose in analyses 
hoscode identification of Activity Base Funding hospital 
Emergency Department in which treatment was provided 
ICD-10d1 codes (see 
Appendix B)  
number (and %) of presentations to an Emergency 
Department coded according to ICD-10 in Hunter New 
England hospitals 
patients access through an Emergency Department to an 
inpatient bed 
SNOMED-CT codes 
(see Appendix C) 
number (and %) of presentations to an Emergency 
Department coded according to SNOMED-CT in Western 
Sydney hospitals 
patients access through an Emergency Department to an 
inpatient bed 
date_of_arrival Allocation of each patient presentation to a study year 
(2009 to 2013) 
triage_category Indicator of severity of patient’s’ clinical condition on 
arrival in an Emergency Department 
departure_status where patients went once treatment in the Emergency 
Department was completed 
postcode_of_residence mapping catchment population 
inflow of patients from other Local Health Districts 
year_of_birth calculate age of patient 
change in patient demographics 
Aboriginality, non-
English speaking 
background 
change in patient demographics 
Source: MoH 2013  
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2.6 Analysis of data 
For each selected clinical condition, the analyses are intended to answer three 
sequential questions, shown in Figure 2.15.   
 
Figure 2.15: Each Question to be answered by the data analysis and the 
focus of analysis for each 
 
 
 
2.6.1 Question 1: what change has occurred? 
This analysis uses the relevant AR-DRGs and the facility identifier (see Table 
2.2), to extract the relevant data to answer a specific question. As an 
example, the variables in a data file might include the: AR-DRGs for a 
selected clinical condition coded to the ‘eligible’ category and those coded to 
the ‘ineligible’ category; the facility identifier (i.e., hospital); date of discharge 
from hospital; and disposition (i.e., the destination of patients when they were 
discharged). Selected data variables were compared, year-on-year and 
before-and-after the introduction of ABF in 2011, to identify change in the 
Question 1: 
what change has 
occurred?
Question 2: 
why might change have 
occurred?
Question 3: 
what is the financial 
implication of change? 
• Patient throughput between and within 
hospitals receiving Activity Based Funding 
•Activity Based Funding
•Demographic factors
•Disease factors
• Social factors
•Hospital policy
•Medical practive
•Coding practice
•Balance between potential revenue available 
and resources used to treat patients
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throughput of patients in the hospital, and in the patients’ destination when 
discharged from hospital.  
After initial analysis of the data for ‘eligible’ and for ‘ineligible’ patients, the 
analysis was narrowed to concentrate on only those patients who were 
identified as being ‘eligible’ for treatment in a setting other than that of an 
acute hospital. The rationale for this concentration was that with the 
introduction of ABF it was anticipated that patients who were ‘eligible’ for 
treatment in a setting other than that of an acute hospital, would be treated in 
an alternative setting, such as an non-admitted patient (or a service provided 
under a Medicare Local). If such service substitution occurred, which was one 
of the intended outcomes of ABF, the number of admissions to hospital for 
this category of patient would fall. Thus, examination of data for this category 
of patients is more relevant to the research question, because those patients 
admitted to hospital who had catastrophic complications and co-morbidities 
(‘ineligible’ category) are likely to have continued to require hospitalisation for 
adequate treatment of their clinical condition. Patient. 
The number of admissions of patients with a selected clinical condition, coded 
to the ‘eligible’ category, to each hospital receiving ABF in each Local Health 
District, were plotted for each of the five years of the study. Linear regression 
trend data were calculated, for the data from all five years combined and, 
separately, for the years 2009 to 2011, and 2011 to 2013. For those hospitals 
where there appeared to be a change in throughput, further analyses were 
undertaken to establish whether the throughput was statistically significantly 
different from zero i.e., the change which had occurred was more than could 
be expected by chance. If the number of admissions varied greatly between 
the hospitals in a group, the slope of the linear regression line was also 
standardised as the change per 100 admissions to each hospital, thus 
providing an index which related the annual change in admissions to the 
throughput of the hospital. 
For those hospitals where the change in throughput was statistically significant 
for patients ‘eligible’ to be treated in a setting other than that of an acute 
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hospital, possible explanations for that change were examined, as described 
in Question two. 
2.6.2 Question 2: why might this change have occurred?  
This analysis examines possible explanations for any statistically significant 
change in the throughput of patients that emerged in the answers to Question 
one, classified under seven possible categories of explanation. Each category 
was examined in turn, until the analysis reached the point where further 
exploration of possible causes was unlikely to be productive, or the data to 
pursue these were not available. The seven possible categories are: ABF 
itself, demographic factors, disease factors, social factors, hospital policy, 
clinical practice, and coding practice. 
Examination of the possible explanations often required analysis of more than 
just the simple metrics of patient numbers, and involved analysis of additional 
data variables extracted from: (i) the inpatient dataset; or (ii) the Emergency 
Department dataset, or (iii) reports prepared by other agencies such as the 
Australian Institute Health and Welfare, and the NSW Ministry of Health. The 
results of those analyses are provided, when relevant, in Chapters four to six, 
in which the findings of the analyses for each clinical condition are reported. 
The methods used in examining each possible explanation for a change in 
throughput, i.e., a change in the number of patients admitted to those 
hospitals receiving ABF, 2009 to 2013, are described below.  
Activity Based Funding: a possible explanation for a decline in the number of 
patients admitted to hospital, coded to the ‘eligible’ category, is that those 
patients are receiving more of the treatment for their condition in a location 
other than that of an acute hospital, thus obviating their need for their 
admission in the first place - which is an intended outcome of ABF.   
If this were the case, the number of patients admitted to hospital, and coded to 
the ‘eligible’ category would decline, and the number of patients coded to the 
‘ineligible’ category would not change greatly over the same period. This 
pattern of change for each clinical condition is the benchmark from which a 
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decision was made about whether (or not), ABF had achieved one of its 
intended objectives: when appropriate, to divert patients from an acute to a 
non-acute location for treatment of their condition (ABFT 2013b).  
The findings from the analysis of data conducted in Question one, were used 
for this purpose. The numbers of admissions of patients with the selected 
clinical condition, coded to the ‘eligible’ category, and to the ‘ineligible’ 
category, were calculated for each ABF hospital in each Local Health District, 
and plotted for each of the five years of the study, year-on-year. Statistical 
tests were applied to those data, and the data were graphed to show the 
relationship between these two categories of patients, 2009 to 2013.  
If the expected pattern of change was not evident, the analysis was continued 
and the next of the remaining six categories of explanation was examined.  
Demographics: a possible explanation for the decline in the number of 
patients admitted to hospitals, and coded to the ‘eligible’ category, is that 
there was a change in the demographic profile of those patients. For example, 
a change in the age-distribution of patients within the catchment population of 
the hospital for patients admitted with the specified clinical conditions, and 
within each condition for both the ‘eligible’ and ‘ineligible’ category of patients.  
The cumulative age-distributions of patients were calculated from their date of 
birth, thus enabling the construction of graphs showing the age-distribution of 
patients with COAD, or diabetes, or cellulitis, who were ‘eligible’ for treatment 
in a setting other than that of an acute hospital, but who were admitted to 
hospital. If there was no evidence that change in the demographic profile of 
patients might have been a possible explanation for the change in throughput, 
the analysis was continued, and the next of the remaining five categories of 
explanation was examined.   
Disease Factors: a possible explanation for a decline in the number of patients 
admitted to hospital, and coded to the ‘eligible’ category, is that there was a 
reduction in morbidity from the condition in the community i.e., fewer people 
were suffering from, and being diagnosed with, the condition.  
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To determine whether or not there had been a change in the incidence or 
prevalence of COAD, or diabetes, or cellulitis, is outside the scope of this 
thesis. However, the pattern of presentations to the Emergency Departments 
of the hospitals does shed some light on this question. If there was a 
decrease in community morbidity for the clinical condition under study, a 
decline would be expected in the number of people, and/or in the severity of 
their clinical condition, when they presented to an Emergency Department for 
treatment, and fewer of those who did present would require admission to 
hospital. Therefore, Emergency Department data were used to explore the 
possibility that disease factors in the community might account for the 
changes in patient throughput.  
On presentation to an Emergency Department, patients are registered and 
assigned to a Triage Category (1 to 5) based on the severity of their clinical 
condition (MoH PD2013_047). Patients who require resuscitation, i.e., 
treatment required within seconds of their arrival are assigned to Triage 
Category 1; patients who should receive emergency treatment within 10 
minutes of their arrival are assigned to Triage Category 2, etc., through to 
Triage Category 5 (see Appendix A). Therefore, a change in the proportion of 
patients assigned to the various Triage Categories can be used as an 
indication of the seriousness (or otherwise) of their clinical condition. 
Diagnoses in Emergency Department data were coded using SNOMED-CT 
(for the Western Sydney Local Health District) and ICD-10d1 (for the Hunter 
New England Local Health District) (see Appendices B and C). Records where 
the relevant principal provisional diagnosis was consistent with the selected 
clinical condition were extracted from this dataset, and those data were 
grouped by hospital, Triage Category, year of presentation, and departure 
status. These data were then analysed to identify any change, over the five 
years of the study, in the number or seriousness of the clinical condition of 
patient presentations in each hospital, and the number and proportion of those 
who, having received initial treatment in the Emergency Department, were 
admitted to the hospital.   
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If no evidence of community morbidity was forthcoming as a possible 
explanation for the change in the throughput of patients in hospital, the 
analysis was continued, and the next of the remaining four categories of 
explanation was examined. 
Social factors: a possible explanation for a decline in the number of patients 
admitted to hospital, and coded to the ‘eligible’ category, is that there was an 
increase in the level of support available in the community to care for these 
often chronically unwell patients, and to treat their chronic illnesses. Greater 
access to general practice clinics, or Medicare Locals or other community-
based health services, could result in the same patient being admitted to the 
same hospital, with the same condition, on fewer occasions.  
Thus the number of admissions of patients to hospital might include data from 
multiple admissions of the same patient, rather than a single admission of 
each of a number of different patients. However, the inpatient dataset does 
not identify individual patients, only individual episodes of admission. 
Nevertheless, an decrease (or increase) in the frequency of admissions in a 
relatively circumscribed patient group, for example, those born in a given year 
and residing in a given postcode, could be due either to a change in the 
number of single admissions of individuals in such a group, or to a change in 
the number of multiple admissions of the same individual. 
From the inpatient dataset, all patients with COAD, or diabetes, or cellulitis, 
who were admitted to a hospital receiving ABF in each Local Health District, in 
2009 and in 2013, were identified and counts were made of the number of 
patients with the same clinical condition, and year of birth, and residing in the 
same postcode, admitted to hospital in 2009 and in 2013. The frequencies of 
admission to hospital of this select group of patients were plotted, and the 
difference between the data for 2009 and 2013 was analysed (chi-squared 
test).   
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If no evidence was obtained that multiple admissions were a possible 
explanation for the change in throughput, the analysis was continued, and the 
next of the remaining three categories of explanation was examined. 
Hospital Policy: a possible explanation for a decline in the number of patients 
admitted to hospital, and coded to the ‘eligible’ category, is that there was a 
change in the discharge policies in that hospital’s Emergency Department, or 
in the State policies governing Emergency Departments.  
If a change had occurred in the State discharge policies, in line with the 
objectives of ABF, patients who presented to an Emergency Department and 
were assessed as requiring semi-urgent or non-urgent treatment (Triage 
Category 4 or 5), might have been referred to an alternative service provider 
located in the community, rather than being admitted to hospital.  
The NSW Ministry of Health policy titled: Departure of Emergency Department 
Patients 2014, and the NSW Ministry of Health policy for Triage of Patients in 
NSW Emergency Departments 2015, were inspected (MoH PD2013_047; 
MoH PD2014_025) (MoH 2014c, 2015a). There has been no substantial 
change in the content of these policies since 2010. Thus it is reasonable to 
conclude that change in these policies would not account for a decline in the 
number of patients admitted from the Emergency Department to hospital.  
It is possible that there might have been changes in the discharge policy in an 
individual Emergency Department for patients who presented with selected 
clinical conditions (a change in clinical policy or guideline). This analysis 
would be more accurate if it were possible to track individual patients on their 
departure from the Emergency Department to their next destination, but this is 
not possible, due to the limited demographic data and lack of relevant data 
variables available in the datasets supplied.   
However, some insight into this question may be obtained from analysis of 
changes in the number or proportion of patients admitted to the hospital from 
the various Triage Categories (1 to 5). Therefore, for this analysis, data were 
extracted from the Emergency Department dataset, using SNOMED-CT or 
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ICD-10d1 codes as appropriate, where the principal provisional diagnosis was 
chronic obstructive lung disease2 (hereafter referred to as COAD), or 
diabetes, or cellulitis; for each of the five years of the study. The dataset 
contained: the hospital, the Triage Category to which each patient was 
assigned, and their departure status.  
If fewer patients who presented to an Emergency Department for treatment 
and who were assigned either to Triage Category 4 or 5, were admitted to (the 
same or another) hospital following initial treatment in the Emergency 
Department, it might be a result of a change in clinical policy, resulting in more 
of those patients being referred to another service location for their on-going 
care, such as to a community health service, or to a local general practitioner. 
For this analysis, patient numbers were aggregated for adjacent Triage 
categories in which there were small numbers of patients. For example, 
patient numbers in Triage Category 5, were aggregated with those in Triage 
Category 4. For the same reason the number of patients assigned to Triage 
Category 1 were aggregated with those in Triage Category 2. Triage Category 
3 remained un-aggregated. 
If there was no evidence that hospital policy might be a possible explanation 
for the change in throughput, the analysis was continued and the next of the 
remaining two categories of explanation was examined. 
Clinical Practice: a possible explanation for a decrease in the number of 
patients admitted to hospital, and coded to the ‘eligible’ category, is a change 
in the way in which clinicians practise medicine. For example a change in the 
treatment of individual patients, and/or the recording of clinical information in 
their medical record, and/or the assignment of Triage Categories of people 
who present to an Emergency Department for treatment. 
                                            
2 Chronic obstructive lung disease is the name of the disease category in the SNOMED CT 
classification, used in the Emergency Department dataset for the Western Sydney Local Health 
District. 
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The recording of additional clinical data might result in ‘up-coding’ - the 
assignment of a patient episode to an AN-DRG which would result in an 
increased ABF payment to the hospital (Steinbusch, Oostenbrink, Zuurbier & 
Schaepkens 2007). If this was the case, it is likely to result in a greater 
identification of patients with severe complications and comorbidities (the 
‘ineligible’ category), rather than without complications and comorbidities (the 
‘eligible’ category), and the absolute number of patients admitted to hospital 
would remain constant.  
This assignment would result in fewer admissions coded to the latter, less 
severe category. If there was no change in the balance between patients 
coded to the ‘eligible’ and ‘ineligible’ categories, then ‘up-coding’ and/or 
changes in medical record keeping would be unlikely to explain the observed 
change in throughput. This possible explanation was tested by analysis of 
changes in the number of admissions of patients with a selected clinical 
condition, coded to the ‘eligible’ category, and to the ‘ineligible’ category over 
the five years of the study. 
If there was no evidence that a change in clinical practice was a possible 
explanation for the change in throughput, the analysis was continued, and the 
last remaining category of explanation was examined. 
Coding Practice: a possible explanation for a decline in the number of patients 
admitted to hospital, coded to the ‘eligible’ category, is a change in the written 
instructions contained in the policy and procedures Manual used by Medical 
Record personnel (Coders) to assign patients, once discharged from hospital, 
to a specific disease category (i.e., to an AR-DRG). 
The NSW Ministry of Health policy titled: Health Care Records - 
Documentation and Management 2012, contains instructions for hospital 
Coders as to the features of the medical record which determine the 
assignment of a patient to one of the two alternative AR-DRGs used in this 
thesis to code patients’ ‘ineligible’, or ‘eligible’ (MoH PD2012_069). This policy 
was inspected, and no change was identified in this policy since the 
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introduction of ABF. Thus it is reasonable to conclude that change in this 
policy would not account for a decline in the number of ‘eligible’ patients 
admitted to hospital.  
While all categories of explanation both for the ‘eligible’ and ‘ineligible’ patient 
groups were explored, only those results that might explain the reduction, or 
increase, in throughput of ‘eligible’ patients are reported in chapters, four to 
six. Having described the methods used to examine several categories of 
explanation for a decline in the number of ‘eligible’ patients admitted to those 
hospitals that received ABF, it is acknowledged that there might be other 
possible, but unidentified, explanations of why there might have been either 
no change, or an increase in the number of patients admitted to hospital, over 
the course of the study period. The elimination of alternative explanations for 
change in hospital throughput other than ABF, would be enhanced by an in-
depth account of the implementation of ABF. However, the provision of such a 
detailed account is outside the scope of this thesis’. 
Such outcomes may be the result of externalities, for example a change in 
clinical staff turnover, or finance having been diverted to another purpose, or 
changes in the availability of services in the community. The change observed 
may also be a result of instability in the system while ABF was being fully 
implemented, rather than an outcome of ABF per se. For example, at the time 
of writing this thesis, ABF was still in the process of being implemented in 
some health services, the result of which is that, because the intervention has 
been gradual or minimal, there is no defined time-point from which change 
can be measured accurately.  
Additionally, the data available for analysis in this study only relate to inpatient 
admissions and to presentations to Emergency Departments, but not to the 
activity levels of the health services to which patients would be diverted if ABF 
had achieved the objectives set for it. The available data only cover the first 
two years since a national approach to the implementation of ABF was agreed 
(2011), and this may not be enough time for changes to be observed in this 
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study, and perhaps by the national and State entities set up to monitor the 
consequences of its implementation.  
Having described the methods used to analysis patient throughput and the 
limitations, the next step is to describe the method for conducting the analysis 
to answer Question three. 
2.6.3 Question 3: what are the financial implications of these changes?  
Question three explores the extent to which public hospitals might gain or lose 
resources since the introduction of ABF. The analysis uses the numbers of 
patients treated in a hospital, the severity of their condition (NWAU Inlier Price 
Weight), and the duration of their stay in hospital to construct an Index called 
the Potential Available Resources Index (PARI), from which is calculated the 
balance between the revenue derived from ABF and the resources required to 
treat patients. This Index is applied to the throughput of patients coded to the 
‘eligible’ category for each clinical condition, in each hospital, in each Local 
Health District.  
The PARI is used as a measure of the extent to which hospitals might gain (or 
lose) resources as a result of the introduction of ABF, enabling comparison 
between the performance of hospitals, or groups of hospitals, when changes 
to funding arrangements were made. Before describing the method used to 
calculate the PARI, the influence of the duration of a patients’ stay in hospital 
on the resources available and used to treat patients is explained.  
A reduction in the length of time spent by a patient in a hospital has two 
potential benefits for the facility: there is a reduction in the cost per patient 
treated, and it enables greater throughput of patients for the same number of 
beds, which, under the ABF, would attract new revenue for the hospital. 
However, it is possible that the savings achieved on the care of patients with 
selected clinical conditions by reducing the duration of their stay in hospital 
might be swallowed up by less-efficient care of hospital patients with other 
conditions, or by sicker patients who require a longer stay in hospital than that 
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incorporated in the calculation of the NWAU Inlier Price Weight. The logic 
underpinning the development of the Index, how it is constructed, how it is 
operationalised, and its limitations are presented.   
The resource implication of changes in the duration of patients’ stay in hospital 
can be calculated from routinely available hospital admission data. For each 
clinical condition (AR-DRG), the Independent Hospital Pricing Authority has 
determined a “National Efficient Price” (NEP) for the hospital care of a patient 
coded to that AR-DRG, based on a nationwide economic analysis of the cost 
of providing care for such a patient during their hospital stay (ABFT 2013b).  
The major component of the price payable to a hospital for a patient’s episode 
of care is the NWAU Inlier Price Weight for the AR-DRG to which the patient’s 
stay has been coded, with adjustments to accommodate factors such as a 
protracted hospital stay, or a requirement for Intensive Care. The resulting 
price-weight is multiplied by a dollar amount ($ 4,993 in 2013-14) to give the 
price payable by the Commonwealth government to a State government for a 
patient’s stay in hospital.  
However, in the case of NSW this is not the actual amount of revenue 
received by the hospital, because the NSW Ministry of Health does not pass 
on the full Commonwealth amount to Local Health Districts, (the NSW unit 
price was $4,671 in 2013), and a Local Health District may not pass on the full 
amount it receives to the hospital – “top-slicing” occurs (ABFT 2013a). 
Nevertheless, for the present purposes, the price payable by the NSW 
Ministry of Health for each admission can be used as a reasonable proxy for 
calculating the amount of revenue received by each hospital based on its 
patient throughput. 
Notwithstanding some imprecision in calculating the precise revenue paid for 
an admission, in principle the funding received for the admission of a group of 
patients who are coded to the same AR-DRG is the product of the number of 
admissions, and the NWAU Inlier Price Weight, and the dollar figure which is 
paid for an admission whose Price Weight equals 1.000. It is acknowledged 
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that, although the NWAU Inlier Price Weight does not apply to every 
admission, the assumption that it does apply to the majority of admissions for 
the ‘eligible’ clinical conditions under study was tested by examining the effect 
of substituting the NWAU Final Price Weight; an item also available for each 
admission in the inpatient dataset, for the generic NWAU Inlier Price Weight, 
which applies to admissions coded to that AR-DRG, Appendix G in ‘NSW 
Activity Based Funding and Small Hospitals Operational Specifications 2013-
14’ (ABFT 2013a).   
In this test, the individual NWAU Final Price Weight for each admission to the 
Hunter New England ABF hospitals, and coded to the ‘eligible’ category for 
COAD was extracted from the dataset. Although data were missing from 22 
per cent of the 5,659 records available for study, the mean of all the 78 per 
cent remaining available NWAU Final Price Weights was 98 per cent of the 
NWAU Inlier Price Weight for this category (1.0173 instead of 1.0331). It is 
concluded that, for the purposes of calculating the PARI, the NWAU Inlier 
Price Weight is an acceptable proxy for the NWAU Final Price Weight.  
Clearly, the cost of the resources required to provide hospital care for a 
patient depends on the complexity of the case (represented by the NWAU 
Inlier Price Weight, and multiplied by the appropriate dollar figure), and on the 
duration of the patient’s stay in hospital. These resource requirements do not, 
of course increase linearly with the duration of patient stay, but, for the 
present purposes, a reduction in length of stay would result in at least some 
reduction in the resources required to care for that patient.  
With the approximations acknowledged above, the ability of a hospital to 
provide the resources for patient care (the PARI) is the balance between the 
revenue it receives for that care, and the estimated cost of the resources 
required to provide it, as shown in Box 1. 
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Box 1: Balance between revenue available and resource 
requirement 
 
 Revenue available 
      Resource Requirement 
 
 
This can be regarded as an index of the potentially available resources to 
provide care for an admitted patient – ‘potentially’, because there is no 
guarantee that the revenue received in respect of a patient admission will be 
applied to the provision of resources for caring for similar patients. For the 
purpose of this thesis the PARI is constructed, as follows, for a given AR-
DRG. It will be seen that most of the variables in the numerator and 
denominator of the expression cancel out, leaving the Index as the reciprocal 
of the Average Length of Stay.   
 
Box 2: Calculation for a given AR-DRG for a single hospital 
 number of admissions * NWAU Inlier Price Wt * $ paid for that Price Wt 
number of admissions * average Length of Stay * NWAU Inlier Price Wt 
 * $ paid for that Price Wt 
 
 
Reciprocal of ALoS  =  1 
Average Length of Stay 
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If data on the average Length of Stay of patients are available for two or more 
time periods, then the reciprocal3 of the average Length of Stay can be used 
to calculate the PARI, to indicate whether a hospital has more or fewer 
resources available to provide care for the patients who are admitted to it in 
the second or subsequent time-periods. It is customary to designate the Index 
for the first time-period as 100. Having described the logic underpinning the 
construction of the PARI, how the PARI is operationalised is presented.  
While the PARI can be applied either to: a single AR-DRG or to several 
groups of AR-DRGs, or hospitals, or Local Health Districts, in this thesis it is 
used to show the balance between the revenue available and resources used 
to treat patients with selected clinical conditions (one AR-DRG), coded to the 
‘eligible’ category, for each of the hospitals, and for the Local Health District 
as a whole.   
2.6.3.1 PARI calculation for several hospitals for a single AR-DRG 
From the inpatient database, data were extracted on all patients whose 
admission had been coded to ‘eligible’ category for each selected clinical 
condition. These data were used to calculate the total number of patients 
admitted to each of the hospitals receiving ABF in each of the Local Health 
Districts, year-on-year, 2009 to 2013. Data for the same period were also 
extracted on the average Length of Stay of those patients, which, multiplied by 
the number of such patients in each category, gives an estimate of the 
number of hospital bed-days occupied by these patients in each year.  
However, basing the starting point at an index of 100 for an AR-DRG for each 
hospital in a given group of hospitals implies that they are starting from the 
same performance base, which is not usually the case. This can be 
circumvented by setting the combined performance of the whole group of 
                                            
3 Definition: “reciprocal” is the quantity obtained by dividing the number one by a given quantity (Oxford 
English Dictionary 2008). 
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hospitals at 100. This gives a baseline against which the initial performance of 
each hospital can be measured, and also provides a base value for measuring 
the combined performance of the whole group of hospitals in subsequent 
years.  
However, this raises the question of how to combine the performance of 
different hospitals into a single Length of Stay performance measure for the 
whole group. This was achieved by summing the number of admissions to all 
the hospitals, and summing the occupied bed-days for all the hospitals, for a 
given year. The sum of the total number of occupied bed-days was divided by 
the sum of the total number of admissions to give the average Length of Stay 
for all the hospitals in the group for that year, as shown in Box 3.   
 
Box 3: Calculation for a given AR-DRG in a group of hospitals 
 
ALoS = Number of occupied bed-days  
    Number of admissions  
 
Reciprocal of ALoS =   1 
     ALoS for whole group 
 
 
The reciprocal of the average Length of Stay for the first time period became 
the benchmark, and this was standardised to give a PARI value of 100. The 
PARI values for each hospital and each year were then calculated. For each 
hospital, the 2009 starting value was calculated in relation to the base value 
for the whole group of hospitals combined, to reflect the hospital’s relative 
Length of Stay performance relative to the whole group. The values for each 
hospital for subsequent years were then based on the 2009 starting value for 
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that hospital. The findings from the calculation of the PARI for each selected 
clinical condition, in each of the ABF hospitals (with the exception of Mount 
Druitt and Kurri Kurri Hospitals, as explained below), in each of the Local 
Health Districts are provided in Chapters four to six.  
At Mount Druitt Hospital, the Length of Stay for many patients who were 
admitted with the selected clinical condition did not fall “between the 
statistically high and low boundary points for …casemix class”, and therefore 
for these clinical conditions the hospital stay did not fulfil the definition of an 
“Inlier Episode” and therefore would not receive funding through the 
mechanism of ABF (ABFT 2013b). At Kurri Kurri Hospital only a small number 
of patients were admitted to the hospital with each of the selected clinical 
conditions, and the Lengths of Stay were variable, which resulted in data from 
this hospital skewing the overall picture for the Local Health District. 
Therefore, the data from these two hospitals have not been included (or 
illustrated) in the calculation of the PARI for each of the selected clinical 
conditions. 
It is acknowledged that the construction of the PARI requires a number of 
assumptions, in particular that quantities in the numerator and the 
denominator of the expression are identical, and can therefore be cancelled 
out in the calculation. While this is true for the number of admissions, the 
NWAU Inlier Price Weight might not be an accurate estimate of the actual 
contribution of this factor to the hospital’s revenue, both because of the “top-
slicing” which occurs at the NSW and Local Health District levels, and 
because the NWAU Inlier Price Weight is not an accurate reflection of the 
actual price weight applied to the set of admissions. Although the relative 
accuracy of this proxy for revenue has been demonstrated, no such 
confirmatory estimate is available for the cost of the resources actually 
required to provide care for those admitted patients. 
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2.7 Conclusion 
This chapter has presented a description of the research design and the 
rationale for using a multi-case study of one Metropolitan and one Regional 
Local Health District, and the method used: (i) to answer a subsidiary 
question, about the extent to which each of those selected Local Health 
Districts is representative of other Regional or Metropolitan Local Health 
Districts; (ii) to select three clinical conditions for analysis; (iii) to identify the 
data items which characterise those conditions, and the variables used to 
answer three Questions, each of which completes a step in the analysis of 
data to answer the research question. The findings from those analyses are 
presented in chapter four to six. 
The next chapter presents background information necessary to understand 
the NF Reform and how it was implemented in NSW.  
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Chapter 3:  National Health Funding Reform  
 
3.1 Introduction: NH Reform  
This chapter outlines the incentives for State governments to sign the 
National Health Reform Agreement (2011), the salient elements contained in 
that Agreement; and the infrastructure established for its implementation. This 
is followed by a description of the model of ABF used to fund public hospital 
services, and how it was operationalised in one State; NSW. A history of the 
development of DRGs and the risks associated with using this disease 
classification system for funding purposes are discussed. This background 
information is important because it conveys the complexity of, and the 
ideology underpinning, the NH Reform, which Griffith (2008) alleged was 
based on neoclassical economics. However as will be shown, the 
characteristics of the NH Reform suggest rather that it is underpinned by 
neoliberal ideology.  
In signing the NH Reform Agreement (2011), the Commonwealth and State 
governments made a commitment to work in partnership to implement new 
arrangements for a nationally unified but locally controlled health system, with 
the aim ‘to improve health outcomes for all Australians and the sustainability 
of the Australian health system’ (COAG 2011, p. 5). This Agreement provides 
the detail of that commitment, and makes explicit that the Commonwealth 
funding contribution was under a model of ABF (COAG 2011).  
The States’ interest in signing the NH Reform Agreement (2011) was to 
ensure that the Commonwealth shared the risk of hospitals requiring further 
increases in funding to meet future demand for acute services. In 2012, NSW 
spent 30 per cent of its total budget on healthcare; this level of funding was 
claimed not to be sustainable, putting pressure on clinicians, managers and 
administrators working in the health system to find ways to reduce the 
escalating cost of providing publicly-funded health services. Duckett and 
Willcox (2011, p. 56) noted that, if not curtailed, the current level of health 
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funding would exceed the States’ total budget by the year 2045-2046. These 
authors claimed that, by using the ‘National Efficient Price as the basis for 
funding public hospital services, a saving of between $570 and $1,300 million 
per annum’ could be made (Duckett & Willcox 2011, p. 304). Such a saving, 
coupled with the Commonwealth’s commitment to provide future public 
hospital growth funding, were attractive economic incentives for the States to 
adopt this new funding model (COAG 2011, Schedule A).  
While all the Schedules included in the NH Reform Agreement (2011) are of 
relevance to a number of health policies, two are most relevant in this thesis. 
These are: Schedule A which makes explicit the Commonwealth funding 
commitment to the States, and that funding for public hospital services would 
be based on a national efficient price, which is the basis on which ABF 
operates; and Schedule D, which set out the local governance and includes 
an objective, ‘to provide more health care in non-acute settings, when 
appropriate’ which is the premise on which this thesis is based. This objective 
was assigned to Medicare Locals (and Super Clinics), which are private 
entities supported by Commonwealth government grants and established 
through public-private partnerships, and to Local Hospital Networks, which 
consist of a group of public hospital services located within a defined 
geographic area (COAG 2011, Schedule D & E).  
The creation (or expansion) of Medicare Locals, Super Clinics, and Local 
Hospital Networks was intended to ‘improve local accountability and 
responsiveness to the health needs of their communities’ (COAG 2011). 
These organisations were expected to work together to provide seamless care 
to patients, and for that care to be efficient. How efficient health care would be 
measured was not clearly defined. Nor was any detail provided about how 
these interest groups would work together to co-ordinate patient services 
more effectively. Professional and organisational tensions continue to exist 
between these service providers, tensions which Hancock (1999, p. 138), 
asserted caused ‘fragmentation of services associated with over-
specialisation and hostile relationships, poor communication, and poor 
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discharge planning’. This structural divide is a known impediment to integrated 
health care, leaving open the question of how these entities will coordinate 
their respective services to meet the clinical needs of patients, particularly 
those suffering from chronic disease (Leeder 1999). 
However, the Agreement lists a number of service types that could be 
considered as public hospital services for the purpose of ABF funding, which 
encourages greater use of non-admitted patient services (COAG 2011). This 
inclusion provided an incentive for Local Hospital Networks to provide 
treatment to patients in non-acute settings, where appropriate. The 
Agreement states that: 
..if a Local Hospital Network is able to operate more efficiently than the 
level of funding set by the State under the Local Hospital Network Service 
Agreement, the Local Hospital Network will be able to retain and reinvest 
the benefits accruing from efficiency in service delivery and in accordance 
with State policy and practice, as guided by the Service Agreement 
(COAG 2011, Schedule A-64).  
 
A further incentive for Local Hospital Networks to develop new models of care, 
with the aim of gaining efficiency through service substitution (i.e, more health 
care provided in non-acute settings), was that, it would reduce the demand on 
acute hospital beds (COAG 2012; MoH 13).  
A number of publicly-funded structures were created to operationalise the NH 
Reform, particularly its policy on ABF. These included: a National Health 
Performance Authority to monitor performance reporting, and a Performance 
and Accountability Framework to improve accountability; a new Australian 
Commission on Safety and Quality in Health Care, to improve and monitor the 
standards of clinical care provided in hospitals (COAG 2011 Schedule B & C). 
A national Independent Hospital Pricing Authority, whose task was to set a 
price which is paid for each episode of patient care, regardless of the setting in 
which that care is provided, where the funding follows the patient (IHPA 2011).  
National Health Funding Reform 
- 88 - 
 
Activity Based Funding, based on the ‘National Efficient Price’, is the 
mechanism that government(s) now use to fund public hospital services. It is 
believed that ABF will enable greater efficiency and effectiveness of the 
delivery of health services in public hospitals, the more efficient allocation of 
resources, and better patient access to integrated care, as well as the 
identification of incentives that will facilitate positive change in the health 
system (IHPA 2011).  
If this mechanism was successful, funding of the delivery of health services 
would be more transparent. The number and type of diagnostic services, 
treatments and medications provided to each patient while in hospital would 
be known, allowing the consequences of clinical decision-making to be 
observed. In time, over-servicing, and/or under-servicing would be reduced, 
and clinical pathways would become explicit, resulting in a stronger emphasis 
on medical interventions being standardised and clinically appropriate for the 
medical condition being treated. It would be possible for the cost for each 
episode of care to be compared with the corresponding allocated ‘National 
Efficient Price’, and clinicians would be encouraged to reduce any variation.  
It was also anticipated that patients would be enabled to make choices about 
the type of health care they need, and to access it when required, preferably 
in the community (seamless care) (COAG 2011, Schedule A & B; IHPA 
2012). These outcomes were to be achieved by enabling as many patients as 
possible to receive health care, and for each to experience the best possible 
health outcome from the care provided (Duckett & Willcox 2011). Collectively 
the above changes, if successful, would address many of the current 
criticisms of the health care system, some of which drove the need for a 
national approach to health reform.  
If these changes occurred, the social basis of clinical practice would also 
change. As more comprehensive general practice clinics and primary health 
care services were established under Medicare Locals, more patients with the 
chronic conditions and diseases associated with ageing could be cared for in 
the community, which, in turn would result in fewer people with those 
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conditions having to be admitted to an acute hospital. This change in clinical 
practice would also be likely to reduce the number of times that a patient 
would be re-admitted to hospital for treatment of the same condition (multiple 
admissions). Those admitted would spend fewer days in hospital and, when 
discharged from hospital, more would be referred to their general practitioner, 
community health or other community based service for any necessary on-
going care.  
 
3.2 Implementation of ABF in NSW 
Prior to 2009 most States, including NSW used the AR-DRG classification 
system to count inpatient activity, and used some form of casemix funding to 
fund public hospitals. From 2012, in NSW, ABF was the funding mechanism 
for patient services in Local Health Districts and Speciality Health Networks 
(ABFT 2013a). 
Using NSW as an example, many of the structural elements created at a 
national level to support the implementation of the ABF policy, are duplicated 
at a State level. The NSW Bureau of Health Information has a similar role to 
that of the National Health Performance Authority (COAG 2011 Schedule B & 
C; Bureau of Health Information [BHI] 2013). The NSW Clinical Excellence 
Commission monitors, reports on, and undertakes interventions to improve 
the quality and safety of health care and the systems that underpin that care 
(Clinical Excellence Commission [CEC] n.d). Those objectives are similar to 
those outlined in Schedule B, for the creation of the Australian Commission 
on Safety and Quality in Health Care (COAG 2011). The NSW Independent 
Pricing Authority, sets its own price for each episode of care provided by 
public hospitals, and allocates funding to Local Health Districts for distribution 
to those hospitals for which they are responsible (ABFT 2013b). This function 
is consistent with that of the national Independent Hospital Pricing Authority 
(IHPA 2011).  
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In addition to the above structural elements, under the National Healthcare 
Agreement (2012), a National Health Funding Pool was created (a centralised 
repository for Commonwealth and State health monies). The Commonwealth 
and NSW Treasury funding for publicly-funded health services, is pooled and 
a formula is agreed for the allocation of those funds (Griffith 2006). The NSW 
Ministry of Health provides hospital patient data which determine the level of 
funding received by NSW from the National Health Funding Pool, to which it 
has contributed funds (COAG 2011). Those data are used to determine not 
just the base price, but an adjustment to the base price which depends on a 
patients’ status. For example, differential weights are applied for patients who 
are Aboriginal, or who live in regional or remote locations, or who received 
specialised paediatric hospital care, or who are a privately insured patient in a 
public hospital (ABFT 2013a). In turn, the NSW Ministry of Health allocates 
funds to Local Health Districts and Specialty Networks to provide health 
services. The governance structure for the allocation, distribution and 
accountability for expenditure of those funds is shown below in Figure 3.1.  
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Figure 3.1: Governance structure for the administration of funds from 
the National Health Funding pool  
 
 
Source: MoH 2013. 
 
The Ministry’s formula for allocation of funding to Local Health Districts is 
determined by multiplying the total units of activity (weighted) by a price set 
by the NSW Independent Pricing Authority, which is a dollar amount paid for 
each unit of patient care. This price takes into account the volume and type of 
patients, the complexity of the patients’ clinical condition, and the cost of 
services, based on standards and weighted averages. However, the Local 
Health Districts allocation of those funds to hospitals is (usually) based on the 
previous years’ annual budget, and projected activity targets. 
Over and above the funding provided through the National Healthcare 
Agreement (2012), the NSW Ministry of Health provides separate funding for 
a range of central publicly-funded health and support services. These are: 
population health, Aboriginal health, Ambulance services, Justice Health, and 
central agencies including: Local Health Districts, the Clinical Excellence 
Commission, the Health Education and Training Institute, the Agency for 
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Clinical Innovation, the Bureau of Health Information; and the administrative 
divisions within the Ministry of Health itself (ABFT 2013a).  
The NSW Ministry of Health is also known to approve either one-off or longer-
term funding to some Local Health Districts during a financial year, but the 
criteria for those decisions remain unclear. The Ministry may also provide 
Transition Grants, which do provide some assurance that patient care will not 
be compromised if the cost of providing care exceeds the ABF price paid for 
it. Such grants are expected to be phased out over time, as Local Health 
Districts become more efficient. Whether the provision of those grants is 
successful in achieving better economic or technical efficiency in the long 
term or, whether they provide an incentive to maintain the status quo, 
remains to be seen. It is clear from this account that the implementation of 
ABF in its pure form has been so diluted that it may in fact have little impact 
on the way that public hospitals conduct their business.  
In summary, using ABF for funding hospital services devolves responsibility to 
each clinician in each clinical unit to document all treatment and movement of 
patients while they are in the hospital, so that the full cost of their care is 
captured. In so doing, it was expected that, in time, this would improve the 
quality of health data, and would contribute to a change in the established 
culture of the medical profession, which is viewed as being inefficient (ABFT 
2013b). The provision of primary care would be improved, and the proportion 
of potentially preventable hospital admissions would be reduced (COAG 
2012).  
Further, the benefits of using ABF as the technical tool by which to fund public 
hospital services was promoted because it was claimed to be simple to use, it 
was consistent with international standards, it promoted cost control, and the 
financial risk was shared between the funder and the provider of health 
services (NSW Health 2005). The risks of using this funding model for funding 
hospital services were well-known at that time, which was made explicit by 
the inclusion in the NH Reform Agreement of a mechanism for monitoring 
over-servicing. These risks are those associated with using the classification 
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system of DRGs as a funding tool, details of which are presented next. This 
classification system is not only the basis for coding each patient’s episode of 
care, on which ABF operates, but it is also the basis on which data have been 
selected (and analysed) to answer the research question.  
More than forty years ago in the USA, academics from Yale University 
developed a system of DRGs in an effort to analyse and understand the costs 
of healthcare. This system was identified as a tool with which hospitals could 
‘reduce costs, increase benefits and improve system quality’ (Leister & 
Stausberg 2005, p. 47). In the USA system, each episode of patient care was 
assigned to one of (originally) 467 DRGs, based on diagnosis, procedure, 
age, sex, discharge destination, and the presence of complications or co-
morbidities. Costing studies then enabled a dollar cost to be assigned to each 
DRG, which meant that, in principle, it would be possible to pay a hospital a 
pre-determined amount (a prospective payment) for treating a patient 
assigned to that DRG, irrespective of what was actually spent on the patient 
during their hospital stay. Thus a set fee could be paid for each unit of care, 
regardless of the cost of the treatment provided (Leister & Stausberg 2005). 
In such a system, payment will, of course be retrospective, in that the hospital 
would be paid in arrears, for patients to whom treatment had been provided 
and a DRG and assigned.  
This retrospective payment is made for each unit of care, and is partly based 
on the number of days that a patient assigned to that DRG would normally be 
expected to stay in hospital. For example, a hospital was not paid more 
money if a patient’s stay in hospital was longer than the average stay for all 
patients for that specific DRG, which was an incentive to discharge patients 
within the benchmark length of stay, and is designed to encourage patients’ 
treatment in hospital to be replaced with treatment and therapy in a (less 
costly) outpatient setting (Leister & Stausberg 2005).  
Leister and Stausberg (2005) critiqued the strengths and weaknesses of the 
DRG cost-accounting method among three countries: USA, Switzerland and 
Australia. They found that it was able to control costs well (one of its design 
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features), and that many service delivery objectives had been achieved 
through the use of the DRG system, making its introduction attractive to 
governments which are driven by economic incentives.   
However, they made a number of criticisms, and their overall rating of the 
DRG cost-accounting system was more negative than positive in those 
countries (Leister & Stausberg 2005). One criticism is that perverse 
incentives are embedded within it: for example, it does not reward activities 
which improve the quality of health care but which cost more; nor does it 
encourage innovations in health care which may require funding in the short-
term, but may reduce costs in the longer term; nor does it discourage the 
health risk behaviours which are known to contribute to many lifestyle-related 
illnesses, for example diabetes and cardio-vascular disease (Leister & 
Stausberg 2005). Another unintended consequence of the DRG system 
reported by Leister and Stausberg (2005), and in a recent Productivity 
Commission Report (2015), is that it rewards health service providers who act 
in ways that can impact negatively on the quality of the care they provide, for 
example, by discharging patients from hospital earlier than their clinical 
condition warrants.  
Further, the DRG system, on which the policy of ABF is based, requires 
accurate recording of each patient’s clinical details in their medical record, 
and subsequent review of the medical record by trained coders, who assign 
the patient’s episode of care to the correct DRG (Steinbusch et al 2007). This 
is a time-consuming process, and is open to manipulation if there is the 
possibility of recording clinical details in such a way that the patient is 
assigned to a higher-cost DRG than their episode of care actually warrants, 
thus attracting more money to the hospital (Steinbusch et al 2007; Collier 
2008). Steinbusch et al (2007, p. 290) referred to this practice as ‘up-coding’, 
which was reported to be influenced by factors such as the size of the 
hospital, the internal and external control mechanisms for coding, and 
characteristics embedded in the classification system, such as the ‘ambiguity 
of the DRG classification criteria’.  
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Since its introduction in the USA, the DRG system has undergone 
considerable development and expansion to cover non-hospital care, and has 
now been adapted for use in a number of other countries, including the United 
Kingdom (UK), the Netherlands, Germany, and Australia (Ham 1994; Leister & 
Stausberg 2005; Steinbusch et al 2007). In Australia, this clinical costing 
classification system has been modified to reflect Australian clinical practice 
and use of hospital resources, and given the title ‘Australian Refined – 
Diagnosis Related Groups’ (AR-DRGs). The current set of AR-DRGs is the 
outcome of many years of repeated modification of this disease classification 
system (every two-years), and the refinements, are reported to have removed 
some of the unintended consequences that resulted from the use of DRGs for 
funding health care in other countries (Leeder 1999; Leister & Stausberg 
2005).  
Leister and Stausberg (2005) noted that many of the observed negative 
consequences of using DRGs were associated with its implementation, rather 
than a fundamental flaw in the DRG system itself. For example, concern 
about the quality of data was heightened when inconsistencies were noted in 
reports from different agencies containing data which had originated from the 
same source (Pollicino, Viney & Haas 2002).   
Traditionally, funding of hospitals has been determined using historical data, 
which meant that each year hospitals received the same amount of funding 
as the previous year, with an adjustment for inflation. This mechanism 
provides little incentive for clinicians and hospital managers to seek internal 
efficiencies. It has resulted in the production of financial information whose 
poor quality makes it less than optimal for making decisions about setting 
priorities for funding, leaving the way open for decisions about the re-
allocation of resources which may have political consequences (Abernethy 
1995; Croxin 2011). The use of historical data for the allocation of funds has 
also been alleged to encourage cost-shifting (Richardson 2005; Griffith 2006). 
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In spite of the risks associated with using DRGs as a funding tool, these were 
not thought to be of a scale sufficient to warrant the development of an 
alternative model to ABF for funding public hospital services. The benefit of 
using DRGs to classify inpatient episodes of care is that the ‘classification 
system groups patient stays in hospital into ‘clinically meaningful categories of 
similar levels of complexity (outputs) that consume similar amounts of 
resources (inputs)’ (Duckett 2007 p.152). As a consequence this DRG 
prospective payment system was introduced by many countries, including 
Australia, as a powerful way to rein in hospital expenditure, and to influence 
the clinical and diagnostic choices made by medical staff, which are two major 
drivers of hospital costs. It was also claimed that it had the capacity to limit the 
power of unions, and, in so doing, gave hospital managers more control to 
contain expenditure (Evans et al 2006).  
As described in Chapter 1, the origin of the development of ABF, and a 
national approach to the funding of hospital services in Australia can be traced 
back to 1988, when the Commonwealth and State governments signed the 
Medicare Agreement (Leeder 1999). This Agreement made Commonwealth 
funding available to undertake the necessary work on the refinement of the 
classification of DRGs to make them suitable for use in the Australian health 
system (Casemix Development Program) (Leeder 1999; Duckett 2007). 
Victoria and South Australia were the first States to introduce a model of 
casemix funding using DRGs as the basis for funding public hospitals (Leeder 
1999; Hancock 1999 p. 141). By 2009, most States were funding public 
hospitals using some form of casemix funding, but the funding methods used 
were not uniform (Hancock 1999). This changed in 2011 with the signing of 
the NH Reform Agreement, and, as a consequence, a nationally consistent 
approach to the funding of hospital services, rather than hospitals per se, 
using ABF where practicable, was implemented (COAG 2011). For the first 
time the Commonwealth had a uniform model for funding hospital services 
across all States. Hospital ‘activity is now described using a single National 
Weighted Activity Unit (NWAU), which is set using a measure of central 
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tendency of the distribution of hospital costs (the median cost is preferred over 
the average’) (Health Policy Solutions [HPS] 2011 p.7). The same price is paid 
for episodes of patient care/treatment regardless of the setting in which the 
service is provided. The price paid by the Commonwealth to the States for 
each episode of patient care is set by the IHPA, which is an independent 
national agency established under the NH Reform Agreement for this 
purpose.  
In a review of the early introduction of ABF in Western Australia (2011), 
interviewees stated that: “ABF has bought rigor and transparency and 
encouraged efficiency and effectiveness. It had promoted an extensive 
reporting culture at both finance and activity levels, together with key 
performance indicators. It was well embedded at executive level and was 
moving mindsets, however it still had to filter down the organisation”. On the 
other side of the equation it was stated that: “ABF costing has the potential to 
drive up hospital activity. No causal link was found between the reduction in 
length-of-stay and ABF” (Scott 2011 p. 13). 
Thus, the imperative of the best allocation of resources to obtain the best 
possible outcome (economic efficiency) has overridden the priority for public 
hospitals to focus on achievement of technical efficiency. Technical efficiency 
objectives, if met, would provide early identification of any unintentional 
adverse effects of the health reform on the quality and safely of care provided 
to patients while in hospital (Scotton & Ferber 1978; COAG 2011). However, 
measuring technical efficiency would require measuring the impact of 
providing more (or less) resources, on the health benefit gained by patients 
who receive care through the use of those resources (a health outcome), or 
alternatively, an improvement in the delivery of services provided to patients 
(a system outcome) (Culyer 2005). While some objectives included in the NH 
Reform documentation incorporate technical efficiency, these are secondary 
in importance to those associated with economic efficiency.  
This emphasis on economic efficiency reinforces the perception that the 
increasing cost of health care in Australia is not affordable, which has driven 
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the NH Reform agenda (Duckett et al 2014). However, the Commonwealth 
Government’s recent statement that it is reconsidering its commitment to 
increase its share of the growth in public hospital funding, and that future 
Commonwealth funding to the States will be linked to population growth and 
the Consumer Price Index4, is a strong indication that the risk associated with 
using the AR-DRG classification system for funding purposes should not be 
under   estimated (Bundey 2014; Productivity Commission [PC] 2015). 
 
3.4 Conclusion 
This chapter has presented the incentives for the States to sign the NH 
Reform Agreement, the objectives of the Reform, the values inherent in the 
rhetoric, and the mechanisms introduced for it to be operationalised. Some of 
the changes that would be expected in public hospitals if the model of ABF, 
has been successful in meeting its objectives are given. The DRG 
classification system is described, which is the basis from which ABF was 
developed to fund public hospital services. The strengths and weaknesses of 
using this system for funding purposes, and its development to reflect the 
Australian health system (AR-DRGs), and why it was initially introduced as a 
tool from which to classify each episode of clinical care provided to patients 
(Duckett 2007). ABF is built on the use of the AR-DRG classification system, 
and this thesis relies heavily on those data to answer the research question.  
The findings from the analysis of data are now presented in chapters four, five 
and six.   
                                            
4 The Consumer Price Index is ‘a measure of the weighted price change, over a period of 
time, of a bundle of goods purchased’ (Culyer 2005, p. 68).  
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Chapter 4: Chronic obstructive airways disease  
 
4.1 Introduction   
The focus of this chapter is those patients admitted to hospitals that receive 
ABF with a primary diagnosis of COAD, coded as being without catastrophic 
complications or co-morbidities (the ‘eligible’ category), or with catastrophic 
complications or co-morbidities (the ‘ineligible’ category). The reason for 
examining the throughput of hospital patients with COAD is that it is a chronic 
condition, exacerbations of which may not necessarily require hospital 
treatment (MoH 2013).  
COAD is one of the diseases that affect the lungs and airways, which are also 
described as diseases of the pulmonary (respiratory) system. It is a chronic 
inflammatory condition resulting in persistent secretion of mucus which 
obstructs the air passages, and predisposes the patient to emphysema, 
bronchitis and pneumonia and similar conditions (AIHW 2010). Air pollution 
and cigarette smoking are examples of social factors known to contribute to 
the development and clinical progression of these conditions (WHO 2014; 
ABS 2014).  
In 2008-2009 the national cost of treating COAD was estimated to be $929 
million. Over 57 per cent of that expenditure was on patients admitted to 
hospital (public and private acute hospitals, psychiatric hospitals, and medical 
services provided to private admitted patients in public hospitals) (AIHW 
2014). Out-of-hospital medical services for COAD patients accounted for a 
further 19.5 per cent of the total expenditure. There is no evidence to suggest 
that the distribution of expenditure on COAD patients in NSW is different.  
The chapter is structured as follows. It begins with a summary of the overall 
throughput of patients with COAD in each of the two Local Health Districts, 
and proceeds with a more detailed presentation of changes in the throughput 
of COAD patients over the five years of the study. For those hospitals where 
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a change in throughput of patients coded to the ‘eligible’ category was found 
to be statistically significant, seven categories of explanation for those 
changes are explored. The overall findings from the analyses are discussed. 
The focus of the analysis is then expanded to examine the balance between 
the potentially available revenue and the resources required to treat this 
category of patient, in each hospital, in each Local Health District.   
 
4.2 Patient throughput  
Four hospitals in the Western Sydney Local Health District receive ABF: 
Westmead, Blacktown, Auburn, and Mount Druitt. Over the five years of the 
study, 8,268 patients were admitted to those hospitals with a principal 
diagnosis of COAD, of whom 75 per cent were coded to the ‘eligible’ category, 
i.e., without catastrophic complications or co-morbidities, who could potentially 
be treated in a setting other than that of an acute hospital.   
This picture is not dissimilar to that in the Hunter New England Local Health 
District, in which eight hospitals receive ABF: John Hunter, Calvary Mater, 
Maitland, Belmont, Manning Base, Tamworth Base, Armidale, and Kurri Kurri. 
Over the five years of the study, 7,611 patients were admitted to these 
hospitals with a principal diagnosis of COAD, of whom 74 per cent were 
coded to the ‘eligible’ category.   
Figures 4.1 and 4.2 present the number of hospital admissions in the two 
Local Health Districts of all patients with COAD who were coded as being 
‘eligible’ for treatment in a setting other than that of an acute hospital.   
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Figure 4.1: Admissions of patients with COAD, coded as ‘eligible’, to 
Western Sydney hospitals, 2009 to 2013 
 
 
Figure 4.2: Admissions of patients with COAD, coded as ‘eligible’, to 
Hunter New England hospitals, 2009 to 2013 
  
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
Blacktown Westmead Mt Druitt Auburn
N
u
m
b
er
 o
f 
 a
d
m
is
si
o
n
s
Hospitals
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
20
70
120
170
220
270
320
N
u
m
b
er
 o
f 
ad
m
is
si
o
n
s 
 
Hospitals
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Chronic Obstructive Airways Disease 
- 102 - 
 
For this patient category in the Western Sydney Local Health District, there 
was an increase in the number of patients admitted to Blacktown Hospital in 
2010 and a steady decline thereafter. Westmead Hospital, had an initial 
decline in patient admissions, which then rose in 2012 and 2013. There was a 
slight decline in throughput of patients at Auburn Hospital, and an increase at 
Mount Druitt Hospital. The decrease in the number of patients admitted to 
Blacktown and the increase in admissions to Mt Druitt Hospital were both 
statistically significantly different from zero (0.02 > p > 0.01, and 0.05 > p > 
0.025 respectively). The overall decline in admissions over the study period 
was not significant at Westmead or Auburn Hospital. 
All Hunter New England hospitals showed a similar trend: an increase in the 
number of patients admitted until 2012, then a decline in the following year. 
The Armidale Hospital was the only hospital which, after 2011, showed a 
decrease in admissions, which was statistically significant (p<0.001).  
To enable comparison of patient throughput between hospitals the annual 
admission rate per 100 admissions, for each hospital, and for all hospitals 
combined in each Local Health District, were calculated. Figures 4.3 and 4.4 
present those data.   
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Figure 4.3 Annual standardised admission rate for patients with 
COAD, coded as ‘eligible’, in Western Sydney hospitals 
 
 
Figure 4.4 Annual standardised admission rate for patients with 
COAD, coded as ‘eligible’, in Hunter New England hospitals 
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For this category of patients’, there was a decrease in the number of patients 
admitted to all the ABF hospitals in the Western Sydney Local Health District 
over the study period, with the exception of Mount Druitt Hospital where, for 
every 100 patients admitted, there was an average increase of six 
standardised admissions per year. The greatest decline in the number of 
standardised admissions was at Blacktown Hospital, and the slopes of the 
linear regression lines for 2009 to 2011 and 2011 to 2013 (before and after 
the introduction of ABF) were not greatly different; -32.0 and -41.0 
respectively (not illustrated).  
In the Hunter New England Local Health District hospitals, the rate of increase 
in standardised admissions was greatest at Maitland Hospital, where there 
was an average increase of six admissions per year, but the probability that 
this trend was significantly different from zero is only 0.07, which fails to reach 
the traditional level of statistical significance (p<0.05). The only hospital to 
experience a statistically significant decline in the number of standardised 
admissions of patients coded to the ‘eligible’ category was the Armidale 
Hospital. However, the number of admissions to this hospital was small, 
contributing less than five per cent of all the admissions coded to the ‘eligible’ 
category in the Hunter New England hospitals. Therefore, it is difficult to draw 
any generalisable inference from the reduction in admissions to this particular 
hospital. 
The increase in the number of admissions to Mount Druitt Hospital reached 
the traditional level of significance, however detailed exploration of possible 
explanations for that change is not warrented for the reasons given at the end 
of this chapter. Thus Blacktown was the only hospital in which the decrease in 
patient throughput was substantial and statistically significantly different from 
zero (0.02 > p > 0.01).  The analyses now focus on possible explanations for 
this result.   
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4.3 Possible explanations for the change in COAD patient 
throughput at Blacktown Hospital 
Seven possible explanations are categorised as: ABF; demographic factors; 
disease factors; social factors; hospital policy; clinical practice; and coding 
practice.  
 
4.3.1 Activity Based Funding 
One possible explanation for the decline in the number of patients admitted to 
Blacktown Hospital is that more patients with COAD were receiving treatment 
for their condition in a location other than that of an acute hospital - which is 
an intended outcome of ABF. If this were the case, the number of patients 
admitted to hospital and coded to the ‘eligible’ category would be expected to 
decline, and the number of patients coded to the ‘ineligible’ category would 
not change greatly over the same period.  
Figure 4.5 presents the change in admissions of these two categories of 
patients in Blacktown Hospital. 
 
Figure 4.5: Admissions of patients to Blacktown Hospital with COAD, 
coded as ‘eligible’, or ‘ineligible’, 2009 to 2013  
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From 2010 to 2012, the total number of patients admitted to Blacktown 
Hospital with COAD remained relatively constant. However, those coded to 
the ‘ineligible’ category nearly trebled, while those coded to the ‘eligible’ 
category declined by one-third. These trends in admission for each category 
of patients were statistically significantly different from zero (0.02 > p > 0.01).   
This pattern of change is inconsistent with that intended by the introduction of 
ABF, and therefore other possible explanations for the changes in the 
throughput of patients were sought.   
 
4.3.2 Demographic Factors  
A possible explanation for the decrease in the number of patients admitted is 
a change in the demographic profile of those patients. If patients are 
diagnosed with COAD at a younger age, early intervention (and effective 
treatment) may delay the progression of the condition, resulting in fewer of 
those patients in the older age groups being admitted to hospital and coded to 
the ‘eligible’ category. 
Figure 4.6 presents the cumulative age-distribution calculated for patients 
admitted to Blacktown Hospital with COAD, and coded to the ‘eligible’ 
category, as well as the annual number of admissions, and the median age of 
these patients. 
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Figure 4.6: Age-distribution of patients admitted to Blacktown Hospital 
with COAD, coded as ‘eligible’, 2009 to 2013 
 
Note:  n= total number of admissions in each of the five years of the study; figures in square 
brackets denote the median age of each cohort of patients 
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Department of Blacktown Hospital with COAD. Further clarification may arise 
also from analysis of the assignment to one of the five Triage Categories of 
each person who did present to the Emergency Department. 
Figure 4.7 presents the number of presentations to the Emergency 
Department of Blacktown Hospital of people coded to COAD, and their 
distribution between the five Triage Categories, 2009 to 2013. 
 
Figure 4.7: Total presentations for COAD to the Emergency Department 
of Blacktown Hospital by Triage Category, 2009 to 2013 
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‘ineligible’ admissions shown in Figure 4.5, where more patients were 
admitted to hospital with catastrophic complications or co-morbidities, over the 
study period.   
The explanation of increased community morbidity can be tested by analysing 
the number of admissions to the hospital from the Emergency Department, 
which would be expected to show a similar pattern to that shown in Figure 4.7. 
Figure 4.8 shows the result of this analysis. 
 
Figure 4.8: Total presentations for COAD treated in the Emergency 
Department of Blacktown Hospital and subsequently 
admitted to the hospital, by Triage Category, 2009 to 2013 
 
 
The total number of people admitted to the hospital from the Emergency 
Department, rose sharply from 2009 to 2010, but remained relatively steady 
thereafter. Admissions from Triage Categories 1 and 2 rose substantially from 
2011 onwards, accompanied by a decline in admissions from Triage 
Categories 3 and 4. 
134
241 236
225
247
0
50
100
150
200
250
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
N
u
m
b
er
 o
f 
p
re
se
n
ta
ti
o
n
s 
ad
m
it
te
d
 t
o
 t
h
e 
h
o
sp
it
al
Year
All
Presentations
Triage 1
Triage 2
Triage 3
Triage 4
Triage 5
Chronic Obstructive Airways Disease 
- 110 - 
 
This pattern in both the number of presentations and admissions could be the 
consequence of increasingly serious community morbidity. The decline in the 
number of admissions of less-seriously ill people in Triage Categories 3 and 4 
could also be due to improved community-based services which provide care 
for such people outside the hospital setting. If this were so, it should be 
reflected in increased numbers of patients being discharged from the 
Emergency Department without being admitted to hospital.   
Therefore, the next step in this analysis is to examine the possibility that these 
social factors might account for the change observed for this category of 
patient at Blacktown Hospital. 
4.3.4 Social Factors 
Another possible explanation for a decline in the number of patients admitted 
with COAD, and coded to the ‘eligible’ category, is that there was an increase 
in the level of support available to care for these patients, and to treat their 
chronic illnesses in the community, either after they were discharged from 
hospital, or reducing the need for their admission in the first place.  
If this were the case, more of those people who presented to the Emergency 
Department would be treated within, and then discharged from, the 
Emergency Department, rather than being admitted to the hospital. Figure 4.9 
shows these data. 
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Figure 4.9: Total presentations for COAD treated in, and discharged 
from the Emergency Department of Blacktown Hospital, by 
Triage Category, 2009 to 2013 
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Figure 4.10: Ratio of hospital admissions to discharges from the 
Emergency Department of Blacktown Hospital, 2009 to 2013 
 
Note:  n= total number of presentations over the five years of the study 
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possible that an increase in the level of support which was available to care 
for these patients in the community once they were discharged from hospital, 
might result in the same patient being admitted to the same hospital, for the 
same condition, on fewer occasions. It is not possible to identify individual 
patients, or the appearance of the same patient in more than one dataset, 
since the data in the datasets contain no unique patient identifier. The best 
that can be done is to identify the hospital admissions of people with the same 
Year of Birth, and residing in the same Postcode. 
Figure 4.11 presents the frequency distribution of the number of times that 
patients with the same Year of Birth, and residing in the same Postcode, were 
admitted to Blacktown Hospital with COAD, and coded to the ‘eligible’ 
category, in the years 2009 and 2013. Because the absolute number of 
admissions declined, the ordinate is expressed as a proportion of admissions, 
not the total number. 
 
Figure 4.11: Proportion of occasions on which a patient with the same 
Year of Birth and residing in the same Postcode was 
admitted to Blacktown Hospital, 2009 and 2013  
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Note: n= total number of admissions in each year 
For this category of patients at Blacktown Hospital there were fewer multiple 
admissions in 2013 than in 2009, although this failed to reach statistical 
significance (chi-squared = 7.2, df = 5, 0.30 > p > 0.20). It can be concluded 
that a reduction in the number of multiple admissions of the same patient is 
unlikely to have contributed to the increase in the number of admissions to 
Blacktown Hospital of patients with COAD coded to the ‘eligible’ category. The 
next step in this analysis is to examine the possibility that changes in hospital 
policy might account for the changes in patient throughput. 
4.3.5 Hospital Policy 
If a change had occurred in the State discharge policies, in line with the 
objectives of ABF, patients who presented to an Emergency Department and 
were assessed as requiring semi-urgent or non-urgent treatment (Triage 
Category 4 or 5), might have been referred to an alternative service provider 
located in the community, rather than being admitted to hospital. The number 
of patients admitted to Blacktown Hospital with COAD, and coded to the 
‘eligible’ category, declined over the five years of the study (Figure 4.1), while 
the number admitted from the Emergency Department rose (Figure 4.7).  
The hospital inpatient data set does not include information on the source of 
the admission, and so data on both ‘eligible’ and ‘ineligible’ admission 
categories must be combined so that the number of admissions from a source 
other than the Emergency Department can be calculated by subtraction. 
These data are shown in Figure 4.12. 
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Figure 4.12: Source of admissions of patients with COAD, to Blacktown 
Hospital, 2009 to 2013 
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This leads to the next step in this analysis which is to examine the possibility 
that changes in clinical practice might account for the changes in patient 
throughput. 
4.3.6 Clinical Practice 
Another possible explanation for the decline in the number of patients with 
COAD and coded to the ‘eligible’ category, is a change in the way in which 
hospital clinicians practised medicine i.e., a change in the treatment of 
individual patients, and/or the recording of clinical information in the medical 
record.  
With the introduction of ABF, medical staff were encouraged to ensure that 
they made an accurate record of all clinical phenomena. If this emphasis had 
resulted in ‘up-coding’, this would result in a greater identification of patients 
with severe complications and comorbidities (the ‘ineligible’ category), rather 
than without complications and comorbidities (the ‘eligible’ category), and the 
absolute number of patients admitted to hospital would remain steady.  
The major change observed at Blacktown Hospital was in the balance 
between patients with COAD who were coded to the ‘eligible’ and to the 
‘ineligible’ categories (Figure 4.5), and the most likely explanation for this 
result is a change in the quality and comprehensiveness of medical record 
keeping after 2011. However, it is also possible that changes in coding 
practice might account for the change in patient throughput.  
 
4.3.7 Coding Practice 
Another possible explanation for the decrease in the number of patients with 
COAD, and coded to the ‘eligible’ category, is a change in the written 
instructions contained in the Policy and Procedures Manual used by Medical 
Record personnel (Coders) to assign patients to a specific disease category 
(an AR-DRG). 
The NSW Ministry of Health, Health Care Records - Documentation and 
Management 2012, (PD2012_069) policy directive, contains no information 
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which suggests that any changes had taken place in the instructions given to 
hospital Coders as to the features of the medical record which would 
determine the assignment of a patient with COAD to one or the other AR-
DRGs, ‘ineligible’ or ‘eligible’.  
Discussion of the significance of these explanations for Blacktown Hospital will 
be deferred until after the changes in throughput at Mount Druitt Hospital have 
been considered. 
Change in throughput at Mount Druitt Hospital: having explored the seven 
possible explanations for the change in throughput at Blacktown Hospital, the 
changes in patient throughput at Mount Druitt Hospital are now discussed. 
The trend in the increase in the number of admissions to Mount Druitt Hospital 
reached the traditional level of statistical significance, however those 
admissions represented only 13 per cent of all admissions of this category of 
patient within the Western Sydney Local Health District.  
While patients with COAD, coded to the ‘eligible’ category, generally remained 
in the other hospitals for between four and seven days, 79 per cent of these 
patients who were admitted to Mount Druitt Hospital were transferred quickly 
(in less than one day) to another hospital, while one per cent were transferrred 
to a nursng home, and the remainder were discharged.  
A similar pattern was observed in the analysis of patients who presented for 
treatment of their COAD to the Emergency Department at Mount Druitt 
Hospital. Of the 1,348 patients who presented to the Emergency Department 
with this condition, only one per cent were admitted to Mount Druitt Hospital, 
and the remainder were either transferred to another hospital (65 per cent), or 
discharged home following treatment (28 per cent), or departed for another 
clinical service location (five per cent).  
It is concluded that these atypical features of the management of patients with 
COAD at Mount Druitt Hospital do not justify detailed exploration of the 
possible reasons for the increase in the throughput of these patients.  
Chronic Obstructive Airways Disease 
- 118 - 
 
4.4 Discussion of changes in hospital patient admissions 
The increasing presentation of patients to the Western Sydney hospitals’ 
Emergency Departments with COAD over the period of the study, and the 
apparent increase in the clinical severity of those presentations, suggests that 
a review of the records of the Environmental Protection Agency for data on air 
quality in Western Sydney over the period of the study might be indicated. A 
deterioration in local air quality would be expected to result in an increase in 
the number of patients who presented to the Emergency Department with a 
range of respiratory conditions, including COAD, asthma and others. 
However, the conduct of such a review is outside the scope of this thesis, and 
was not pursued. 
At Blacktown Hospital the decline in the number of admissions of patients with 
COAD, and coded to the ‘eligible’ category, was accompanied by an increase 
in the number of patients admitted and coded to the ‘ineligible’ category, while 
the total number of patients admitted year-on-year did not change greatly. 
There are two possible explanations for this result: an increase in the 
prevalence of COAD in the community, which is unlikely, given that the 
absolute number of patients admitted to this hospital did not change greatly; 
and/or a change in the documentation in the medical records of patients at 
Blacktown Hospital. There is some evidence consistent with progressive ‘up-
coding’ in the case of Blacktown Hospital (Figure 4.5), most possibly as a 
result of more accurate recording of patients’ clinical condition in their medical 
record.  
Patients who were initially admitted to Mount Druitt Hospital were transferred 
to another hospital comparatively quickly, and the Length of Stay for the 
majority of patients in the ‘eligible’ category admitted to that hospital was less 
than one day. This pattern of the throughput of patients at the Mount Druitt 
Hospital, suggest that this hospital acts more like a casualty clearing station 
than an acute hospital. The data from this hospital contributed little to 
answering the research question, and they have been excluded from the 
analysis reported in the next section.  
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In spite of variations between the performance of the ABF hospitals, in both 
the Western Sydney and Hunter New England Local Health Districts, it may 
reasonably be concluded that there was no overall policy shift by the Local 
Health Districts in response to the introduction of ABF, or, if there was such a 
shift, it proved ineffective in its implementation.   
The findings from analyses to answer Question three: what is the financial 
consequences of these changes, expressed in terms of the balance between 
available revenue and resource use? - are presented next. 
 
4.5 Financial implications of Activity Based Funding  
The PARI is an indicator of the balance between the potentially available 
revenue and the resources required to treat patients with COAD, and coded 
to the ‘eligible’ category for each hospital receiving ABF, and for the 
respective Local Health District as a whole. For each Local Health District, the 
PARI for all hospitals combined is anchored at 100 for 2009. The trend of a 
rise in the PARI, over the five years of the study, is caused by a decline in the 
duration of hospital stay for these patients. 
Figures 4.13 and 4.14 present the PARI performance of the individual 
hospitals in the Western Sydney, and Hunter New England Local Health 
Districts, in treating patients admitted with COAD, who were coded as 
‘eligible’ for treatment in a setting other than that of an acute hospital, and 
compared with the combined performance of all the hospitals in the Local 
Health District, from 2009 to 2013. The data for Mount Druitt Hospital and 
Kurri Kurri Hospital have not been included, for the reasons stated previously. 
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Figure 4.13: PARI for each Western Sydney hospital, and for all 
hospitals combined, for patients with COAD coded as 
‘eligible’, 2009 to 2013  
 
 
Figure 4.14: PARI for each Hunter New England hospital, and for all 
hospitals combined, for patients with COAD coded as 
‘eligible’, 2009 to 2013 
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The combined PARIs for Western Sydney and for Hunter New England both 
showed an increase, which became more marked after the introduction of 
ABF in 2011. The principal contributor to the Western Sydney hospitals’ rise in 
PARI was Westmead, with Auburn showing a less marked rise. For Blacktown 
Hospital, the PARI was low initially, but rose steadily after 2011. If the revenue 
from ABF were to be passed on to individual hospitals, Westmead and Auburn 
Hospitals would benefit most. While initially Blacktown Hospital appeared to 
use more resources to treat those patients than would have been available 
from ABF, this trend was reversed after 2011.  
The principal contributors to the Hunter New England hospitals’ rise in PARI 
were the Calvary Mater and Manning Base Hospitals, while Belmont Hospital 
showed variation in the rise and fall in the PARI over the five years of the 
study. If the revenue from ABF were to be passed on to individual hospitals, 
the Calvary Mater and Manning Base Hospitals would benefit most. The John 
Hunter Hospital initially used more resources to treat these patients than 
would have been available from ABF but this trend was reversed in 2012, and 
by 2013 the PARI for John Hunter Hospital was 104. 
These findings suggest that ABF may have acted as a financial incentive for 
hospitals to reduce the duration of patients’ stays in hospital, with the 
exceptions of Belmont and Tamworth Base Hospitals in the Hunter New 
England Local Health District. The final conclusion to be drawn from these 
findings, and the implications, are presented in chapter seven. 
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Chapter 5: Diabetes  
 
5.1 Introduction   
The focus of this chapter is those patients admitted to hospitals that receive 
ABF in the Western Sydney and Hunter New England Local Health Districts, 
with a primary diagnosis of diabetes, coded as being without catastrophic 
complications or co-morbidities (the ‘eligible’ category), or to diabetes with 
catastrophic complications or co-morbidities (the ‘ineligible’ category). The 
reason for analysing the throughput of patients hospitalised with diabetes is 
that this is a chronic condition, exacerbations of which may not necessarily 
require treatment in hospital (MoH 2013).   
Diabetes is a chronic disease, which occurs when the pancreas does not 
produce enough insulin, or when the body cannot use effectively the insulin 
produced by the pancreas (AIHW 2015). This leads to an increased 
concentration of glucose in the blood (hyperglycaemia). There are three types 
of diabetes. Type 1 diabetes is characterised by a lack of insulin production by 
the pancreas. Type 2 diabetes is caused by the body’s ineffective use of 
insulin. It often results from excess body weight and physical inactivity. The 
third type, gestational diabetes, is hyperglycaemia that is first recognised 
during pregnancy (AIHW 2015).  
Diabetes is claimed to ‘affect more than four per cent of Australians, at least 
10 per cent of the elderly, and up to 30 per cent of some Aboriginal 
communities’ (AIHW 2014). In 2012–2013, the total national expenditure on 
the treatment of patients with diabetes was estimated to be $138.7 billion, of 
which $55.9 billion was for hospital care (AIHW 2014). The average annual 
cost for each patient diagnosed with diabetes in 2015 was about $1,700 for 
men and $2,100 for women. Twenty nine per cent of these costs were for 
hospital care, 20 per cent for pharmaceuticals, and 14 per cent was expended 
on medical services’ (AIHW Media Release, 17 May 1999). 
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The chapter is structured as follows. An overview is given of the hospital 
throughput of all patients with diabetes in each Local Health District. The 
analysis then focuses on more detailed changes in the throughput of patients 
with diabetes over the five years of the study. For those hospitals where a 
change in throughput of patients coded to the ‘eligible’ category was found to 
be statistically significant (or was very close to being so), seven categories of 
explanation for those changes are explored. The overall findings from the 
analyses are discussed. The focus of the analysis is then expanded to 
examine the balance between the potentially available revenue and the 
resources required to treat this category of patient, in each hospital, in each 
Local Health District.   
 
5.2 Patient throughput  
Over the 5 years of the study, 3,299 patients with a principal diagnosis of 
diabetes were admitted to one of the four hospitals in the Western Sydney 
Local Health District that received ABF, of whom 76 per cent were coded to 
the ‘eligible’ category.  
Over the same period, 3,345 patients with a principal diagnosis of diabetes 
were admitted to one of the eight hospitals in the Hunter New England Local 
Health District that received ABF, of whom 75 per cent were coded to the 
‘eligible’ category. 
Figures 5.1 and 5.2 present the number of admissions of all diabetic patients, 
coded as ‘eligible’ for treatment in a setting other than that of an acute 
hospital, for the two Local Health Districts.   
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Figure 5.1: Admissions of patients with diabetes, coded as ‘eligible’, to 
Western Sydney hospitals, 2009 to 2013 
 
 
Figure 5.2: Admissions of patients with diabetes, coded as ‘eligible’, to 
Hunter New England hospitals, 2009 to 2013 
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For this patient category in the Western Sydney Local Health District, there 
was a trend of gradually declining admissions to Westmead Hospital. At 
Blacktown and Mount Druitt Hospitals, patient admissions varied from one 
year to another, while at Auburn Hospital there was little change in the 
throughput of patients over the study period. None of these changes were 
statistically significantly different from zero.  
In the Hunter New England Local Health District the number of patients 
admitted with diabetes, and coded to the ‘eligible’ category in each of the 
hospitals, varied over the study period. The annual number of admissions to 
each of these hospitals was less than 70, with the exception of the John 
Hunter Hospital, which admitted around 250 patients each year. For the John 
Hunter, Tamworth Base and Armidale hospitals, there was a non-significant 
trend of declining admissions, 2009 to 2013. For the Calvary Mater and 
Maitland Hospitals there was a trend of an increase in the number of 
admissions from 2009 to 2012, followed by a decrease in 2013. For each year 
at Belmont and Kurri Kurri Hospitals, less than 30 patients were admitted with 
diabetes and coded to the ‘eligible’ category.    
Thus, for this category of patient, there was no consistent pattern of change 
across the Western Sydney Local Health District, as a whole. And, in the 
Hunter New England Local Health District hospitals, there is little to be 
inferred from the individual patterns of change observed.  
Figure 5.3 and 5.4 present the admission rates (standardised to 100 
admissions per year) for each hospital, and for all hospitals combined, in each 
Local Health District. 
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Figure 5.3 Annual standardised admission rate for patients with 
diabetes, coded as ‘eligible’, in Western Sydney hospitals 
 
 
Figure 5.4 Annual standardised admission rate for patients with 
diabetes, coded as ‘eligible’, in Hunter New England 
hospitals 
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For this patient category there was a decrease in the standardised annual 
number of patients admitted to each of the hospitals in the Western Sydney 
Local Health District, over the study period, with the exception of Mount Druitt 
Hospital, where for every 100 patients admitted there was an average 
increase of seven admissions per year. The greatest decline in admissions 
was observed at Westmead and Blacktown Hospitals. However, even for 
Westmead Hospital the rate of decline (11.1 admissions) was not statistically 
significantly different from zero, although it did approach that level (p=0.054), 
which makes it worthy of further exploration. 
In the Hunter New England Local Health District, the greatest increase in the 
number of standardised admissions each year was at Belmont Hospital (12.0 
admissions), followed by Maitland (11.8 admissions), Calvary Mater (9.9 
admissions), and Manning Base Hospital (1.4 admissions). Over the five years 
of the study, all the other ABF hospitals experienced a decline in the number 
of admissions per year. The probability that any of these trends was 
statistically significantly different from zero, failed to reach the traditional level 
of significance, with the exception of the John Hunter Hospital where the 
decline in the number of admissions to this category of patient was statistically 
significantly different from zero (0.05 > p > 0.025).   
Therefore, for seven of the eight hospitals in the Hunter New England Local 
Health District, no inference should be drawn from the small reductions or 
increases in admissions of this category of patient. The decline in the number 
of admissions at the John Hunter Hospital, does warrant further investigation 
to determine whether the change observed could be accounted for by the 
introduction of ABF.   
Because Westmead and the John Hunter Hospital had the greatest number of 
admissions for patients with diabetes, and the greatest change in throughput, 
possible explanations for the changes observed in the throughput of patients, 
at these two hospitals are explored further.  
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5.3 Possible explanations for the changes in throughput at 
Westmead and John Hunter Hospitals 
Seven possible reasons are categorised as: ABF; demographic factors; 
disease factors; social factors; hospital policy; clinical practice; and coding 
practice.  
 
5.3.1 Activity Based Funding 
One possible explanation for the decline in the number of patients admitted to 
Westmead Hospital and to the John Hunter Hospital with diabetes, and coded 
to the ‘eligible’ category, is that more patients with diabetes were receiving 
treatment for their condition in a location other than that of an acute hospital, 
which is an intended outcome of ABF. If this were the case, the number of 
patients admitted to these hospitals with diabetes, and coded to the ‘eligible’ 
category would decline, and the number of patients coded to the ‘ineligible’ 
category would not change greatly over the same period. 
Figures 5.5 and 5.6 present the changes in admissions of these two 
categories of patients (‘eligible’ and ‘ineligible’) to the Westmead and John 
Hunter Hospitals. 
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Figure 5.5: Admissions of patients to Westmead Hospital with diabetes, 
coded as ‘eligible’, or ‘ineligible’, 2009 to 2013 
 
 
Figure 5.6: Admissions of patients to John Hunter Hospital with 
diabetes, coded as ‘eligible’, or ‘ineligible’, 2009 to 2013 
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From 2009 to 2013, the number of patients admitted to Westmead Hospital 
and to the John Hunter Hospital with diabetes declined, both in the ‘eligible’ 
and in the ‘ineligible’ patient categories. For Westmead Hospital the trend of 
change in the total number of admissions (for both categories combined) was 
statistically significantly different from zero (0.05 > p > 0.025). For the John 
Hunter Hospital the declines in both the ‘eligible’ and ‘ineligible’ patient 
categories were statistically significant. The probability of the difference from 
zero occurring by chance for both categories of patients was 0.05 > p > 0.025.   
These patterns of reduction in the throughput of patients with diabetes, and 
coded to the ‘eligible’ category, are consistent with that intended by the 
introduction of ABF, but the corresponding decline in the ‘ineligible’ category is 
not. Therefore, other possible explanations for the changes in the number of 
patients admitted to these two hospitals, were sought.  
5.3.2 Demographic Factors 
Another possible explanation for the decline in the number of patients 
admitted with diabetes, and coded to the ‘eligible’ category is a change in the 
demographic profile of these patients. If patients are diagnosed with diabetes 
at a younger age, early intervention (and effective treatment) may delay the 
progression of the disease, resulting in a greater number of younger patients, 
when they are admitted to hospital, being coded to the ‘eligible’ category.   
Figures 5.7 and 5.8 present the cumulative age-distribution calculated for 
patients admitted to Westmead Hospital and to the John Hunter Hospital with 
diabetes, and coded to the ‘eligible’ category, as well as the annual number of 
admissions, and the median age of these patients.   
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Figure 5.7: Age-distribution of patients admitted to Westmead Hospital 
with diabetes, coded as ‘eligible’, 2009 to 2013 
 
Figure 5.8: Age-distribution of patients admitted to John Hunter 
Hospital with diabetes, coded as ‘eligible’, 2009 to 2013 
 
Note:  n= total number of admissions in each of the five years of the study; figures in square 
brackets denote the median age of each cohort of patients 
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The median age of patients admitted to the Westmead Hospital with diabetes, 
who were coded as ‘eligible’ for treatment in a setting other than that of an 
acute hospital, declined over the five years of the study. However, this trend 
was not statistically significant (0.10 > p > 0.05).   
The demographic profile of this category of patient at the John Hunter Hospital 
did not change greatly over the five years of the study. The relatively young 
median age of patients admitted to hospital with diabetes, and coded to the 
‘eligible’ category may reflect the predominance of Type 1 (rather than Type 
2) diabetes in this population.  
The conclusion is that, while the demographic profile of this category of patient 
changed in both hospitals, these changes, were not statistically significantly 
different from zero, and, at Westmead Hospital, are unlikely to account for the 
decline in the number of patients admitted in the ‘eligible’ category.   
The leads to exploration of community morbidity as a possible explanation for 
the changes observed. 
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5.3.3 Disease Factors (community morbidity) 
Another possible explanation for the decline in the number of patients with 
diabetes, coded to the ‘eligible’ category and admitted to Westmead Hospital, 
and to the John Hunter Hospital, is a reduction in the prevalence of this 
condition in the community i.e., fewer people were suffering from, and being 
diagnosed with, diabetes. If there was a decrease in community morbidity, 
fewer people would be expected to present to the Emergency Departments for 
treatment of their diabetes and of those who did present, fewer would require 
immediate treatment on their arrival.   
Therefore, evidence of a reduction in the prevalence of diabetes in the 
community as a possible explanation for the changes observed in hospital 
admissions may emerge from analysis of the numbers of people who 
presented to the Emergency Departments of Westmead Hospital and the 
John Hunter Hospital with diabetes, and their distribution between the five 
Triage Categories. 
Figures 5.9 and 5.10 present the number, and distribution across the five 
Triage Categories, of all patients presenting to the Emergency Departments of 
Westmead and to the John Hunter Hospital, and coded to a principal 
diagnosis of diabetes, 2009 to 2013.  
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Figure 5.9: Total presentations to the Emergency Department of 
Westmead Hospital, by Triage Category, 2009 to 2013 
 
 
Figure 5.10 Total presentations to the Emergency Department of John 
Hunter Hospital, by Triage Category, 2009 to 2013 
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The total number of people attending the Emergency Department of 
Westmead Hospital for treatment of their diabetes increased more than three-
fold over the five years of the study. Most of the increase was in those who, 
on their arrival at the Emergency Department, required Emergency treatment 
(Triage Category 2); with a slight increase in the number who required Urgent 
treatment (Triage Category 3), and only a slight increase in those requiring 
Semi-Urgent treatment (Triage Category 4). The numbers of people who 
required Resuscitation (Triage Category 1), or Non-Urgent treatment (Triage 
Category 5), were small and did not change.  
Thus, not only were more people with diabetes presenting to the Emergency 
Department of Westmead Hospital for treatment, but those who did present 
were more unwell, and it would be expected that they would be more likely to 
require admission to hospital. 
Over the five years, there was a modest upward trend (14 per cent over the 
five years) in the number of people presenting to the Emergency Department 
of John Hunter Hospital for treatment of their diabetes, although there was 
little change in the relative urgency of their need to receive treatment. The 
majority of these patients (55 per cent) required Urgent treatment (Triage 
Category 3).  
The destination of these patients after their treatment in the Emergency 
Department may shed further light on their level of unwellness. Figures 5.11 
and 5.12 present the number of admissions to these two hospitals from their 
respective Emergency Departments each year. 
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Figure 5.11: Total presentations for diabetes treated in the Emergency 
Department of Westmead Hospital and subsequently 
admitted to the hospital, by Triage Category, 2009 to 2013 
 
 
Figure 5.12: Total presentations for diabetes treated in the Emergency 
Department of John Hunter Hospital and subsequently 
admitted to hospital, by Triage Category, 2009 to 2013 
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The total number of people who, having presented to the Emergency 
Department of Westmead Hospital with diabetes, were admitted to hospital, 
also trebled over the five years of the study. Admissions from Triage 
Categories 2 and 3 rose substantially from 2011 onwards, while a less marked 
rise was observed for admissions from Triage Category 4. However, the 
proportions of patients admitted from the different Triage Categories remained 
relatively stable over the study period, pointing to a possible increase in 
community morbidity, rather than any change in admission policy. 
Of all the people who attended the Emergency Department at the John Hunter 
Hospital for treatment of their diabetes, about 69 per cent were admitted to the 
hospital (to a ward or to the Intensive Care Unit), but the number was small 
and after an initial decrease in 2010, the number of patients admitted did not 
change greatly from year to year.   
These findings suggest that decreasing morbidity in the community does not 
explain why there was a decline in the absolute number of patients admitted 
to the John Hunter Hospital. Nor does it appear that the change can be 
explained by the way that the hospital admitted, treated, or recorded the 
clinical details of these patients.   
This leads to the next step in this analysis which is to examine the possibility 
that social factors might account for the change observed for this category of 
patient. 
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5.3.4 Social Factors 
Another possible explanation for a decline in the number of patients admitted 
with diabetes, and coded to the ‘eligible’ category, is that there had been an 
increase in the level of support available to care for these patients, and to 
treat their chronic illnesses in the community, either after they were 
discharged from hospital, or reducing the need for their admission in the first 
place.   
If this were the case, more of those people who presented to the Emergency 
Department with diabetes would be treated within, and then discharged from, 
the Emergency Department, rather than being admitted to the hospital.  
Figures 5.13 and 5.14 show the data. 
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Figure 5.13: Total presentations for diabetes treated in, and discharged 
from the Emergency Department of Westmead Hospital, by 
Triage Category, 2009 to 2013 
 
 
Figure 5.14: Total presentations for diabetes treated in, and discharged 
from the Emergency Department of John Hunter Hospital, 
by Triage Category, 2009 to 2013 
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There was a steady increase in the number of people who presented to the 
Emergency Department of Westmead Hospital and who, after treatment, were 
discharged from it without being admitted to the hospital. However the 
numbers who were treated in, and discharged from the Emergency 
Department each year were small, ranging from 31 in 2009, to reach a peak of 
78 in 2012 (Figure 5.13).  
After 2011, more patients who presented to the Emergency Department of 
John Hunter Hospital for the treatment of their diabetes were discharged 
without being admitted to hospital, principally from Triage Categories 3 and 4 
(the less unwell patients).   
The changing balance between admission to hospital, and discharge from the 
Emergency Department for people with diabetes can be seen in the ratio of 
hospital admissions to discharges, as shown in Figures 5.15 and 5.16. This 
analysis focused on patients in Triage Categories 2, 3 and 4, since the 
numbers in Triage Categories 1 and 5 were small, making the admission-to- 
discharge ratio less meaningful for these Triage Categories. 
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Figure 5.15: Ratio of hospital admissions to discharges from the 
Emergency Department of Westmead Hospital, 2009 to 2013 
 
  
Figure 5.16: Ratio of hospital admissions to discharges from the 
Emergency Department of John Hunter Hospital, 2009 to 
2013 
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The ratio of admissions to discharges from the Emergency Department of 
Westmead Hospital, for the three Triage Categories (2, 3 and 4 combined), 
remained low (1.5 to 2), and did not change greatly over the five years of the 
study. It is possible that the change that occurred in the proportion of patients 
assigned to each Triage Category in 2013 reflects a policy change in the 
triaging of patients at Westmead Hospital. This explanation is explored under 
the heading of Hospital Policy. 
At John Hunter Hospital, the ratio of admissions to discharges fluctuated from 
year to year, but showed a declining trend over the five years. There were 
quite wide variations within the Triage Categories, but there was a trend 
towards a reduction in admissions from Triage Category 4, and an increase in 
the ratio of admissions for the (more unwell) patients in Triage Category 2.   
It is possible that an increase in the level of support which was available to 
care for these patients in the community once they were discharged from 
hospital, might result in the same patient being admitted to the same hospital, 
with the same condition, on fewer occasions (a reduction in the number of 
multiple admissions). As explained in the previous chapter, it is not possible to 
identify individual patients, or the appearance of the same patient in more 
than one dataset, since the data in the datasets contain no unique patient 
identifier. The best that can be done is to identify the hospital admissions of 
people with the same Year of Birth, and residing in the same Postcode. 
Figures 5.17 and 5.18 present the frequency distributions of the number of 
time that patients with the same Year of Birth, and residing in the same 
Postcode, were admitted to Westmead Hospital or to the John Hunter Hospital 
and coded to the ‘eligible’ category, in the years 2009 and 2013.   
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Figure 5.17: Proportion of occasions on which a patient with the same 
Year of Birth and residing in the same Postcode was 
admitted to Westmead Hospital, 2009 and 2013  
 
Figure 5.18: Proportion of occasions on which a patient with the same 
Year of Birth and residing in the same Postcode was 
admitted to John Hunter Hospital, 2009 and 2013  
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For this category of patients at Westmead Hospital there were fewer multiple 
admissions in 2013 than in 2009, a difference which was statistically 
significant (chi-squared = 22.03, df = 2, p<0.0005). However, this decline 
represented only 34 admissions, which would account for only one-third of the 
decline of 106 in the total number of patients admitted to this hospital with 
diabetes, who were coded to the ‘eligible’ category.  
For this category of patients at the John Hunter Hospital there were fewer 
multiple admissions in 2013 than in 2009, a decline which was also 
statistically significant (chi-squared = 13.59, df = 6, 0.05 > p > 0.025). This 
decline represented 60 admissions, which, if they were in fact different 
patients would be more than sufficient to account for the decline in the total 
number of patients admitted with diabetes, and coded to the ‘eligible’ 
category, over the period of the study.  
It can be concluded that a decrease in multiple admissions of the same patient 
is unlikely to have been a major contributor to the decrease in the number of 
admissions of patients with diabetes, and coded to the ‘eligible’ category at 
Westmead Hospital. The converse was true for John Hunter Hospital. The 
decrease in multiple admissions, if they were of the same patient, could well 
account for the decrease in the number of admissions of patients to this 
hospital.   
Even though this possibility exists for the John Hunter Hospital, for 
completeness of the overall analysis, examination is continued for the other 
four possibilities that might have also contributed to the decline in admissions. 
The next step is to examine the possibility that changes in hospital policy 
might account for the changes in patient throughput. 
 
5.3.5 Hospital Policy 
If a change had occurred in the State discharge policies, in line with the 
objectives of ABF, patients who presented to an Emergency Department and 
were assessed as requiring semi-urgent or non-urgent treatment (Triage 
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Category 4 or 5), might have been referred to an alternative service provider 
located in the community, rather than being admitted to hospital.  
The number of patients admitted to Westmead Hospital with diabetes, and 
coded to the ‘eligible’ category, declined over the five years of the study 
(Figure 5.1), while the number of patients admitted to hospital from the 
Emergency Department doubled (Figure 5.11).  
The number of patients admitted to the John Hunter Hospital with diabetes, 
and coded to the ‘eligible’ category, declined over the same period (Figure 
5.2), while the number of people admitted from the Emergency Department 
did not change greatly (Figure 5.12).   
The hospital inpatient dataset does not include information on the source of 
the admission, and so data on both ‘eligible’ and ‘ineligible’ admission 
categories must be combined so that the number of admissions from all 
sources other than the Emergency Department can be calculated by 
subtraction. The data are shown in Figures 5.19 and 5.20 respectively. 
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Figure 5.19: Source of admissions of patients with diabetes to 
Westmead Hospital, 2009 to 2013 
 
 
Figure 5.20: Source of admissions of patients with diabetes to John 
Hunter Hospital, 2009 to 2010 
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The trend of increasing admissions from the Emergency Department of 
Westmead Hospital was offset by a larger trend of declining admissions to the 
hospital from other sources, resulting in an overall decline in the absolute 
number of patients admitted. The most plausible reason for this change is that 
more people presented to the Emergency Department of Westmead Hospital 
for treatment of their diabetes, rather than attending another health service, 
such as a local general practitioner.   
From 2009 to 2013, the total number of patients admitted to John Hunter 
Hospital with diabetes declined steadily, due almost entirely to a reduction in 
the number of patients admitted from other sources, while the number 
admitted from the Emergency Department remained steady. 
There is no immediately obvious explanation for this pattern of change at John 
Hunter Hospital, which was unlikely to have been due to changes in hospital 
policies, but the pattern of discharges from the hospital suggests that, even if 
such policy changes had been promulgated, compliance with them was 
patchy. 
This leads to the next step in this analysis which is to examine the possibility 
that changes in clinical practice might account for the changes in patient 
throughput. 
5.3.6 Clinical Practice 
Another possible explanation for the decline in the number of patients with 
diabetes and coded to the ‘eligible’ category who were admitted to Westmead 
Hospital, or to the John Hunter Hospital, is a change in the way in which 
hospital clinicians practised medicine, i.e., a change in the treatment of 
individual patients, and/or the recording of clinical information in their medical 
record. 
There is anecdotal evidence that, with the introduction of ABF, medical staff 
were encouraged to ensure that they made an accurate record of all clinical 
phenomena. If this emphasis had resulted in up-coding, this would result in a 
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greater identification of patients with severe complications and comorbidities 
(the ‘ineligible’ category), rather than without complications and comorbidities 
(the ‘eligible’ category), and the absolute number of patients admitted to 
hospital with diabetes would remain steady. 
The data presented in Figure 5.5 and Figure 5.6 are inconsistent with this 
description. There was a decline in the number of patients admitted to hospital 
in both the ‘eligible’ and ‘ineligible’ categories of patients, and this pattern 
suggests that there is limited evidence of up-coding in the case of either 
Westmead or John Hunter Hospital.   
Thus, on balance, there is little convincing evidence that changes in medical 
record keeping contributed to the decrease in the number of patients admitted 
to either of these two hospitals with a primary diagnosis of diabetes in the five 
years covering the introduction of ABF.  
5.3.7 Coding Practice 
A change in coding practice is the final possible explanation for the decline in 
the throughput of patients with diabetes, and coded to the ‘eligible’ category. 
However, as discussed in chapter four, there is no evidence that any changes 
had taken place in the instructions given to hospital Coders as to the features 
of the medical record which would determine the assignment of a patient with 
diabetes to one or the other AR-DRGs, ‘ineligible’ or ‘eligible’. It is therefore 
reasonable to conclude that change in coding policy would not account for a 
decline in the number of ‘eligible’ patients admitted to hospital. 
 
5.4 Discussion of changes in hospital patient admissions  
For those patients admitted to Westmead Hospital in the Western Sydney 
Local Health District with diabetes, and coded to the ‘eligible’ category, there 
was a trend of decrease in admissions of patients, coded both to ‘eligible’ and 
to ‘ineligible’ categories. These declines in the number of admissions to the 
hospital occurred in the face of increasing numbers of people with diabetes 
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presenting to the Emergency Department of the hospital, as well as an 
increase in the clinical severity of those patients condition.   
There are two possible, but not mutually exclusive, explanations for these 
apparently contradictory changes. The first explanation is that the 
documented increase in the number of people presenting to the Emergency 
Department of Westmead Hospital is a corollary of an increase in the 
prevalence of diabetes in the community. Proving that there was a change in 
community morbidity for diabetes is beyond the scope of this thesis, but there 
is some evidence to suggest that this explanation is plausible, since 
increasing numbers of people with diabetes presented to (all) the Western 
Sydney hospitals’ Emergency Departments over the period of this study, as 
well as an increase in the clinical severity of those people’s diabetes.   
The second explanation is that the declines in the number of admissions to 
hospital represent either an improving ability of people with diabetes to self-
manage their condition, and/or that more support is available to care for 
people with diabetes in the community, which was an objective of ABF. 
However, the more likely explanations for this increase in presentations to the 
Emergency Department of Westmead Hospital are an increase in community 
morbidity for diabetes, and/or that more people with diabetes, attended the 
Emergency Department as their preferred choice of service when they 
required medical care. The majority of these patients were clinically assessed 
and treated in a timely way (BHI 2010-2013). 
At the John Hunter Hospital the decline in the number of patients with 
diabetes, and coded to the ‘eligible’ category, was associated with a decline in 
the number of patients who were readmitted to hospital for treatment. The 
most likely explanations for this result are, again, that these patients’ were 
able to self-manage their condition better, and/or, that there was more support 
available in the community to care for this category of patient after they were 
discharged from hospital.   
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The former explanation is the more likely. The median age of this cohort of 
diabetes patients’ at the John Hunter Hospital was 16 to18 years: these 
patients were making the transition from childhood to adulthood, which is 
often accompanied by short-term instability in maintaining good glycaemic 
control (Hartl, Seiffge & Laursen 2015). Stabilising glycaemic control might 
require additional supervised adjustment in diet, exercise and medication in 
the short-term.   
The conclusion from these results is that, for people with diabetes, the 
consequences of the implementation of ABF have been variable, at best, and 
have not been uniform across all ABF hospitals in either Local Health District. 
The findings from analyses to answer Question three: what is the financial 
consequence of these changes, expressed in terms of the balance between 
available revenue and resource use? are presented next.  
 
5.5 Financial implications of Activity Based Funding 
The PARI is an indicator of the balance between the potentially available 
revenue and the resources required to treat patients with diabetes, and coded 
to the ‘eligible’ category for each hospital receiving ABF, and for the 
respective Local Health District as a whole. For each Local Health District, the 
PARI for all hospitals combined is anchored at 100 for 2009. 
Figures 5.21 and 5.22 present the PARI performance of the individual 
hospitals in the Western Sydney and Hunter New England Local Health 
Districts in treating patients admitted with diabetes, who were coded as 
’eligible’ for treatment in a setting other than that of an acute hospital, and 
compared with the combined performance of all hospitals in the Local Health 
District, from 2009 to 2013. The data for Mount Druitt Hospital and Kurri Kurri 
Hospital have not been included in the calculation of the PARI.    
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Figure 5.21: PARI for each Western Sydney hospital, and for all 
hospitals combined, for patients with diabetes, coded as 
‘eligible’, 2009 to 2013   
 
 
Figure 5.22: PARI for each Hunter New England hospital, and for all 
hospitals combined, for patients with diabetes, coded as 
‘eligible’, 2009 to 2013   
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In Western Sydney, the PARI fluctuated over the five years of the study, and 
rose to reach a value 124 in 2013. This rise in PARI results from a decrease in 
the duration of patients’ stay in hospital. Both Westmead and Auburn 
Hospitals were the principal contributors to the Western Sydney ABF 
hospitals’ rise in PARI, while for Blacktown Hospital the PARI remained 
consistently below the index of 100, except in the year 2010 when it rose 
briefly to 106.  
If the revenue available from ABF were to be passed on to individual 
hospitals, the hospitals that would benefit most would be Auburn, followed by 
Westmead Hospital. Blacktown Hospital consistently appeared to use more 
resources to treat these patients than would have been available from ABF. 
All ABF hospitals in the Hunter New England Local Health District showed 
some variation in the rise and fall of the PARI, over the study period. In 2013, 
the principal contributors to the rise in PARI were the Calvary Mater, Armidale 
and Manning Base Hospitals, while the PARI for the John Hunter, Tamworth 
Base and Belmont Hospitals all remained close to the index of 100.  
The potential financial implications of ABF are that over the five-year period of 
this study, the Calvary Mater, Armidale and the Manning Base Hospital would, 
to a greater or lesser extent, use fewer resources to treat these patients than 
the resources available from ABF, while the John Hunter, Tamworth Base and 
Belmont Hospitals would use more. The net result is that in 2013, the 
increases and decreases in the PARI had cancelled out, with the result that a 
PARI of 100 was achieved for the Local Health District as a whole. These 
findings suggest that ABF did not act as a financial incentive for these 
hospitals to reduce the duration of hospital stay for patients with diabetes 
category. The final conclusion to be drawn from the findings of this study, and 
the implications are discussed in chapter seven.
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Chapter 6: Cellulitis  
 
6.1 Introduction  
The focus of this chapter is those patients admitted to hospitals with a primary 
diagnosis of cellulitis, and coded as being without catastrophic complications 
or co-morbidities (the ‘eligible’ category), or with catastrophic complications or 
co-morbidities (the ‘ineligible’ category). The reason for analysing the 
throughput of patients hospitalised with cellulitis is that it is a chronic 
condition, exacerbations of which may not necessarily require treatment in 
hospital (MoH 2013). 
Cellulitis is the name given to a bacterial infection of the deepest layer of the 
skin. Bacteria enter through a break in the skin from a cut, scratch, or bite.  
With proper care, an infection of the superficial layers of the skin usually heals 
of its own accord. But, in cellulitis, the deep skin tissues in the infected area 
become inflamed - red, hot, and painful, and the condition persists and 
requires medical treatment (AIHW 2015). 
The disease burden of cellulitis in Australia is unlikely to be substantially 
different from that in the US, where the ‘incidence of cellulitis is reported to be 
16.4 to 24.6 per 1000 person years. It accounted for 14 per cent of all visits to 
the Emergency Department and contributed up to seven per cent of hospital 
admissions’ (Yuxin Tay, Fook-Chong, Chiat Oh, Thirumoorthy, Min Pang & 
Yueh Lee 2015). In the US, each admission to hospital is estimated to cost 
$US 13,000 (Yuxin Tay et al 2015).    
The chapter is structured as follows. It begins with a summary of the overall 
throughput of cellulitis in each of the two Local Health Districts, and proceeds 
with a more detailed presentation of changes in the throughput of cellulitis 
patients over the five years of the study. For those hospitals where a change 
in the throughput of patients coded to the ‘eligible’ category was statistically 
significant, seven categories of explanation for those changes are explored. 
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The overall findings from the analyses are discussed. The focus of the 
analysis is then expanded to examine the balance between the potentially 
available revenue and the resources required to treat this category of patient, 
in each hospital, in each Local Health District.   
 
6.2 Patient throughput 
Four hospitals in the Western Sydney Local Health District receive ABF. Over 
the five years of the study, 7,330 patients were admitted to those hospitals 
with a principal diagnosis of cellulitis, and 88 per cent of those patients were 
coded to the ‘eligible’ category, i.e., those patients without catastrophic 
complications or co-morbidities, who could, potentially, be treated in a setting 
other than that of an acute hospital.   
Eight hospitals in the Hunter New England Local Health District receive ABF. 
Over the five years of the study, 5,617 patients were admitted to these 
hospitals with a principal diagnosis of cellulitis, of which 76 per cent of patients 
were coded to the ‘eligible’ category.  
Figures 6.1 and 6.2 present the number of hospital admissions in the two 
Local Health Districts of all patients with cellulitis who were coded as ‘eligible’ 
for treatment in a setting other than that of an acute hospital.   
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Figure 6.1: Admissions of patients with cellulitis, coded as ‘eligible’, to 
Western Sydney hospitals, 2009 to 2013 
 
 
Figure 6.2: Admissions of patients with cellulitis, coded as ‘eligible’, to 
Hunter New England hospitals, 2009 to 2013 
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In the Western Sydney hospitals, there was an overall trend of decline in the 
number of patients admitted with cellulitis to Westmead Hospital, which was 
not statistically significantly different from zero (0.30 > p > 0.20). The increase 
in the number of patients admitted to Blacktown Hospital continued unabated 
during the study period, and this trend was statistically significantly different 
from zero (0.02 > p > 0.01). The smaller increase at Auburn Hospital did not 
reach the traditional level of statistical significance. There was no real change 
observed in the number of patients admitted to Mount Druitt Hospital. 
In the Hunter New England hospitals, there was a trend of decline in the 
number of the patients admitted with cellulitis to the Manning Base, Tamworth 
Base, Armidale and Kurri Kurri Hospitals, but these all failed to reach the 
traditional level of statistical significance. There were less than 25 admissions 
each year to the Kurri Kurri Hospital. For the John Hunter, Calvary Mater and 
Belmont Hospitals, there was a trend of increase in the number of patients 
admitted. The trend for the John Hunter Hospital was statistically significantly 
different from zero (0.02 > p > 0.01).  
For consistency in the analysis of data across the three clinical conditions 
included in this study, the annual admission rate per 100 admissions was 
calculated for each hospital receiving ABF. Figures 6.3 and 6.4 show those 
data. 
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Figure 6.3 Annual standardised admission rate for patients with 
cellulitis, coded as ‘eligible’, in Western Sydney hospitals 
 
 
Figure 6.4 Annual standardised admission rate for patients with 
cellulitis, coded as ‘eligible’, in Hunter New England 
hospitals 
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For this patient category there was an increase in the number of patients 
admitted to each hospital in Western Sydney Local Health District over the 
study period, with the exception of the Westmead Hospital, where for every 
100 patients admitted, there was a decline of about two patients per year, 
which was not statistically significant. 
The increase in the standardised annual admission rate to Hunter New 
England Local Health District hospitals was greatest in the Calvary Mater 
(16.6 admissions) and Belmont Hospitals (13.9 admissions), followed by the 
John Hunter (7.2 admissions) and Maitland (3.9 admissions). The other three 
hospitals showed an annual decline of two to seven patients.   
Because the annual increase in the number of admissions both to Blacktown 
Hospital and to John Hunter Hospital were statistically significant (0.02 > p > 
0.01), possible explanations for those changes at these two hospitals are 
explored further.  
 
6.3 Possible explanations for changes in throughput at Blacktown 
and John Hunter Hospitals 
Seven possible reasons are categorised as: ABF; demographic factors; 
disease factors; social factors; hospital policy; clinical practice; and coding 
practice.  
 
6.3.1 Activity Based Funding 
The difference in the ratio of ‘eligible’ and ‘ineligible’ categories of all patients 
admitted to Blacktown Hospital or to John Hunter Hospital with cellulitis, are 
shown in Figure 6.5 and 6.6, respectively. 
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Figure 6.5: Admissions of patients to Blacktown Hospital with cellulitis, 
coded as ‘eligible’, or ‘ineligible’, 2009 to 2013  
 
Figure 6.6: Admissions of patients to John Hunter Hospital with 
cellulitis, coded as ‘eligible’, or ‘ineligible’, 2009 to 2013 
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There was a substantial, and statistically significant, increase in the number of 
patients admitted to Blacktown Hospital with cellulitis, coded to the ‘eligible’ 
category, which continued for the duration of the study period. Over the same 
period there was little change in the throughput of patients coded to the 
‘ineligible’ category, until 2013 when there was an increase in the number of 
admissions.  
The increase in the total admissions to the John Hunter Hospital from 2009 to 
2013, was mainly due to a steady increase in the admission of patients coded 
to the ‘eligible’ category, which was statistically different from zero (0.05 > p > 
0.025). There was a slight increase in the number of admissions coded to the 
‘ineligible’ category over the study period, but the actual number was small 
and the trend was not statistically significantly different from zero.  
These patterns of change are clearly inconsistent with that intended from the 
introduction of ABF, but it is instructive to pursue possible explanations for the 
significant increase in admissions. Thus, other possible explanations for the 
change in the throughput of patients were sought.   
It is possible that demographic factors might explain the increase in the 
number of patients who were admitted to these hospitals over the study 
period.   
6.3.2 Demographic Factors 
Figure 6.7 and 6.8 present the cumulative age-distribution calculated for 
Blacktown Hospital and for John Hunter Hospital for patients admitted with 
cellulitis, and coded to the ‘eligible’ category. The annual number of 
admissions, and the median age of those patients are also shown.    
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Figure 6.7: Age-distribution of patients admitted to Blacktown Hospital 
with cellulitis, 2009 to 2013 
 
 
Figure 6.8: Age-distribution of patients admitted to John Hunter 
Hospital with cellulitis, 2009 to 2013 
 
Note:  n= total number of admissions in each of the five years of the study; figures in square 
brackets denote the median age of each cohort of patients.  
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The median age of patients admitted to Blacktown Hospital who were coded 
as ‘eligible’ for treatment in a setting other than that of an acute hospital 
declined over the study period, which indicates that an increased number of 
people with cellulitis were being diagnosed at a younger age.  
The median age of patients admitted to John Hunter Hospital with cellulitis 
rose over the same period, although the number of ‘eligible’ patients admitted 
each year remained relatively stable, until it rose in 2013. While the 
demographic profile of these patients did change, this pattern of change is 
unlikely to account for all of the increase in the number of these patients who 
were admitted to Blacktown Hospital or to John Hunter Hospital.  
6.3.3 Disease Factors (community morbidity) 
Another possible explanation for the increase in the number of admissions of 
patients with cellulitis at Blacktown Hospital and at John Hunter Hospital is 
that there was an increase in the prevalence of cellulitis in the community i.e., 
more people were suffering from, and being diagnosed with, cellulitis. If an 
increase in prevalence of this condition were the cause, an increase would be 
expected in the number of patients presenting to the Emergency Department 
at these hospitals for treatment, and a greater number of those patients would 
be sufficiently un-well to require being seen by a medical practitioner sooner 
after their arrival, and more of those patients who presented would be likely to 
require admission to hospital.  
Figure 6.9 and 6.10 present the number of presentations to the Emergency 
Departments of Blacktown Hospital and the John Hunter Hospital with 
cellulitis, and their distribution between the five Triage Categories, 2009 to 
2013.    
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Figure 6.9: Total presentations for cellulitis to the Emergency 
Department of Blacktown Hospital, by Triage Category, 2009 
to 2013  
 
 
Figure 6.10: Total presentations for cellulitis to the Emergency 
Department of John Hunter Hospital, by Triage Category, 
2009 to 2013 
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The total number of people who presented to the Emergency Department at 
Blacktown Hospital from 2009 to 2011 increased substantially from 252 to 
405, but then declined slightly. Over the five years of the study, the increase in 
the number of patients who presented to the Emergency Department was not 
statistically significantly different from zero. 
There was a trend of a steady increase in the number of people who required 
to be seen by a medical practitioner within 10, 30 or 60 minutes of their having 
arrived in the Emergency Department (Triage Category 2, or 3, or 4). Those 
requiring Non-Urgent treatment (Triage Category 5) declined over the same 
period, and no person who presented for treatment of their cellulitis required 
resuscitation (Triage Category 1). Thus there was evidence of a modest 
increase in severity in those presenting to the Emergency Department at 
Blacktown Hospital over the study period. 
From 2010 to 2013, there was a steady increase in the number of people who 
presented at the Emergency Department at the John Hunter Hospital. The 
majority of those who presented were required to be seen by a medical 
practitioner within 60 minutes of having arrived to the Emergency Department 
(Triage Category 4), and there was a slight but steady increase in the number 
of people who required to be seen within 30 minutes of having arrived at the 
Emergency Department (Triage Category 3). However, none of these 
changes were statistically significantly different from zero.  
The explanation of increased community morbidity can be tested by analysing 
the number of admissions to the hospital from the Emergency Department, 
which would be expected to show a similar pattern to that shown in Figures 
6.9 and 6.10.  
Figure 6.11 and Figure 6.12 show the number of people who presented to the 
respective Emergency Departments for treatment of their cellulitis, and were 
admitted to the hospital.   
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Figure 6.11: Total presentations for cellulitis treated in the Emergency 
Department of Blacktown Hospital, and subsequently 
admitted to the hospital, by Triage Category, 2009 to 2013  
 
Figure 6.12: Total presentations for cellulitis treated in the Emergency 
Department of John Hunter Hospital, and subsequently 
admitted to the hospital, by Triage Category, 2009 to 2013 
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From 2009 to 2012, an increasing number of those who presented to the 
Emergency Department for treatment of their cellulitis were admitted to 
Blacktown Hospital, and the proportion of admitted patients increased from 25 
per cent of all patients who presented in 2009, to 50 per cent in 2012. This 
trend was reversed in 2013. 
The total number of people who, having presented to the Emergency 
Department with cellulitis, were admitted to John Hunter Hospital, remained 
steady until 2012, after which it then rose sharply. The balance between 
admissions to this hospital for Triage Categories 4 and 3, in 2010 and 2011 is 
an indication that there might have been a change in the triaging of patients 
within the Emergency Department at the John Hunter Hospital. This possibility 
will be explored under the heading of Hospital Policy.  
From these results, there is little convincing evidence that an increase in the 
prevalence of cellulitis in the community could account for the increase in the 
number of people presenting to either of these hospitals’ Emergency 
Departments with cellulitis.  
The pattern observed at Blacktown Hospital is consistent with the apparent 
increase in severity of the condition in those presenting to the Emergency 
Department, but it could also be due to social factors, such as a decline in the 
availability of care for these people outside the hospital setting. This possibility 
is now examined. 
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6.3.4 Social Factors 
Another possible explanation for the increase in the number of patients 
admitted with cellulitis, and coded to the ‘eligible’ category, is that there was 
limited support available to care for these patients and to treat their chronic 
illnesses in the community, either after they were discharged from hospital, or 
reducing the need for their admission in the first place.   
If this were the case, it would be expected that fewer of those people who 
presented to the Emergency Department for treatment of their cellulitis would 
be treated within, and then discharged from, the Emergency Department, 
rather than being admitted to the hospital. Figures 6.13 and 6.14 show those 
data for Blacktown Hospital and John Hunter Hospital respectively. 
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Figure 6.13: Total presentations for cellulitis treated in, and discharged 
from, the Emergency Department of Blacktown Hospital, by 
Triage Category, 2009 to 2013 
 
 
Figure 6.14: Total presentations for cellulitis treated in, and discharged 
from, the Emergency Department of John Hunter Hospital, 
by Triage Category, 2009 to 2013 
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The number of people who presented to the Emergency Department of 
Blacktown Hospital for treatment of their cellulitis, and were discharged from it 
without being admitted to hospital, rose initially, but then from 2010 declined 
steadily over the remainder of the study period. This pattern is similar to that 
seen in Figure 6.9.  
Figure 6.14 shows the reverse trend for John Hunter Hospital, where there 
was a decline initially (in 2010) and then a steady increase in presentations, 
mainly accounted for by patients requiring non-urgent treatment (Triage 
Category 4).  
The changing balance between the admissions of people with cellulitis to 
Blacktown Hospital, and the discharges from the Emergency Department can 
be seen in the ratio of hospital admissions to discharges, as shown in Figures 
6.15 and 6.16. This analysis focused on patients in Triage Categories 2, 3 and 
4, since the numbers of patients in Triage Categories 1 and 5 were small, 
making the admission-to-discharge ratio less meaningful for these Categories. 
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Figure 6.15: Ratio of hospital admissions to discharges from the 
Emergency Department of Blacktown Hospital, 2009 to 
2013. 
 
Figure 6.16: Ratio of hospital admissions to discharges from the 
Emergency Department of John Hunter Hospital, 2009 to 
2013 
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At Blacktown Hospital, the ratio of admissions to discharges for Triage 
Categories 2, 3 and 4 combined, was less than unity, and did not change 
much over the period of the study. However the ratio of admissions to 
discharges of patients in Triage Category 2, rose steeply and, in 2012, for 
every patient who was treated and discharged from the Emergency 
Department without being admitted, seven patients were admitted. It is 
possible that this change was associated with a change in the level of support 
to care for these patients in the community.  
At the John Hunter Hospital, the ratio of admissions to discharges from the 
Emergency Department for Triage Categories 2, 3 and 4 combined, did not 
change greatly over the period of the study. The ratio of admissions to 
discharges in Triage Category 2, fluctuated, but, because of the small number 
of presentations, little can be inferred from these data.   
If there was limited support to provide care for people with cellulitis in the 
community, it might result in the same patient being admitted to the same 
hospital, with the same condition, on more occasions (an increase in the 
number of multiple admissions).  
Figure 6.17 and 6.18 present the frequency of the number of times that 
patients with the same Year of Birth, and residing in the same Postcode, were 
admitted to the Blacktown Hospital or to the John Hunter Hospital and coded 
to the ‘eligible’ category, in the years, 2009 and 2013. 
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Figure 6.17: Proportion of occasions on which a patient with the same 
Year of Birth and residing in the same Postcode was 
admitted to Blacktown Hospital, 2009 and 2013 
 
 
Figure 6.18: Proportion of occasions on which a patient with the same 
Year of Birth and residing in the same Postcode was 
admitted to the John Hunter Hospital, 2009 and 2013  
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For this category of patients at the Blacktown Hospital there were more 
multiple admissions in 2013 than in 2009, and this trend was statistically 
significant (chi-squared = 20.37, df = 6, p=0.0005). This increase represented 
61 admissions, which would be sufficient to account for the increase in the 
total number of patients admitted with cellulitis, coded to the ‘eligible’ 
category, if some or most of these were in fact multiple admissions of the 
same individual, rather than of different people sharing the same Year of Birth 
and Postcode of residence.  
For this category of patients at the John Hunter Hospital, four per cent more 
patients in 2013 than in 2009 were admitted with cellulitis, and coded to the 
‘eligible’ category with the same Year-of-Birth and the same Postcode of 
Residence, but this represented only 17 admissions, and the trend was not 
statistically significant (chi-squared =2.5, df = 2, p>0.05). Even if these were 
all multiple admissions of the same patient, they are not sufficient to account 
for the increase in the total number of admissions to the John Hunter Hospital.  
If multiple-admissions accounted for the increase in the number of admissions 
to hospital, it might be because there was limited support to provide care for 
this category of patient in the community, as is suggested for Blacktown 
Hospital. The next step in this analysis is to examine the possibility that 
changes in hospital policy might account for the changes in patient 
throughput. 
6.3.5 Hospital Policy 
The hospital inpatient data set does not include information on the source of 
the admission, and so data on both ‘eligible’ and ‘ineligible’ admission 
categories must be combined so that the number of admissions from a source 
other than the Emergency Department can be calculated by subtraction. 
These data for Blacktown Hospital and for the John Hunter Hospital are 
shown in Figures 6.19 and 6.20, respectively.  
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Figure 6.19: Source of admissions of patients with cellulitis to 
Blacktown Hospital, 2009 to 2013 
 
 
Figure 6.20: Source of admissions of patients with cellulitis to John 
Hunter Hospital, 2009 to 2013 
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The number of patients admitted with cellulitis to Blacktown Hospital, 
increased over the five years of the study (Figure 6.5), as did the number of 
people who presented to the Emergency Department for treatment of their 
cellulitis (Figure 6.9). However, the proportions of the source of those 
admissions did not change greatly over the same period, implying that there 
was no great change in hospital admission policy. 
The number of patients admitted to the John Hunter Hospital with cellulitis, 
increased over the five years of the study (Figure 6.6), as did the number of 
people admitted from the Emergency Department (Figure 6.11). The only 
explanation which can account for the anomalous finding shown in Figure 
6.20, that apparently, more people were admitted from the Emergency 
Department to the hospital than the total number of admissions appearing in 
the inpatient database, is that there was a change in documentation in the 
medical records of patients once they were admitted.  
This leads to the next step, which is to present the findings from analysis of 
the possibility that changes in clinical practice might account for the increase 
in patient throughput. 
6.3.6 Clinical Practice 
Another possible explanation for the increase in the number of patients 
admitted to Blacktown Hospital or John Hunter Hospital with cellulitis and 
coded to the ‘eligible’ category, is a change in the way in which hospital 
clinicians’ practised medicine, i.e., a change in the treatment of individual 
patients, and/or the recording of clinical information in their medical record. 
With the introduction of ABF, medical staff were encouraged to ensure that 
they made an accurate record of all clinical phenomena. If this emphasis 
resulted in up-coding, it would result in a greater identification of patients with 
severe complications and comorbidities (the ‘ineligible’ category), rather than 
without complications and comorbidities (the ‘eligible’ category), and the 
absolute number of patients admitted to hospital with cellulitis would remain 
constant. 
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The data presented in Figure 6.5 and 6.6 are not consistent with this 
description, which suggest that changes in medical record keeping (clinical 
practice) does not account for the increase in the number of people admitted 
to these hospitals, over the five years of the study.  
However, it is also possible that changes in coding practice might account for 
the change in patient throughput. 
6.3.7 Coding Practice 
Another possible explanation for the increase in the number of patients 
admitted with cellulitis and coded to the ‘eligible’ category, is a change in the 
written instructions contained in the Policy and Procedures Manual used by 
Medical Records personnel (Coders) to assign patients to a specific disease 
category (AR-DRGs). 
However, as discussed in chapter four, there is no evidence that any changes 
had taken place in the instructions given to hospital Coders as to the features 
of the medical record which would determine the assignment of a patient with 
COAD to one or the other AR-DRGs, ‘ineligible’ or ‘eligible’. It is therefore 
reasonable to conclude that change in coding policy would not account for an 
increase in the number of ‘eligible’ patients admitted to hospital. 
 
6.4 Discussion of changes in hospital patient admissions  
At both the Blacktown Hospital and the John Hunter Hospital, there was an 
increase in the number of admissions of patients with cellulitis coded to the 
‘eligible’ category. The most likely explanation for the trend of increasing 
number of admissions at Blacktown Hospital is a lack of support to care for 
these patients in the community, resulting in multiple admissions of some of 
these patients.  
For the John Hunter Hospital there are two possible, but not mutually 
exclusive, explanations for the increase in the throughput of this category of 
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patient. The first explanation is that the documented increase in number of 
people presenting to the Emergency Department for treatment of their cellulitis 
is the expression of an increase in community morbidity for cellulitis. Proving 
that there was a change in community morbidity for cellulitis is beyond the 
scope of this thesis, but there is limited evidence to support this explanation. 
Although increasing numbers of people with cellulitis presented to all the 
Hunter New England hospitals’ Emergency Departments over the period of 
the study, there was no great increase in the clinical severity of those people’s 
cellulitis (Figure 6.10).  
The second explanation is that the documentation in the medical record of 
people with cellulitis, from which their clinical diagnosis is determined, 
changed for many of those people after they were admitted from the 
Emergency Department to the hospital, which explain the anomalous source 
of admission data. The principal Emergency Department provisional diagnosis 
is based on an assessment of the clinical condition of each person when they 
present to the Emergency Department. It is therefore possible that, after the 
patient was admitted to the hospital, this diagnosis was revised, based on the 
results of laboratory and other diagnostic tests undertaken in the hospital.  
It is also possible that this unexpected result might reflect inconsistent 
documentation of the triaging of patients in the Emergency Department. Even 
if a change in triaging policy and processes within the Emergency Department 
did occur, it does not account for the increase in the number of people who 
presented there initially for treatment. Nor does it account for the increase in 
the number of admissions of patients in the John Hunter Hospital with cellulitis 
who were coded to the ‘eligible’ category.  
The overall conclusion reached from these findings is that the pattern of 
change observed in throughput for this category of patient in all these 
hospitals is inconsistent with that intended by the introduction of ABF. The 
patterns of change support the possibilities of there being both an increase in 
the prevalence (or incidence) of cellulitis in the community, and a change in 
the triaging processes within the Emergency Department.  
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If there had been a change in the triaging processes within the Emergency 
Department it was specific to individual hospitals, and not associated with any 
documented change in the NSW State policy. It is recognised that the 
assignment of patients to Triage Categories is a dynamic process, and the 
initial clinical assessment of patients is subjective C (NSW Ministry of Health 
2012). 
Having discussed the findings from the analysis of the throughput of patients 
with cellulitis, the next step is to present the findings from the calculation of 
the PARI for each hospital, in each Local Health District. 
 
6.5 Financial implications of Activity Based Funding  
The PARI is an indicator of the balance between the potential revenue 
received and the resources required to treat patients with cellulitis coded to 
the ‘eligible’ category, for each hospital receiving ABF, and for the respective 
Local Health District as a whole. The PARI for all hospitals combined is 
anchored at 100 for 2009. 
The data for Mount Druitt Hospital and Kurri Kurri Hospital have been 
included in the calculation of the PARI. The rationale for the inclusion of data 
from Mount Druitt and Kurri Kurri Hospital here, having excluded them from 
the calculation of the PARI for other clinical conditions, is as follows. Patients 
who were initially admitted to Mount Druitt Hospital, were transferred to 
another hospital comparatively quickly, and in the years 2011 to 2013 the 
Length of Stay for the majority of patients in the ‘eligible’ category admitted to 
that hospital with cellulitis, was less than one day (0.9 days), and therefore 
would not attract ABF. However, over the whole five-year period of the study, 
85 per cent of these patients experienced a length of stay which fell “between 
the statistically high and low boundary points for …casemix class”, and thus 
the hospital care did fulfil the definition of an “Inlier Episode” of care, and 
would therefore have received funding through the mechanism of ABF (ABFT 
2013b). Although the number of patients admitted to Kurri Kurri Hospital was 
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small, the duration of patients’ stay was greater than one day, thus, for 
consistency, data from this hospital were included in the calculation of the 
PARI for cellulitis in the Hunter New England Local Health District.  
Figures 6.21 and 6.22 present the PARI performance of individual Western 
Sydney and Hunter New England Local Health District hospitals in treating 
patients, who were coded as ‘eligible’ for treatment of their cellulitis in a 
setting other than that of an acute hospital, and compared with the 
performance of all the hospitals combined, from 2009 to 2013. 
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Figure 6.21: PARI for each Western Sydney hospital, and for all 
hospitals combined, for patients with cellulitis coded as 
‘eligible’, 2009 to 2013   
 
 
Figure 6.22: PARI for each Hunter New England hospital, and for all 
hospitals combined, for patients with cellulitis coded as 
‘eligible’, 2009 to 2013   
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Figure 6.21 shows that the PARI rose substantially over the study period, 
which is the result of including data from Mount Druitt Hospital in the 
calculation. Mount Druitt, and Auburn Hospital were the principal contributors 
to the rise in the PARI in the Western Sydney Local Health District as a whole. 
If the revenue available from ABF were to be passed on to individual 
hospitals, the hospitals that would benefit most would be Mount Druitt, 
followed by Auburn Hospital. While, in terms of the PARI, both Blacktown and 
Westmead Hospitals would have used more resources to treat these patients, 
than was available from ABF. 
For the Hunter New England Local Health District as a whole, the principal 
contributors to the rise in PARI were the Calvary Mater and Armidale 
Hospitals, while at the Kurri Kurri Hospital there was instability in the PARI 
over the five years of the study, probably due to the relatively small numbers 
of admissions. The PARI was reasonably stable over the study period at 
Belmont Hospital, while the John Hunter, Manning Base and Tamworth Base 
hospitals contributed less to the general rise in PARI over the period of the 
study. 
The potential financial implications of ABF for the treatment of patients with 
cellulitis who were ‘eligible’ for treatment in a setting other than that of an 
acute hospital, are that over the five-year period of this study, all hospitals, 
with the exception of Belmont and Kurri Kurri Hospitals, would, to a greater or 
lesser extent, use fewer resources to treat those patients than those available 
from ABF. If this revenue were to be passed on to individual hospitals, the 
hospitals that would benefit most would be Calvary Mater and Armidale 
hospitals.  
The final conclusion to be drawn from these findings, and the implications, are 
presented in chapter seven. 
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Chapter 7: Conclusion and implications  
 
It is claimed that publicly-funded health care in Australia is provided by, and 
delivered within, a dynamic system of competing interests and interest 
groups. Accordingly, each is motivated either to maintain the status quo, or to 
support change only if it has the potential to maximise their respective utility 
and/or to give a competitive advantage (Johnston & Duffield 2002). It is within 
the context of these claims that the findings presented in the preceding 
chapters are now discussed. The findings are discussed at three levels: first, 
the micro level (public hospitals and patient care); second, the meso level 
(public health policy for publicly-owned and operated health services); and 
third, the macro level (the role of the state vis-à-vis capital accumulation, 
interest groups and the global health market).  
If the introduction of ABF in public hospitals had achieved one of its intended 
outcomes, ‘…to reduce the proportion of potentially preventable hospital 
admissions’ by diverting less-ill patients to a non-acute location (e.g., a 
general practice clinic, or a hospital non–admitted patient service), then the 
admissions of patients ‘eligible’ to be treated in a setting other than an acute 
hospital would fall, and the admissions’ of patients who are ‘ineligible’ for 
treatment other than in an acute hospital, would remain steady (AIHW 2015). 
A decline in the duration of ‘eligible’ patients’ stay in hospital would be also 
expected, because some chronically unwell patients could be discharged 
earlier, as more community support became available for their care. If ABF 
has led to a decline in patient throughput, or in the duration of patient hospital 
stays, these findings would be expected to occur more or less consistently for 
each of the clinical conditions selected for study, in each hospital receiving 
ABF.  
For the 36 cases analysed (three clinical conditions in 12 ABF hospitals), a 
statistically significant trend of a decline in the number of patients admitted to 
hospital, and coded to the ‘eligible’ category in only three of these cases was 
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found - COAD patients admitted to Blacktown, and diabetes patients admitted 
to Westmead and John Hunter Hospital. However, for each of these cases 
there are credible alternative explanations for those declines other than the 
implementation of ABF.  
These alternative explanations include: more accurate clinical documentation in 
medical records of COAD patients, and fewer re-admissions of the same patient 
for treatment of their diabetes. Suffice to say that in both of the Local Health 
Districts, the changes observed in the throughput of patients with each of the 
three chronic conditions are not consistent with those intended as an outcome of 
the introduction of ABF. Therefore it may reasonably be concluded that the 
implementation of ABF did not result in an overall shift in clinical policy and/or 
practice in either Local Health District, or, if there was a shift, it proved ineffective 
in engaging clinicians (‘professional monopolists’) at a micro level. Three sets of 
implications arise from the finding of this study.  
At a micro level, using health policy to achieve sustainable change in patient 
throughput requires the deployment of incentives which take account of the 
clinical practices and behaviours of ‘professional monopolies’ and ‘corporate 
monopolists’ who work within public hospitals. The NH Reform contains 
strategies designed to achieve the engagement of these interest groups more 
broadly, by providing financial incentives to States’ and their Local Hospital 
Networks, and by creating Medicare Locals using public-private partnerships. 
However these strategies provide no incentives for greater technical efficiency at 
the public hospital or general practice level. Nor do these strategies address the 
impediments that Hancock (1999) identified as hindering the coordination of 
patient care among these services.  
In essence, the apparently unchanged modus operandi of the ‘professional 
monopolies’ and ‘corporate monopolists’ who work in public hospitals indicates 
that the policy of ABF has not been successful in changing their practice or 
behaviour. Indeed, the reverse may occur, partly driven by the way that non-
hospital services operate. When people seek health care from a private medical 
practice (e.g., a Medicare Local service), an appointment may not be 
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immediately available, a fee may be required at the point of care (over and 
above the Medicare rebate) and patients access to many private practices is not 
available on week-ends or after-hours. For example, between 2003 and 2014, 
fewer general practitioners were working in practices that provided their own 
after-hours service (‘43.6 compared with 30.7 per cent’), and general practitioner 
referrals to Emergency Department’s increased (Britt, et al 2013 p.31). Thus 
access barriers exist for those people who require medical services in a timely 
way (the ‘repressed structural interests’ may be disadvantaged).  
In contrast to the provision of private health care, public hospital services 
cannot refuse to give treatment to a patient if it is required, and there is no 
out-of-pocket expense at the point of care for patients for whom treatment is 
provided, nor are there any time restrictions on access to treatment (public 
hospital Emergency Departments do not close). These characteristics of 
public hospital services give consumers’ access to health care when they 
need it, regardless of their health status or their capacity to pay. Therefore, in 
the absence of the availability of, and easy access to, Medicare fully-funded 
health services located in the community that offer services after-hours and 
on week-ends, (which the Australian Medical Association would be unlikely to 
support), people in need of health care will continue to access the Emergency 
Departments of public hospitals, either of their own accord or referred by their 
general practitioner as reported by Scotton and Ferber (1980) and Britt et al 
(2013), and as was observed in this study.  
An increase in the number of patients presenting to an Emergency Department 
for treatment of their clinical condition was found. In spite of the absolute 
increase in patients, the majority of whom were clinically assessed and treated in 
a timely way, a consistent pattern was observed. Between 60 and 70 per cent of 
patients left the Emergency Department after treatment, and about 35 per cent 
required admission to hospital. Of all those admitted to hospital with COAD, 
diabetes or cellulitis, over 70 per cent were coded as ‘eligible’ to receive their 
treatment in a setting other than as an inpatient in an acute hospital. 
Nevertheless, these patients were admitted to hospital.  
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There is nothing to suggest that these patterns of presentation and clinical 
management will not continue. The consequence is that, as more patients 
attend Emergency Departments for treatment, a greater absolute number will 
be admitted, thus creating additional demand for more public hospital beds, 
staff and goods and services, and therefore, an increase in hospital 
expenditure. The increased demand for beds will place pressure on clinicians 
to reduce the length of a patient’s hospital stay.  
Analysis of lengths of stay showed that there was a decline in the duration of 
the stay of patients with COAD, diabetes, and cellulitis coded to the ‘eligible’ 
category in many of the ABF hospitals in both Local Health Districts. However, 
over the period 2009 to 2013, only three hospitals showed a trend of decline 
in the length of stay of patients which was consistent across all three clinical 
conditions: Auburn Hospital (Western Sydney), and Armidale and Calvary 
Mater Hospitals (Hunter New England).  
There is, of course, some financial advantage in reducing the duration of a 
patient’s hospital stay, as was demonstrated by the use of the PARI in this 
thesis. Fewer resources are required for a shorter stay, which also has the 
potential to increase throughput (i.e., the absolute number of patients admitted 
and discharged). If a shorter patient stay enables another patient to be 
admitted, that admission will generate another item of ABF revenue for the 
hospital. There are two potential implications of shorter hospital stays. For 
interest groups who rely on public hospitals for their employment, there is a 
disincentive to take any action that will enable the treatment of patients to 
occur in a setting other than that of an acute hospital. At the same time, there 
is an incentive to reduce the duration of patient stays in order to maximise 
revenue and minimise expenditure. Thus, not only does ABF contain no 
incentive for the publicly-funded health system to treat ‘eligible’ patients 
outside hospital, but it contains perverse incentives for ‘professional 
monopolies’ or ‘corporate monopolists’ working in public hospitals not to do 
so.  
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Some health administrators and policy-makers might present the increase in 
the number of admissions and a decline in the patient length of stays as the 
achievement of greater economic and technical efficiency, but this is not the 
case. The more people who attend an Emergency Department or are admitted 
to hospital, with a condition that could be treated elsewhere, the greater are 
the avoidable costs, i.e., costs that were unnecessarily incurred in that 
hospital care, as was pointed out by Duckett et al 2014. 
Additionally, the consumers of health services (’repressed structural interests’) 
expect that their treating doctor will provide them with the best possible care, 
regardless of cost. Thus, on the one hand, doctors (‘professional monopolists) 
are being trained to put patients’ clinical needs at the centre of the care they 
provide, and to be the patients’ agents in their quest for a good health 
outcome. On the other hand, doctors are asked by hospital administrators to 
provide the most efficient care possible by curbing expenditure (Niessen et al 
2000; Hollingsworth & Peacock 2008). In response to these competing 
priorities at a micro level, doctors continue to provide the best clinical care for 
patients, leaving the responsibility for the implementation of any new policy 
directive to administrators and managers of health services (‘corporate 
monopolists’) (Leeder 1999).  
These factors make the containment of costs a challenge. The main drivers of 
expenditure that contribute to the escalation of the cost of running a hospital, 
are the continuation of the traditional role and function of public hospitals, 
coupled with little administrative control over doctors’ clinical decision-making. 
This challenge is not being met by managers and administrators, who 
continue to seek the greatest possible share of the public funding for their 
sector of the health system, as they always have. Additionally, these 
‘corporate monopolists’ are resistant to changing their current practices if 
change means a loss of inpatient beds (to which their salary and prestige is 
often pegged). Conversely, they will support changes which result in 
additional beds.  
Conclusion and implementations 
- 188 - 
 
Other ‘professional monopolies’, such as trade unions, welcome changes that 
will result in attracting new members but, they too remain resistant to any 
change that impacts negatively on their membership. The same 
considerations apply to the community in general, who recognise that the 
more beds in the local hospital, the greater are the opportunities for 
employment for members of their community. Finally, universities and other 
education and training institutions, who rely on public hospitals as a venue for 
the training and education of their students, welcome expansion in these 
facilities. As reported by Hollingsworth and Boyer (1997) and Evans et al 
(2006) the professional and economic survival of those interest groups who 
rely on public hospitals for their employment, or who benefit most from the 
current model of health service delivery, have a vested interest in the model 
remaining relatively unchanged. It is concluded that, at a micro level, not only 
has ABF had no impact on the current model of the delivery of public hospital 
services, but the current model is likely to remain unchanged.  
This leads to the implications of the finding at a meso level, which is about 
the passage of legislation and its associated regulations and health policies. 
Governments use these mechanisms to implement change and/or to have 
influence in the health market. Medicare (and ABF), the PBS, the TGA, PHI, 
are health policies that govern the provision of health care in Australia, all of 
which have common characteristics. The objectives stated for each are 
normative, and none have been evaluated to determine its benefit in terms of 
public-good. Embedded in all of these policies is the implicit support of 
government for greater involvement of the private sector in the provision of 
health-related goods and/or services; a neoliberal phenomenon that has been 
reported by both Stilwell (2011) and Spies-Butcher (2014). While all these 
health policies enable the private sector to have legitimate access to taxpayer 
dollars, the private health insurance industry stands out because it has been 
so heavily subsidised by government grants, with the objective of creating 
competition. In contrast, the policies of the PBS and the TGA, were 
formulated mainly (but not entirely) to contain expenditure, and at the same 
time to provide some benefit to the public-good.  
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The characteristics described above are also evident in the NH Reform, which 
contains two very different strategies. The aim of one strategy is to achieve 
greater efficiency in public hospitals through the implementation of the ABF 
policy. The aim of the other strategy is to increase the level of health service 
infrastructure in the community through the creation of public-private 
partnerships, with the overall intention of enabling more health care to be 
provided in the community. Local Hospital Networks and Medicare Local 
services are expected to work together, but communication barriers exist 
between these entities, which hinder any change in clinical practice. In 
hospitals, clinicians report to clinical managers, while operational staff report 
to corporate managers. Community-based services have different reporting 
arrangements as do services provided under Medicare Locals, and, as 
reported by Hancock (1999), coordination of services across these groups 
remains a challenge. For example, the failure of the Community Health 
Program to reduce ‘institutionalisation, or provide a saving in health care 
costs’ has be attributed to the tension between health service providers 
(Hancock 1999, p. 173). Yet, to meet some of the objectives of ABF, 
coordination and communication among these various service providers is a 
necessary prerequisite.  
The conclusion drawn in this thesis is that neither of these strategies/policies 
have achieved their intended goal, and the outcome of their implementation 
combined, provide the condition for the introduction of further ‘programs of 
market-oriented reform’ (Peck 2010). For example, The Hon. Julian Skinner 
MP, NSW Minister for Health and Minister for Health Research, announced 
recently the intent to privatise some NSW public hospitals (Media Release, 15 
September 2016). Further, in the 2014-15 budget papers, the Commonwealth 
government has pulled back from the previous Gillard Labor government 
commitment to increase the Commonwealth’s share of the growth in public 
hospital funding, which was reported by Bundey (2014). More recently in a 
Productivity Commission Report (2015) it was stated that, after July 2017, 
when the Commonwealth and States sign the new National Health 
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Agreement, the Commonwealth funding share to the States will be linked to 
population growth and the Consumer Price Index.  
These statements have created a level of uncertainty about the future funding 
of public hospitals. One of the incentives for States to sign the NH Reform 
Agreement (2011) was to share the risk of the increasing cost of running 
public hospitals with the Commonwealth. The National Health Agreement will 
be re-negotiated in 2017 but, in the interim, public hospitals, Local Health 
Districts, and the NSW Ministry of Health, are required to continue to meet 
the objectives of the original Agreement, and ABF remains the official 
mechanism by which funding is provided to public hospital services (Bundey 
2014).  
It is anticipated that the changes to the arrangements for the funding of public 
hospital services is likely to put further pressure on hospitals, in particular on 
their capacity to provide timely services. If this occurs, more consumers will 
be forced to seek health services in the private sector, which will require them 
to have private health insurance. Alternatively, they will be required to meet 
more of their health care costs from their own pocket. The implication is that, 
as less funding becomes available, public hospitals will not have the 
resources to continue to provide the level of service which is currently 
provided. In spite of this concern, and the growing doubt that a funding model 
based on the use of AR-DRGs will improve the efficiency of hospitals, in the 
long-term, Duckett (2007) and other health policy commentators, continue to 
commend the value of using ABF to fund hospital services (Hancock 1999). 
Eventually, as foreshadowed by Johnson (2011b, p. 283) and Spies-Butcher 
(2014) this will lead to public hospital services being ‘hollowed-out’ in the long-
term.  
However this outcome would only be achieved if comparable services were 
available in the private sector. The second major strategy embedded in the 
NH Reform is the development of public-private partnerships to provide the 
necessary infrastructure to meet the anticipated increase in demand for 
health services located in the community. These non-hospital health service 
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providers are encouraged by government to improve their capacity to support 
people, particularly those living with chronic conditions, to achieve and 
maintain good health in the community.  
These services are paid for by government grants, and through the Medicare 
Benefits Schedule, which is a list of the health services that can be provided 
in the private sector. Reimbursement for services provided is then claimed 
from Medicare, on a fee-for-service basis. Over-servicing and cost-shifting 
are unintended consequences of this model of funding, which were known to 
policy makers prior to the introduction of the NH Reform. These 
consequences are now being addressed. In response to the over-servicing by 
some service providers working in the private sector (and other outcomes), 
the Federal Health Minister, the Hon. Sussan Ley, M.P., recently announced 
a review of the Medical Benefits Schedule. However, this Review is clearly 
not designed to make any substantial contribution to removing the now well-
known structural (and cultural) impediments to improving the health of the 
public (DoH 2015).The Terms of Reference (2015) of the review are limited to 
some moderate housekeeping (removing some items from the Schedules 
and including others).  
Another recent decision of the Commonwealth government was to replace 
the 61 Medicare Locals (established through public-private partnerships) with 
30 Primary Care Networks. This change in policy is an indication that these 
partnerships might have failed in their ability to support the objectives outlined 
in the NH Reform (PC 2015). As illustrated by the history of Medicare, such 
incremental change creates an unproductive cycle of change in policy, which 
does not address the underlying defects that undermined it originally, and 
thus the status quo is reinforced. 
These policy decisions have raised suspicion that the current government is 
attempting to change the ratio of public to private services. In so doing it is 
shifting more of the costs of health care from the taxpayer to the consumer, 
rather than obtaining efficiency in the provision of health services, or 
providing a sustainable public-good (Bundey 2014; Chester 2014). This 
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suspicion is fuelled by legislation that allows private providers to charge a co-
payment for the provision of health services, which is not covered by the 
Medicare rebate, as was reported by Baker (2014). 
Today taxpayer dollars flow easily from the public to the private sector under 
neoliberal health policies. About $100 billion of taxpayer dollars are spent 
each year on providing health care, which is distributed by a number of 
agencies, governed by regulations and health policies. The Medicare Benefits 
Schedule enables grants and subsidies to flow to the private sector unabated. 
The private health insurance industry costs the taxpayer $5.5 billion annually, 
and the cost to the taxpayer of the PBS is estimated to be an annual $8.8 
billion. The more taxpayer dollars that flow to the private sector, the less are 
available to provide publicly-owned and operated health services, or the 
infrastructure necessary to support the continuum of care for patients when 
they are discharged from hospital.  
The above examples demonstrate that while the Government continues to 
support a greater involvement of the private sector in the provision of health 
services, it has only limited influence in managing service providers whose 
decision-making is based on a profit motive. In terms of the hierarchy of 
interests operating at a meso level, little has changed since Alford (1975) first 
identified interest groups within the health system. What has changed since 
1975 is that there is now a greater interest by, and involvement of the interest 
groups that operate multi-national companies globally, and the growing 
influence of these companies has increased their ability to secure, both from 
their home state and other governments, policies that consistently meet their 
own business objectives. 
The implication of the rise of these ‘corporate monopolists’ and their 
increasing dominance in the health market globally (the macro level) is that, 
these companies now operate ‘global supply chains’ for the supply of health 
service infrastructure (e.g., medical technology) and other health-related 
goods and services (e.g., pharmaceuticals and diagnostic services). 
Additionally, these companies have been successful in establishing a 
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relationship with government in their home state, which not only favours the 
accumulation of capital which these states gain through taxation revenue, but 
it has enabled them to gain and/or maintain their influence in the health 
market.  
Australia does not benefit greatly as a beneficiary of tax revenue from this 
source. As reported by Gardner (1996) Australia no longer has a strong 
manufacturing industry for health-related infrastructure and goods and 
services. Thus Australia is increasingly dependent on the importation of these 
necessary items. The dependence on imports, coupled with the continued 
support of these multi-national companies by the Australian government, has 
limited the government’s capacity to meet its obligation to provide public-good 
for its citizens. This interdependence between government and multi-national 
companies is likely also to hinder the development of a strong domestic 
industry for the production of those items which, if allowed to flourish, would 
enable more of the health dollar to remain and circulate in Australia. 
The former Prime Minister, Tony Abbott, demonstrated his Government’s 
priority support for these companies when he stated that he was not opposed 
to the use of an Investor-State Disputes Settlement clause in Free Trade 
Agreements. This clause is used effectively by multi-national companies to 
protect their market share globally. An example reported by Ranald (2014) is 
the Philip Morris Tobacco Company’s pending legal challenge, in which it is 
seeking to overturn the Australian government’s legislation which mandates 
plain packaging of cigarettes. The current Conservation Coalition 
Government has also agreed to the inclusion in the Trans-Pacific Partnership 
Agreement, of an extension of the life of patents (Legge et al 2014). The 
outcomes of this decision was reported by Legge et al (2014) to benefit large 
multi-national pharmaceutical companies (and their home state), but to delay 
the availability of cheaper medications to Australian citizens. 
The concept of competitive advantage underpins Free Trade Agreements, 
which West (2011) has reported have, in the past, been used to focus 
economic development in Australia on the exploitation (and export) of its 
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natural resources such as coal, while other industries were neglected. Ranald 
(2014) and Legge et al (2014) have both pointed out the folly of this approach 
when they reported that free trade agreements support the global market, and 
undermine the power of the state to protect its own domestic market. Other 
authors, such as George (2013) went further to claim that trade agreements 
are underpinned by neoliberal ideology, which has been described by David 
Harvey (2012, p. 6) in an interview as a ‘project of class power’. Neoliberal 
ideology is known to result in negative outcomes for everyone, except the 
wealthy individuals and powerful corporations which operate globally (George 
2013). The implication is that, increasingly, multi-national companies will 
dominate the global supply of health-related, and other goods and services, 
aided and abetted by their home state, as was reported by Legge, et al (2014, 
p. 113). Mikler (2012) has argued that these influences will ultimately change 
the role of the state. While Galbraith (2011) contended that the likely result of 
the increasing influence of multi-national companies is that, the state’s 
legislation and its associated regulations and health policies, are likely to 
become ineffective in enabling it to maintain any influence in what is now a 
global health market. 
Unlike publicly-funded health services, which have been paralysed by 
constant policy change, private sector services have been able to maintain 
their policy focus and corporate knowledge. This has enabled many 
companies to be opportunistic when there is a change in government, and for 
them to resist any change in public policy that may detract from their market 
share. Multi-national companies will continue to operate in this way, as long 
as governments continue to support them in ways which not only enable them 
to access public monies globally, but which weaken the bargaining power of 
customer states in their providing public-good (Mikler 2012; Spies-Butcher 
2014).  
Suffice to say that the existence of a global health market, which favours 
investment that provide quick returns, has had a profound effect on the ability 
of government to reform the health system, even if it were committed to 
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achieving this as an outcome of its health policies (Galbraith (2011). Coriat 
and Weinstein (2005) have argued that, this health market is based on a 
social system of production. Here, power is institutionalized in the structure of 
society, and the values held in society are embedded in regulations and 
health policy decisions, which change (to varying degree) depending on 
which political party is in power. In this market, as reported by Swiercz and 
Skipper (1982), the impediments that must be overcome for health reform to 
be successful remain those associated with the culture and activities of the 
vested interest groups. Given the influence of all these interests and interest 
groups, and their alliances with government, it is hard to see how the 
implementation of the most recent NH Reform and its policy of ABF could 
have been successful in achieving its policy objectives.  
The result of these dynamics has been reported widely, and the conclusion is 
that, regardless of the need to change the current health system to meet the 
health needs of the population, publicly-funded health services, as a 
commodity, are likely to remain stationary, or to change only very slowly. This 
is in spite of growing public dissatisfaction with the current health system, 
which was claimed by Richardson (2005) to have placed avoidable financial 
and human costs on the community. In other words, as Anderson (1968) has 
reported, the health system possesses remarkable resilience, in spite of 
attempts to change it.  
The ‘professional monopolies’ remain the most dominant interest group in the 
current health system, while ‘corporate rationalisers’ are less dominant. 
Consumers and others (‘repressed structural interests’) remain those least 
dominant in the health system, as was the case in 1975. It is predicted that 
the ability of ‘corporate monopolists’ to influence governments (and their 
formulation of public health policy) will, now and in the future, challenge all 
other interest groups, including the state, and will become the most dominant 
influence in the health market globally. 
The question as to the degree to which, there has been a ‘hollowing-out’ of 
public hospital services in Australia, given the Government’s commitment to 
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neoliberalism and the rise of multi-national companies, and whether, as a 
result, the state will lose its influence in the health market globally, are 
subjects worthy of future research. 
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Appendices 
Appendix A: Emergency Department Triage Categories 
Triage 
Category 
Description 
 
1 
 
Resuscitation – People who need to have treatment 
immediately or within two minutes are categorised as having 
an immediately life-threatening condition.  People in this 
group are critically ill and require immediate attention. Most 
would have arrived in Emergency Department by Ambulance. 
They would probably be suffering from a critical injury or 
cardiac arrest. 
 
2 
 
Emergency – People who need to have treatment within 10 
minutes are categorised as having an imminently life-
threatening condition.  People in this group suffer from a 
critical illness or are in very severe pain. People with serious 
chest pains, difficulty in breathing and severe fractures are 
included in this group. 
 
3 
 
Urgent – People who need to have treatment within 30 
minutes are categorised as having a potentially life-
threatening condition.  People in this group suffer from severe 
illness, bleed heavily from cuts, have major fractures, or be 
dehydrated. 
 
4 
 
Semi-Urgent – People who need to have treatment within one 
hour are categorised as having a potentially serious 
condition.  People in this group have less severe symptoms or 
injuries, such as a foreign body in the eye, sprained ankle, 
migraine or earache 
 
5 
 
Non-Urgent – People who need to have treatment within two 
hours are categorised as having a less urgent condition. 
People in this group have minor illnesses or symptoms that 
may have been present for more than a week, such as rashes 
or minor aches and pains. 
Source: MoH 2015b.  
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Appendix B: ICD10d1 codes for each selected clinical condition in the 
Hunter New England Local Health District, Emergency 
Department 
Disease ICD10d1 Code Description 
COAD J44.0 
chronic obstructive pulmonary disease with acute 
exacerbation, unspecified 
 J44.1 
chronic obstructive pulmonary disease with acute 
exacerbation, unspecified 
 J44.8 
other specified chronic obstructive pulmonary 
disease 
 J44.9 
chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, unspecified 
 J98.9 respiratory disorder unspecified  
   
Diabetes E16.2 hyperglycaemia, unspecified 
 E23.2 diabetic insipidus 
 E10.11  insulin dependent diabetes mellitus with 
ketoacidosis stated as uncontrolled 
   
Cellulitis L03.01 cellulitis of finger 
 L03.03 cellulitis of toe 
 L03.9 cellulitis unspecified 
 L03.10 cellulitis  
 L03.11 cellulitis of other parts of limb 
 L03.221 cellulitis of neck 
 L03.211 cellulitis of face 
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 L03.81 cellulitis of other sites 
 L03.31 cellulitis of trunk 
Source: MoH 2013. 
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Appendix C: SNOMED-CT codes for each selected clinical condition in 
the Western Sydney Local Health District Emergency 
Department 
Disease SNOMED-CT 
Code 
Description 
COAD 13645005 chronic obstructive lung disease (disorder) 
 285381006 acute infective exacerbation of chronic 
obstructive airways disease (disorder) 
   
Diabetes 80394007 hyperglycomia 
 402864004 diabetic wet gangrene of the foot 
 302866003 hypoglycemia  
 237598005 hyperglycemic disorder 
 33747003 glucose measurements 
 420422005 ketoacidosis in diabetes mellitus 
 237623001 acute hyperglycaemia 
   
Cellulitis 128045006 cellulitis (disorder) 
 385627004 cellulitis (morphologic abnormality) 
 238402004 cellulitis of leg (disorder) 
 109245003 cellulitis of periorbital region (disorder) 
 13301002 cellulitis of knee (disorder) 
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 200682008 cellulitis and abscess of ankle 
 200630006 cellulitis and abscess of finger  
 59883002 cellulitis of abdominal wall 
 62837005 cellulitis and abscess of leg 
 75817003 cellulitis of breast 
 267782008 cellulitis and abscess of leg 
Source: MoH 2013.  
 
